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I.INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 caused the most severe global
economic downturn since the Great Depression. 1 The financial
disruption that triggered the Great Recession began in the United
States and spread to financial markets around the world, just as the
financial contagion that began on Wall Street in October 1929 spread
through foreign markets in the early 1930s.2
The recent crisis has generated renewed interest in the GlassSteagall Banking Act of 1933,3 which Congress adopted in response to
the collapse of the U.S. banking system and the freezing of U.S.
capital markets during the Great Depression.4 Glass-Steagall included
provisions that were designed to stabilize the U.S. financial system by
separating commercial banks from the capital markets and by
prohibiting nonbanks from accepting deposits.5 As described in this
1

BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE
GREAT RECESSION, AND THE USES – AND MISUSES – OF HISTORY 1 (2015)
(describing "the Great Recession of 2008–09 and the Great Depression of 1930–33"
as "the two great financial crises of our age"); see also Benjamin S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Swearing-In Ceremony Remarks (Feb. 3, 2010),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100203a.htm
(referring to the financial crisis of 2007–09 as "the deepest financial crisis since the
Great Depression").
2
ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 168–70, 409–28 (2013) (explaining how the
global financial crisis of 2008-09 began in America and spread to Europe);
EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that financial crises began in America
and spread to Europe during both the Great Depression and the Great Recession).
3
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (including provisions repealed in
1999).
4
See EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 66; see also BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE
CRASH AND ITS AFTERMATH: A HISTORY OF SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1929–1933 (1985) (explaining generally the breakdown of the U.S. banking
system and capital markets between 1930 and 1933); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did
Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s Boom-and-Bust
Cycle of 1921–33? A Preliminary Assessment, 4 CURRENT DEV. IN MONETARY &
FIN. L. 559, 559–60, 564–68 (2005) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Universal Banks in the
1920s]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Prelude to Glass-Steagall: Abusive Securities
Practices by National City Bank and Chase National Bank During the “Roaring
Twenties”, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1285, 1289, 1301–03, 1322–26 (2016) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Prelude to Glass-Steagall].
5
Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall prohibited commercial banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System (member banks) from affiliating with
securities firms or sharing directors, officers, or employees with securities firms.
Banking Act of 1933 §§ 20, 32. Sections 5(c) and 16 of Glass-Steagall barred
member banks from underwriting or dealing in securities, except for specified
categories of "bank-eligible" securities, such as U.S. government securities and state
continued . . .
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article, a series of rulings by federal agencies and courts during the
1980s and 1990s undermined Glass-Steagall's structural barriers, and
Congress repealed the most important provisions of Glass-Steagall in
1999 by passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).6
Since the financial crisis, there has been a lively debate on the
question of whether the removal of Glass-Steagall's structural barriers
promoted the unsustainable and toxic credit bubble that led to the
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Some authors have argued that GlassSteagall's repeal was an important factor that helped to fuel the
financial crisis, while others have contended that Glass-Steagall's
disappearance did not contribute to the crisis in any significant way.7
This article sheds further light on that debate by describing GlassSteagall's positive impact on the stability of the U.S. financial system
from World War II through the 1970s and the adverse consequences of
Glass-Steagall's disappearance.
and local bonds, which were lawful for underwriting or investment by national
banks. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 5(c), 16. Section 21 forbade securities firms and
other nonbanking firms from accepting deposits. Banking Act of 1933 § 21. For
detailed discussions of these provisions, see DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN
MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41181, PERMISSIBLE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF
COMMERCIAL BANKS UNDER THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT (GSA) AND THE GRAMMLEACH-BLILEY ACT (GLBA) 5–7 (2010); MELANIE FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF
BANKS §§ 1.02, 4 (3d ed. 2002).
6
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
7
For commentaries supporting the view that Glass-Steagall's demise helped to
promote the toxic credit bubble that triggered the financial crisis, see EICHENGREEN,
supra note 1, at 8–9, 69–70; Douglas M. Branson, A Return to Old-Time Religion?
The Glass-Steagall Act, the Volcker Rule, Limits on Proprietary Trading, and
Sustainability, 11 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L.J. 359, 360–61, 367–69 (2014); Carolyn
Sissoko, The Plight of Modern Markets: How Universal Banking Undermines
Capital Markets, 46 ECON. NOTES 53, 58, 88–90 (2017); Martin Mayer, GlassSteagall in Our Future: How Straight, How Narrow 5–6 (Networks Fin. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2009-PB-07, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505488; Yeva
Nersisyan, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Reserve’s
Extraordinary Intervention during the Global Financial Crisis 2–4, 8, 21–22 (Levy
Econ. Inst. Of Bard C., Working Paper No. 829, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554066. Contra Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis –
A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 UNIV.
PENN. J. BUS. L 1081, 1082 (2010); Lawrence J. White, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act: A Bridge Too Far? Or Not Far Enough?, 18 SUFFOLK L. REV. 937, 937–38
(2010); Peter J. Wallison, Did the ‘Repeal’ of Glass-Steagall Have Any Role in the
Financial Crisis? Not Guilty; Not Even Close 2–3 (Networks Inst. Pub. Policy Brief,
Working Paper 2009-PB-09, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507803; Paul G.
Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis 1 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 2957801, 2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2957801. See also Wilmarth, Prelude to Glass-Steagall,
supra note 4, at 1287–88, 1329 (describing broader public debates about the repeal
of Glass-Steagall and proposals for its reinstatement).
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As Part II.A of this article explains, the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)8 helped to maintain the
stability of the banking industry and capital markets from World War
II through the 1970s. Domestic and international developments began
to challenge the post-New Deal system of financial regulation in the
1970s, but the structural barriers established by Glass-Steagall and
BHCA maintained a significant degree of separation between
commercial banks and other financial sectors until Congress removed
those barriers in 1999.9 Glass-Steagall and BHCA limited the risks of
contagion across the banking, securities, and insurance industries,
thereby helping to ensure that problems arising in one sector would
not spill over into other sectors.10
As discussed in Part II.B, large banks and nonbank financial
institutions opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall and BHCA after 1980
by persuading federal regulators to approve limited exceptions to their
structural prohibitions. During the 1980s and 1990s, federal banking
agencies and courts adopted creative statutory interpretations that
enabled banks to engage in capital market activities and allowed
nonbank financial institutions to offer bank-like products, including
substitutes for deposits. 11 The collective impact of those rulings
eroded Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's barriers by permitting
commercial banks to behave more like securities firms and insurance
companies, and by allowing nonbank financial institutions to behave
more like banks.
Part II.B highlights three of the most significant ways in which
federal agencies and courts undercut Glass-Steagall and BHCA. First,
nonbank financial institutions were allowed to fund their operations by
offering short-term financial instruments that were redeemable at par
and served as functional substitutes for deposits. 12 Those "shadow
banking" instruments included money market mutual funds,
8

See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–52 (2012).
Branson, supra note 7, at 368.
10
See infra Part II.A.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 66–68; ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD
BANKS DO? 34–35 (1987); JEFF MADRICK, THE AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF
FINANCE AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT 97–98 (2011);
Timothy Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds and Other
Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 156–59,
164–67 (Timothy Q. Cook and Robert K. LaRoche eds., 7th ed. 1993) (discussing
emergence and regulation of MMMFs); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, AUTHORIZED EDITION: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES 29–30, 33 (2011) [hereinafter FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N
(2011)].
9
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commercial paper, and securities repurchase agreements (repos). 13
The largest commercial banks also began to rely significantly on
"shadow bank deposits" after they were allowed to establish securities
affiliates beginning in 1987.14
Second, banks received permission to convert their consumer and
commercial loans into asset-backed securities through the process of
securitization.15 Third, banks gained authority to become dealers in
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, which provided synthetic
substitutes for securities, exchange-traded options and futures, and
insurance. 16 Shadow banking, securitization, and OTC derivatives
helped to weaken Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's walls, which formerly
separated banks from the securities and insurance industries. In
addition, all three innovations were leading catalysts for the
destructive credit bubble that led to the financial crisis of 2007-2009.17
As described in Part III, big banks were not satisfied with the
limited victories they achieved by opening loopholes in Glass-Steagall
and BHCA. The big-bank lobby and its allies launched a prolonged
campaign in the 1980s and 1990s to repeal Glass-Steagall's and
BHCA's provisions that restricted banks from expanding across state
lines and prevented banks from establishing full-scale affiliations with
securities firms and insurance companies. 18 In 1991, the U.S.
Treasury Department issued a landmark report, which called for the
removal of state-law restrictions on interstate banking and branching
as well as the repeal of Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation
rules.19 Congress adopted Treasury's plan for nationwide banking and
branching by enacting the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) in 1994.20 Ambitious bank
executives quickly created giant megabanks, which were eager to
13

See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra notes 133, 136–37 and accompanying text.
15
See infra Part II.B.2.
16
Russell J. Funk & Daniel Hirschman, Derivatives and Deregulation:
Financial Innovation and the Demise of Glass-Steagall, 59 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 669,
697 (2014); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011); see also infra Part II.B.3.
17
See infra notes 129–44, 242–56, 343–65 and accompanying text.
18
EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 69–70; Sissoko, supra note 7, at 76; White,
supra note 7, at 941; Robert Scheer, Privacy Issue Bubbles Beneath the Photo Op,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at B9; see infra Part III.A.
19
See generally U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS, 49–61
(1991) (recommending legislation authorizing interstate banking and repealing the
anti-affiliation rules of Glass-Steagall and BHCA).
20
See generally Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
14
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expand their activities in the securities and insurance sectors. 21
Securities firms and insurance companies abandoned their
longstanding defense of Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's structural
barriers after they realized that they could no longer counteract the
growing political influence of the largest banks. 22 However,
community banks and independent insurance agents continued to
block efforts by the largest financial institutions to remove those
barriers between 1995 and 1997.23
In 1998, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) placed great pressure on
Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation rules
by approving a merger between Travelers, a large insurance and
securities conglomerate, and Citicorp, the largest U.S. bank.24 That
merger created Citigroup, the first "universal bank" to operate in the
United States since the 1930s. 25 President Bill Clinton, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin, and Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan endorsed
the creation of Citigroup, even though it was contrary to the clear
intent of Glass-Steagall and BHCA.26
Citigroup and other large financial institutions spearheaded a
massive lobbying campaign that finally persuaded Congress to adopt
GLBA in 1999.27 GLBA authorized the creation of financial holding
companies that could own banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies, thereby confirming the validity of Citigroup's universal
banking strategy.28 As I argued in an article published in 2002, GLBA
made the "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) problem "much worse" by
21

See infra notes 510–18, 536–37 and accompanying text.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and
Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 73–75 (2002) [hereinafter Wilmarth,
Citigroup]; see also infra notes 541–43 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 539–40 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 544–57 and accompanying text.
25
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, 220 (2002) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Transformation]. As used in this
article, the term "universal bank" means a banking organization that can engage,
either directly or through affiliates, in a broad array of banking, securities, and
insurance activities. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "bank" includes both
chartered banks and bank holding companies (including their subsidiaries and
affiliates). Id. at 223 n.23.
26
See infra notes 550–59 and accompanying text.
27
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified in scattered versions of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see infra notes 562, 580–
82 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying campaign that led to the passage
of GLBA).
28
GLBA § 101, 113 Stat. 1341 (repealing §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall);
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 219–21, 306–07 (describing the impact
of GLBA).
22
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expanding the scope of the federal "safety net" for banks to cover "the
entire financial services industry."29
The twenty-year campaign by big banks to destroy the barriers that
separated them from the capital markets culminated in Congress'
enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in
2000. 30 CFMA authorized large financial institutions to offer a
complex array of OTC derivatives without any substantive regulation
by federal or state authorities.31 GLBA and CFMA both ratified and
significantly expanded the deregulatory measures that federal
authorities had implemented on an incremental, piecemeal basis
during the 1980s and 1990s.32 By providing legal certainty for those
measures and expanding their scope, Congress validated a new regime
of regulatory laxity that enabled giant financial conglomerates to
operate with relatively few constraints. Those financial conglomerates
led the way in financing the toxic credit boom that triggered the
financial crisis of 2007-2009.33
This article contends that Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA were
highly consequential laws because they (i) allowed large banks to
become much bigger and more complex, and to undertake a much
wider array of high-risk activities, (ii) permitted securities firms and
insurance companies to offer bank-like products (including deposit
substitutes), and (iii) provided a blueprint for light-tough supervision
of large financial institutions.34 All of those factors helped to fuel the
29

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 444–51, 474–75; see also
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV
963, 1049–50 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking]. At
the time of the financial crisis, the federal "safety net" for banks consisted of federal
deposit insurance, the Fed's role as "lender of last resort" in providing emergency
loans to troubled banks through its discount window, and the Fed's guarantee of
interbank payments made on Fedwire. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the
Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1588 n.284 (2007)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce].
30
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000); see infra notes 746–56 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of
CFMA).
31
Letter from Lynn A. Stout, Professor, Univ. of Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law, to
Comm. on Agric., Forestry, and Nutrition 1, 2 (June 4, 2009), available at
https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/testimony_stout.pdf; see infra
notes 750–52 and accompanying text (describing the impact of CFMA).
32
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving
in to Wall Street, 81 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1360 (2013) [hereinafter Wilmarth,
Turning a Blind Eye]; see infra Parts III.C and III.D.
33
Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 968–72, 1002–
50.
34
EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 69–73; see infra Part IV (discussing the
continued . . .
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destructive credit boom of the early 2000s. Accordingly, I disagree
with commentators who argue that those laws did not have any
significant connection to the financial crisis.
As discussed in the Conclusion, this article does not include
detailed recommendations for proposed reforms to address the
problems created by Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA. I have
discussed possible reforms in previous work, and I plan to develop a
more detailed set of potential reforms in future work. At a minimum,
as the Conclusion indicates, those reforms should (i) shrink the
shadow banking system by prohibiting nonbanks from offering deposit
substitutes, and (ii) establish a regime of strict separation between
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-insured banks and the
capital markets. The second reform should include a prohibition that
bars FDIC-insured banks from entering into derivatives except for
those that create bona fide hedges against risk exposures arising out of
traditional banking activities.
II.GLASS-STEAGALL AND BHCA HELPED TO MAINTAIN POSTWAR
FINANCIAL STABILITY BUT WERE UNDERMINED BY THE FINANCIAL
INDUSTRY AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
Glass-Steagall and BHCA contributed to the stability of the
financial system after World War II. 35 However, large U.S. banks
resented the restrictions imposed on them by Glass-Steagall's and
BHCA's structural barriers. 36 During the 1980s and 1990s, federal
regulators opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall and BHCA by allowing
banks and nonbank financial institutions to create short-term
nondeposit liabilities, to engage in securitization, and to develop OTC
derivatives. 37 In combination, those regulatory loopholes helped to
undermine the post-New Deal system of financial regulation.38
A. The Structural Barriers Established by Glass-Steagall and
BHCA Helped to Preserve Financial Stability by Preventing
Contagious Spillovers of Risks and Losses among the Banking,
Securities, and Insurance Sectors
In adopting the Glass-Steagall Act and other Depression-era
statutes, Congress sought to prevent a recurrence of the Great
collective impact of Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA).
35
See infra Part II.A.
36
See infra Part III.A.
37
Markham, supra note 7, at 1095–1103; White, supra note 7, at 940–41.
38
See infra Part II.B.
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Depression by establishing a stable financial system comprised of
separate and compartmentalized financial markets.39 Congress barred
banks from participating in speculative activities in the capital
markets, and Congress required banks to focus on their traditional
roles of accepting deposits, making loans to consumers and
businesses, providing fiduciary services, and investing in low-risk
government securities.40 To deter banks from pursuing nontraditional
banking activities, the Glass-Steagall Act barred the Fed from making
loans to banks through its discount window if those loans would
enable banks to finance speculative activities in the capital markets.41
At the same time, Congress prohibited nonbanks from accepting
deposits, to prevent nonbanks from engaging in the banking
business. 42 Congress wanted to ensure that the Fed would not be
forced "to rescue speculators to save depositors."43
Congress took further steps to bolster the stability of the banking
system. First, Congress established a system of federal deposit
insurance to discourage destructive "runs" by depositors on banks.44
Second, Congress tried to stop what it viewed as destructive
competition between banks. 45 To accomplish that goal, the GlassSteagall Act prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits
(checking accounts) and required the Fed to adopt a rule (Regulation
Q) that would limit the interest rates banks could pay on their
certificates of deposit, savings accounts, and other time deposits. 46
39

Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1564–65;
Wilmarth, Universal Banks in the 1920s, supra note 4, at 564–68, 588–91, 611.
40
LITAN, supra note 12, at 25–35; See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note
25, at 225–30, 254–57; see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 1
(discussing Glass-Steagall's provisions that separated banks from capital markets
activities).
41
Banking Act of 1933, §§ 3(a), 9, 11(a), 48 Stat. 163, 180–81 (1933);
Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems, S. REP. NO. 73-77,
at 9, 15, 17 (1933). Section 11(a) of the statute barred member banks from
encouraging speculation in securities by acting as "the medium or agent" for loans
made by nonbank firms to securities brokers or dealers backed by stocks, bonds, or
"other investment securities." 48 Stat. 181.
42
See Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 48 Stat. 189.
43
RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY
AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 374–75 (1990).
44
Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. 168; S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 11–12, 14
(1933); see also RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21 (5th ed. 2017) (stating that federal deposit insurance
"proved remarkably successful at preventing runs" on FDIC-insured banks).
45
Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73–66, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 181; S. REP. NO. 73–
77, at 15; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 29.
46
Id.; see also MADRICK, supra note 12, at 13 ("The fear was that competition
for deposits would drive rates up and encourage banks to make risky investments to
continued . . .
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Congress also maintained limits on geographic expansion by banks, as
Congress allowed national banks to establish branches only within
their home state and only to the extent that branching was permissible
for state banks under state law.47
In 1956, Congress enacted the BHCA to reinforce Glass-Steagall's
policy of maintaining separate and decentralized financial markets.48
The BHCA was enacted in response to the rapid growth and
diversification of Transamerica and other large bank holding
companies after World War II.49 By 1956, Transamerica "controlled
banks in ten states as well as several insurance companies and
commercial businesses engaged in oil and gas development, fish
canning and processing, frozen foods, and a variety of manufacturing
ventures."50
BHCA required holding companies to obtain the Fed's approval
before they acquired banks. 51 BHCA also authorized the Fed to
regulate the activities of bank holding companies.52 The statute barred
bank holding companies from engaging in industrial and commercial
activities.53 Under Section 3(d) of BHCA, bank holding companies
could not acquire banks across state lines unless such transactions
were specifically authorized by the laws of the states in which the
acquired banks were located.54 The states did not begin to pass such
laws until 1975.55
Section 4 of BHCA allowed bank holding companies, with the
Fed's permission, to own nonbank subsidiaries whose activities were
"closely related" to banking. 56 With limited exceptions, Section 4
prohibited bank holding companies from owning subsidiaries that
engaged in most types of insurance activities or that conducted
commercial or industrial operations. 57 Section 4 also prevented
insurance, commercial, and industrial companies from owning
earn higher returns" unless Congress imposed restrictions on deposit interest rates).
47
Banking Act of 1933 § 23; S. REP. NO. 73–77, at 11, 16–17 (1933); Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide
Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 973-75 (1992) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail].
48
Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566.
49
Id. at 1566–67.
50
Id.
51
See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012).
52
Id. §§ 1842–44.
53
12 U.S.C. § 1843.
54
See Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 975–76; Wilmarth,
Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566–67 (discussing
BHCA's enactment in 1956).
55
Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 977.
56
Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1567.
57
12 U.S.C. § 1843.
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banks. 58 Thus, BHCA represented "a powerful statement of
Congress's intention to separate banking and commerce."59
*********************************************
Under the financial system established by Glass-Steagall and
BHCA, "banks accepted deposits and extended loans to businesses and
consumers," while "securities firms accessed 'at risk' funds of longterm investors to meet the capital needs of commercial and industrial
firms," and "the insurance industry collected premiums to underwrite
business and individual risks, allocating the funds received to the
capital markets." 60 The U.S. financial system of 1960 ensured that
regulated depository institutions were the primary repositories for
household savings and short-term funds held by business firms, while
securities firms relied on longer-term commitments of invested funds
and insurance companies financed their operations with longer-term
streams of premium payments.61 This system of "segmented" markets
"generally prospered well into the 1970s."62
During the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts defended the post-New
Deal financial system and struck down attempts by federal bank
regulators to evade Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's structural barriers.63
The courts overruled a series of rulings issued by Comptroller of the
Currency James Saxon between 1961 and 1966, which attempted to
expand the securities and insurance powers of national banks. 64
58

Id.
Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566–67
(explaining that, while the original BHCA applied only to holding companies that
controlled two or more banks, in 1970 Congress expanded BHCA's scope to reach
one-bank holding companies).
60
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991), at XVIII-9.
61
Id. at XVIII-6 through XVIII-9.
62
Id.; see also EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that the United States
enjoyed a "golden age of financial stability . . . [b]etween the end of World War II
and the 1970s").
63
See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971) (striking down a
regulation authorizing national banks to establish and operate collective investment
funds); see also Saxon v. Ga. Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1020 (5th
Cir. 1968) (invalidating a ruling that allowed national banks to operate insurance
agencies across the nation); see also Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392
F.2d 497, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (overruling a regulation that permitted national banks
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds).
64
See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at 617; see also Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1010; see
also Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d at 497; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of
State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual
Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1157–58 (1990) [hereinafter Wilmarth,
continued . . .
59
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Similarly, the courts and Congress prevented the Fed from enlarging
the permissible insurance activities of bank holding companies during
the 1970s and early 1980s.65
As discussed below in Part II.B., the stable postwar financial
system established by Glass-Steagall and BHCA experienced a series
of economic shocks and legal challenges after 1970.66 However, the
anti-affiliation provisions of both statutes maintained a significant
degree of separation between commercial banks and securities firms
and insurance companies until GLBA repealed those provisions in
1999. 67 After Congress removed Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's
structural barriers, large financial conglomerates grew rapidly in size
and in scope, and their activities became more complex, opaque, and
risky.68 Large financial conglomerates were the dominant players in
the U.S. financial industry by the early 2000s, and the systemic risk
they generated steadily increased until it reached critical levels in
2007, on the eve of the financial crisis.69
In an article published in 2002, I argued that Glass-Steagall and
BHCA significantly reduced systemic risk in U.S. financial markets by
separating the banking sector from the securities and insurance
sectors.70 As a result of that separation, risks and losses in one sector
were less likely to spill over into other sectors, and financial
institutions in one sector could support other sectors that were under
stress.71 Major banks (with support from the Fed's discount window)
provided emergency credit to the commercial paper market following
Penn Central's default in 1970, to securities broker-dealers after the
stock market crash of 1987, and to corporate borrowers after Russia's
debt default in 1998.72 During each of those disruptions, major banks
did not suffer crippling losses in the capital markets (although losses
incurred by several large banks in 1998 revealed that those banks were
increasing their exposure to securities activities). 73 Accordingly,
State Bank Powers].
65
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 226–27.
66
See infra notes 88–98 and accompanying text.
67
Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566–73,
1580–81.
68
See Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 972–97;
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response
to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 963–75 (2011) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response].
69
Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 1002–50;
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 963–82.
70
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 444, 451.
71
See id. at 235–37, 444, 451.
72
See id. at 235–37.
73
Id. at 235–37, 375–77.
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banks could serve as a "backup source of liquidity" for other sectors of
the financial industry and nonfinancial corporations. 74 Similarly,
securities firms were able to serve as an alternative source of credit for
nonfinancial businesses when large banks suffered serious losses from
nonperforming loans during the early 1990s.75
In the same 2002 article, I contended that "the greatest danger" of
GLBA was that it would increase "the concentration of credit risk and
market risk within the U.S. financial system" by removing the
"alternative financial channels . . . that acted as 'shock absorbers' for
the U.S. economy" prior to the removal of Glass-Steagall's and
BHCA's structural barriers.76 I also warned that GLBA would "extend
the scope of the TBTF subsidy to reach nonbank affiliates of large
financial holding companies," because federal regulators would be
"likely to conclude that they should protect nonbank affiliates of big
financial conglomerates during economic disruptions in order to
reduce systemic risk."77 After GLBA, I argued, it was highly probable
that "major segments of the securities and life insurance industry will
be brought within the scope of the TBTF doctrine, thereby expanding
the scope and cost of federal 'safety net' guarantees."78 The financial
crisis of 2007-09 exceeded my worst expectations.
In September 1999 – just two months before Congress repealed
Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation rules – Fed Chairman
Alan Greenspan boasted that the U.S. financial industry had a "spare
tire" that successfully maintained the stability of financial markets
during the crises of 1990 and 1998.79 As Greenspan noted, securities
firms "were able to substitute for the loss of bank financial
74

Id. at 235–37, 451. For additional discussions of how the Fed mobilized the
banking system to provide emergency liquidity support to the capital markets during
the commercial paper crisis of 1970 and the stock market crash of 1987, see
CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 700–01; E. P. DAVIS, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND
SYSTEMIC RISK, 161–63, 250–51 (1992); FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 98–104 (1991);
Andrew F. Brimmer, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central
Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5–7, 11–15
(1989); see also infra note 452 and accompanying text (explaining that the stock
market crash in October 1987 did not have a contagious impact on the banking
industry due to the structural insulation provided by the Glass-Steagall Act).
75
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 451.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 446–47.
78
Id. at 447.
79
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks by Fed Chairman
Alan Greenspan Before the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund,
Program of Seminars (Sept. 27, 1999); see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011),
supra note 12, at 56–58 (discussing Greenspan’s “spare tire” speech).
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intermediation" when "American banks seized up in 1990." 80
Conversely, when "public capital markets in United States virtually
seized up" during the Russian default crisis of 1998, commercial banks
"replaced the intermediation function of the public capital markets."81
It was highly ironic that Greenspan gave his "spare tire" speech at
a time when he was strongly urging Congress to enact GLBA and
thereby destroy the structural separations established by Glass-Steagall
and BHCA. GLBA removed the "spare tire" lauded by Greenspan and
facilitated the emergence of giant financial conglomerates. 82 Those
conglomerates exposed the U.S. economy to devastating spillovers of
risks and losses between the banking industry and the securities and
insurance sectors. It is hardly a coincidence that the financial crisis of
2007–2009 was triggered by failures or threatened collapses of leading
firms within all three sectors.83
In 2012, economist Luigi Zingales announced his support for a
restoration of Glass-Steagall's structural barriers, in part because a
separation of banks from the capital markets would "make the
financial system more resilient."84 He noted the evident benefits of
Glass-Steagall during the 1987 stock market crash and the 1990-91
banking crisis. 85 In contrast, after Glass-Steagall was repealed, "in
2008 the banking crisis and the stock market crisis infected each other,
pulling down the entire economy."86

80

Speech by Alan Greenspan, supra note 79.
Id.
82
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 957–59,
963–67, 970–77.
83
Id.
84
Luigi Zingales, Why I Was Won Over by Glass-Steagall, FIN. TIMES (June 10,
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb3e52be-b08d-11e1-8b3600144feabdc0.html.
85
Id.
86
See id. In a March 2010 interview, former Citigroup co-chairman John Reed
observed that "the compartmentalization that was created by Glass-Steagall would be
a positive factor" because it would reduce the risks of "a catastrophic failure"
affecting the entire financial system. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011),
supra note 12, at 55, 474 n.18 (quoting Mr. Reed); see also Wilmarth, Prelude to
Glass-Steagall, supra note 4, at 1287 (discussing Mr. Reed's publicly-stated view
that Congress made a serious mistake in enacting GLBA and repealing GlassSteagall); Reed left Citigroup in April 2000, after Sandy Weill convinced Citigroup's
board to put Weill in charge. MADRICK, supra note 12, at 314–15.
81
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B. The Financial Industry and Federal Authorities Used Three
Principal Strategies to Undermine the Separation of the
Banking Industry from the Securities and Insurance Industries
1. The Demise of Regulation Q, the Creation of Deposit
Substitutes by Nonbanks, and the Rise of Shadow Banking
The interest rate ceilings on bank deposits established by
Regulation Q were the first major component of Glass-Steagall to
fall.87 Regulation Q's interest rate limits became unviable during an
extended period of high and volatile interest rates that lasted from the
late 1960s until the early 1980s. 88 Inflationary pressures began to
develop during the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the Johnson and
Nixon Administrations ran large federal budget deficits to finance
ambitious domestic spending programs as well as higher military
expenditures for the Vietnam War.89 Deficits and trade imbalances
weakened the dollar and forced President Nixon to suspend the
convertibility of dollars into gold in August 1971.90 Nixon's action led
to the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime of relatively stable
international currency exchange rates.91 The demise of Bretton Woods
resulted in much higher volatility for interest and currency exchange
rates.92
The oil embargo imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum
87

Allan H. Meltzer, Origins of the Great Inflation, 87 FED. RES. BANK ST.
LOUIS REV. 145, 158–72 (March/April 2005),
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/05/03/part2/MarchApril2
005Part2.pdf
88
Id.
89
Id.; ROBERT L. HETZEL, THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE:
A HISTORY, 67–93 (2008)
90
See Michael D. Bordo, The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods
System, 1958 to 1971 24 (Hoover Inst. Working Paper No. 23189, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23189.
91
See id. Under the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, the United States
promised to convert dollars into gold at a fixed price of thirty-five dollars per ounce,
and many other nations agreed to peg their currencies to the dollar. Id. at 3. The
Bretton Woods System permitted member nations to adjust their exchange rates
under the oversight of the International Monetary Fund. Id. at 3. Nixon's suspension
of the convertibility of dollars into gold in August 1971 led to the complete
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in early 1973, when many developed
countries adopted floating exchange rates. See id. at 26. See also HETZEL, supra
note 89, at 100–07 (discussing the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system);
WILLIAM L. SILBER, VOLCKER: THE TRIUMPH OF PERSISTENCE 23–26, 86–92, 113–
21 (2012) (same).
92
See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF
RISK 246, 251, 320–22 (1996); HETZEL, supra note 89, at 150–54.
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Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 caused a dramatic increase in oil
prices,93 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 triggered a second spike in
oil prices.94 Rising oil prices helped to push U.S. inflation rates to alltime highs by 1980. 95 Under the leadership of Chairman Paul
Volcker, the Fed adopted an aggressive anti-inflation policy and hiked
short-term interest rates to unprecedented levels.96 The federal funds
rate rose to twenty percent in early 1981 and remained as high as
fourteen percent in 1982.97
As short-term interest rates rose far above the interest rate ceilings
established by Regulation Q, depositors withdrew their funds from
bank accounts and sought higher-yielding investments.98 Large banks
looked for ways to offer higher-yielding deposits while avoiding
Regulation Q. 99 Beginning in the 1960s, under Walter Wriston's
leadership, Citibank issued negotiable-rate, large-denomination
certificates of deposit (CDs) through its domestic branches and also
accepted Eurodollar deposits through Citibank's overseas branches.100
Both types of deposits paid interest rates higher than those permitted
93

Greg Myre, The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo: The Old Rules No Longer Apply,
NPR (Oct. 16, 2013, 12:15 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/10/15/234771573/the-1973-arab-oilembargo-the-old-rules-no-longer-apply.
94
See Laurel Graefe, Oil Shock of 1978-79, FED. RESERVE HIST. (Nov. 22,
2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1978–79.
95
R.A., Who Beat Inflation?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2010),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/03/volcker_recession.
96
See id.
97
Business Desk, What Led to the High Interest Rates of the 1980s?, PBS (May
29, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/what-led-to-thehigh-interest/; MADRICK, supra note 12, at 165–66, 169–70. See also SILBER, supra
note 91, at 165–215, 222–24 (discussing Paul Volcker's leadership of the Fed's antiinflation policy during his tenure as Fed Chairman).
98
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 18, 22, 97–98.
99
See id.
100
See id. at 17–19. HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND & THOMAS F. HUERTAS,
CITIBANK, 1812–1970 253–57 (1985). Wriston's bank will be referred to as
"Citibank" in this article, but the bank operated under the name of "First National
City Bank of New York" from 1962 to 1976, when its name was changed to
"Citibank." Id. In the early 1960s, Wriston arranged for Citibank to make a $10
million loan to the Discount Corporation of New York, a government bond dealer
(Discount), in order to persuade Discount to create a secondary market for investors
who wanted to trade in Citibank's negotiable CDs. MADRICK, supra note 12, at 17.
Citibank's loan to Discount created a situation where Citibank was effectively
"making its own markets for the CDs they issued, taking a substantial risk and
violating the spirit and perhaps even the letter of New Deal regulations that
prevented conflicts of interest." Id. However, with "the Federal Reserve looking the
other way," Citibank's negotiable CDs were very successful, and other major U.S.
banks soon followed Citibank's example. Id. at 17–18.
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by Regulation Q. Although Citibank acted without advance approval
from the Fed, the Fed acquiesced in Citibank's circumvention of
Regulation Q, and other large banks soon followed Citibank's
example.101
In the early 1970s, the securities industry introduced its own
innovative financial instrument, the money market mutual fund
(MMMF). 102 MMMFs were short-term investment vehicles that
offered deposit-like features and were not subject to the interest-rate
limits of Regulation Q. 103 MMMFs allowed investors to withdraw
their funds based on a fixed net asset value (NAV) equal to the
original purchase price of one dollar per share.104 MMMFs were not
federally insured like bank deposits, but they offered investors the
ability to withdraw their funds on demand at par, were regulated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and were required to
invest in "safe" short-term securities, such as U.S. Treasury bonds and
highly-rated commercial paper. 105 Investors generally believed that
the institutional sponsors of MMMFs would provide financial backing
to prevent their funds from breaking the buck.106
In 1977, Merrill Lynch, a leading securities broker-dealer, created
the "cash management account" (CMA), which allowed holders to
write checks against their funds held in Merrill Lynch's MMMFs.107
Other securities broker-dealers quickly added check-writing features
to their own MMMFs.108 MMMFs were exempt from Regulation Q
because they were classified and regulated as mutual funds (equity
investments) rather than "deposits."109 As a result, MMMFs offered
customers many of the functional attributes of deposits, including
redemption at par on demand and check-writing, along with much
higher yields on their invested funds.110 Institutions and individuals
101
See MADRICK, supra note 12, at 17–19. See also Morris, Marc D. & John R.
Walter, Large Negotiable Certificates of Deposit, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY
MARKET 34–47 (7th ed. 1993) (discussing negotiable certificates of deposit).
102
Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 156–67.
103
See id.
104
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 29–30.
105
See id.; Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 156–60, 164–65.
106
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 29–30. For
discussions of the emergence and regulation of MMMFs, see Cook & Duffield,
supra note 12, at 156–59, 164–67; LITAN, supra note 12, at 34–35.
107
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 30.
108
See id.
109
See Regulations Q and D: Interest on Demand Deposits/Reserve
Requirements, FED. RESERVE 1 (Jan. 2006),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/200601/int_depos.pdf;
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 33.
110
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 30.
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rapidly shifted their short-term funds from bank deposits to MMMFs,
and the total volume of MMMFs mushroomed from $3 billion in 1977
to $235 billion in 1982.111
As Morgan Ricks pointed out, the emergence of MMMFs
"represented a deliberate end-run around the U.S. deposit banking
system," an evasion that the SEC "abetted" through its decision to
exempt MMMFs from many of the regulations governing mutual
funds.112 The most important exemption allowed MMMFs to redeem
their shares based on a "stable" NAV of one dollar per share, instead
of following the general rule that mutual funds must redeem their
shares based on “current market value.”113 The “stable” NAV, which
permitted redemption at par, was crucial to the success of MMMFs
because MMMFs “want[ed] investors to view shares in an MMF as
close substitutes for savings and time deposits at commercial banks
and other depository institutions.”114
Morris Crawford, chairman of the Bowery Savings Bank in New
York City, sent letters to the U.S. Attorney General and the SEC in
October 1979, alleging that MMMFs with check-writing privileges
were illegal deposits prohibited by Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall
Act. 115 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) rejected Crawford's
claims and concluded that an investor in an MMMF was not a
"depositor."116 In the DOJ's view, an investor in an MMMF owned an
equity interest with "the potential for capital gain or loss on his
investment."117 The DOJ also determined that an investor's ability to
"transfer his ownership" in an MMMF to other parties by writing
checks was "a mere formality and serves in no way to alter the
substance of his status as owner." 118 The DOJ's rejection of
Crawford's claims ignored the practical reality that MMMFs with
CMA features offered services that were functional substitutes for
111

See id. at 29–30; Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 157.
MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL
REGULATION 233 (2016).
113
See Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 164–65.
114
Id.
115
Letter from Philip E. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ’s
Criminal Division, and Lawrence Lippe, Chief of the Criminal Division’s General
Litigation and Legal Advice Section, to Martin Lybecker, Associate Director for the
SEC’s Division of Marketing Management (Undated letter evidently sent in
December 1979) (rejecting claims made in letters sent to the SEC and the Attorney
General in October 1979 by Morris D. Crawford, Jr., Chairman of the Board of the
Bowery Savings Bank of New York) (photocopy on file with the author). I am
indebted to Morgan Ricks for providing the photocopy of the letter to me.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
112
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checking accounts. The significant advantages of MMMFs induced
many customers to transfer their savings from bank accounts into
higher-yielding MMMFs, and the total volume of MMMFs reached
$235 billion in November 1982.119
********************************************
Fed chairman Paul Volcker's war on inflation between 1979 and
1983 made Regulation Q's interest-rate ceilings untenable for banks
and savings and loan associations (thrifts). 120 The rapid growth of
MMMFs (which federal regulators did not try to stop) provided a
convenient rationale for abolishing Regulation Q. Congress passed
statutes in 1980 and 1982 that phased out Regulation Q and permitted
banks and thrifts to offer deposit accounts with market-based yields
that could compete with MMMFs.121 However, MMMFs did not have
to bear the costs of complying with banking regulations, and they
generally offered higher returns than bank deposits. As a result, the
outstanding volume of MMMFs continued to grow, rising from $235
billion in 1982 to $740 billion in 1995, $1.8 trillion in 2000, and $3.8
trillion in 2007.122
The expansion of MMMFs encouraged the growth of the shadow
banking system – a system in which securities broker-dealers, finance
companies, and other nonbanks obtained funds on a short-term basis
from investors and used those funds to provide longer-term loans to
consumers and businesses.123 Securities firms established MMMFs to
attract large amounts of short-term funding from retail and
institutional customers.
MMMFs were leading investors in
commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements (repos), which
became two of the most important short-term funding vehicles for the
119

Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 157.
Wilmarth, State Bank Powers, supra note 64, at 1143–44.
121
The 1980 and 1982 statutes authorized banks and thrifts to offer (i)
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, which functioned in practice as
consumer checking accounts, and (ii) money market deposit accounts, which were
savings accounts that could pay market rates of interest. See EICHENGREEN, supra
note 1, at 67–68; JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF
BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES
A THRILLING BUSINESS 51–61 (2014); see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25,
at 239–40.
122
See Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 157–58; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 30, 33; Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Credit Supply
Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis 20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Boston, Working Paper No. 15-5, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2687395.
123
See Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (July
2010), at 11–20, 33–46, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337.
120
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shadow banking system. 124 Commercial paper is a short-term debt
security that typically has a maturity of less than ninety days.125 A
repo is a short-term, secured lending arrangement in which the lender
provides a cash loan and the borrower provides collateral in the form
of securities acceptable to the lender.126 The amount of the repo loan
equals the market value of the collateral minus a “haircut” reflecting
the perceived riskiness of the collateral.127 Upon the expiration of a
repo’s term (typically one day or a few days), the parties either renew
(“roll over”) the loan or the lender returns the collateral to the
borrower and the borrower repays the cash loan with accrued
interest.128
As MMMFs grew, so did the commercial paper and repo markets.
The volume of outstanding commercial paper increased from less than
$50 billion in 1975 to $560 billion in 1990, $1.3 trillion in 2000, and
$2 trillion in 2007. 129 The volume of repos entered into by large
securities broker-dealers rose from $110 billion in 1981 to $800 billion
in 1990, $2.5 trillion in 2002, and $3.5 trillion in 2007.130 During that
period, MMMFs were the largest purchasers of commercial paper and
among the most important cash lenders for repos.131 Funding provided
by MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos enabled securities firms and
other nonbanks to compete with banks in providing credit to
124

See Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 46–52; Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp
Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of
2007-2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30–31 (2010).
125
See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 38; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 30.
126
Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, 73
FED. RESERVE BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV. 15, 15–17 (1987).
127
Id. at 17.
128
BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 241–42 (2010); see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N
(2011), supra note 12, at 31. The repo market consists of two major segments:
triparty repos, in which a clearing bank manages the transaction as agent for both the
lender and the borrower, and bilateral repos, in which the lender and the borrower
deal with each other directly. Viktoria Baklanova et al., Reference Guide to U.S.
Repo and Securities Lending Markets 8–13 (Office of Fin. Research, Working Paper
No. 15-17, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664207.
129
See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 30–32, 38.
130
Lumpkin, supra note 126, at 73–74; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 122, at
19; Michael Fleming & Kenneth Garbade, The Repurchase Agreement Refined: GCF
Repo, 9 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. 1, 1–7 (2003).
131
MMMFs owned about one-third of the outstanding commercial paper in both
1992 and 2007. Thomas Hahn, Commercial Paper, 79 FED. RESERVE BANK
RICHMOND 45, 50–51 (1993); see Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 35.
MMMFs were also among the most significant cash lenders for repos. Pozsar et al.,
supra note 125, at 50–52.
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consumers and businesses through the process of securitization. 132
After regulators allowed banks to establish their own securities
affiliates and to engage in securitization, large banking organizations
became active participants in the shadow banking system.133
********************************************
The high inflation rates that led to the demise of Regulation Q did
not compel policymakers to allow nonbanks to offer deposit
substitutes and thereby create the shadow banking system. Congress
and federal regulators could have removed or relaxed Regulation Q's
interest-rate ceilings for bank deposits — thereby permitting fairer
returns to savers — while enforcing Glass-Steagall's prohibition
against the acceptance of deposits by nonbanks. As Morgan Ricks has
recommended, federal regulators could have barred securities firms
and other nonbanks from issuing deposit substitutes like MMMFs,
short-term commercial paper, and repos.134 However, regulators never
chose the available option of prohibiting deposit substitutes and
requiring nonbanks to fund their activities in a more stable and
transparent manner by issuing stock and longer-term debt securities, or
by entering into term loans with banks.135
After the largest banks obtained regulatory permission to establish
securities subsidiaries, beginning in 1987, those banks also increased
their reliance on deposit substitutes in the shadow banking system.136
Major banks and leading Wall Street securities firms brought in huge
volumes of short-term funding by (i) selling commercial paper to
MMMFs and to off-balance-sheet securitization conduits, and (ii)
132

Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 33–46 (explaining how securities brokerdealers, finance companies and other nonbanks relied on short-term funding
provided by MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos to originate or purchase longerterm consumer and business loans, including residential and commercial mortgages).
133
Id. at 22–33.
134
RICKS, supra note 112, at 5–6, 226, 230–37, 301.
135
The check-writing privileges offered by Merrill Lynch's MMMFs with CMA
features depended on Merrill Lynch's ability to employ a large regional bank (Banc
One) to clear CMA checks through the banking industry's check-clearing system,
which the Fed regulated. Mayer, supra note 7, at 10. Thus, the Fed could have
blocked MMMFs with check-writing privileges by instructing banks not to clear
their checks. In a 1981 interview, the noted financial journalist Martin Mayer asked
Paul Volcker why the Fed allowed Merrill Lynch to offer MMMFs that functioned
as substitutes for checkable deposits. Id. According to Mayer, Volcker replied, "It
was one of those things where you look and think, 'That's interesting, I wonder
where it will go,' and the next time you look at it it's so big you don't dare to do
anything about it." Id. (quoting Volcker).
136
Pozsar et al., supra note 123 at 22–36, 46–53.
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entering into repos and other short-term securities lending
arrangements with MMMFs and other cash lenders. 137 The total
volume of short-term, shadow-banking liabilities grew from less than
$500 billion in 1980 to approximately $1 trillion in 1990, $6 trillion in
2000, and more than $12 trillion in 2007.138
When the shadow banking system reached its apex in 2007, the
total amount of "shadow bank deposits" held by large banks and
securities firms substantially exceeded the amount of traditional
deposits held by FDIC-insured institutions.139 As Morgan Ricks has
explained, the rapidly increasing volume of shadow-bank funding after
1990 "can be understood as an increasing privatization of the broad
money supply in the pre-crisis years." 140 The growing reliance of
major banks and securities broker-dealers on shadow-bank funding
exposed them to severe liquidity problems when investors engaged in
panicked "runs" on MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos during
2007 and 2008.141 To prevent the failures of large banks and brokerdealers, the Fed, FDIC, and Treasury provided a "360 [degree]
backstop" for shadow banking liabilities through an array of "liquidity
facilities, large-scale asset purchases and guarantee schemes." 142
Those ad hoc rescue programs served as the "modern-day equivalents
of deposit insurance." 143 The collapse of shadow banking markets
137

See id.
Compare FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 32 (electing
not to include uninsured bank deposits or Eurodollar deposits in its calculation of
shadow banking funding), with RICKS, supra note 112, at 32–36 (including
uninsured bank deposits and Eurodollar deposits in his classification of “privatemoney claims”).
139
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 32; see also
Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 50–52; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking
Profile: First Quarter 2008, 2 FDIC QUARTERLY 2, 15 (2008),
https://www5.fdic.gov/qbp/2008mar/qbp.pdf (reporting that at the end of 2007,
FDIC-insured depository institutions held about $8.4 trillion of deposits, including
$4.3 trillion of FDIC-insured deposits and about $4.1 trillion of uninsured domestic
and foreign deposits.); Tobias Adrian & Hyun Son Shin, Money, Liquidity, and
Monetary Policy, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. 1, 1 (figure 1) (Jan. 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331004 (showing that lenders funded by the securities
markets held $16.6 trillion of assets in mid-2007, compared with $12.8 trillion of
assets held by regulated depository institutions).
140
RICKS supra note 112, at 36.
141
Gary Gorton, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. Fin. Econ.,
425, 423–36, 443–48 (2009); Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 36–48;
Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 2–7, 58–66.
142
Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 61, 64.
143
Id.; see also RICKS supra note 112, at 96–101 (stating that the federal
government's responses to the financial crisis "were aimed, with few exceptions, at
propping up the private money-claim markets. . . . [E]very major category of private
money-claim was specifically targeted with emergency stabilization programs in
continued . . .
138
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during the financial crisis and the necessity for a massive bailout of
shadow-banking liabilities cast a very dark cloud over the collective
decision by federal authorities not to enforce Glass-Steagall's
prohibition on deposit-taking by nonbanks.144
2. The Rapid Growth of Private-Label Securitization
Securitization was the second major way in which the financial
industry and federal authorities broke down Glass-Steagall's and
BHCA's structural barriers. Securitization is a process that creates
bankruptcy-remote pools of loans and other payment obligations
(receivables), which are then used as collateral for the issuance of
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other types of
asset-backed securities (ABS). 145 The process of securitization has
been extensively analyzed elsewhere,146 and only a summary will be
presented here.
In a typical securitization, the sponsor – usually a large bank or a
securities broker-dealer – either originates or purchases loans, pools
the loans, and transfers the loan pool to a bankruptcy-remote special
purpose entity (SPE).147 The SPE sells the loan pool to a second SPE
(which is usually organized as a trust) in exchange for the second
SPE’s promise to pay for the loans after it has securitized the pool.148
The second SPE issues ABS, which confer upon investors the right to
receive designated streams of income from payments made on the
loans in the pool.149 The second SPE hires a securities broker-dealer
(frequently an affiliate of the sponsor) to underwrite the sale of ABS to
investors.150 After the underwriting has been completed, the second
SPE transfers the proceeds from the sale of ABS to the first SPE, and
the first SPE transfers the sale proceeds to the sponsor.151 The second
SPE manages the loan pool and, in many cases, the second SPE hires
the sponsor (or another of the sponsor's affiliates) to act as servicing
agent for the pooled loans. 152 The sponsor, the SPEs, the ABS
underwriter, and the servicing agent all receive substantial fees for
2008.").
144
RICKS, supra note 112, at 96–122, 184–99, 230–37.
145
See FEIN, supra note 5, at § 13.
146
See generally id.; see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED
FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 1, 6-16 (LexisNexis 2004).
147
See FEIN, supra note 5, at § 13.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
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their roles in the securitization process.153
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) began to securitize
home mortgages in the late 1960s and early 1970s.154 At first, GSEs
structured their "agency" RMBS as pass-through certificates that gave
investors pro rata interests in the pooled mortgages.155 However, passthrough certificates were not attractive to many investors because they
were long-term instruments subject to prepayment risk and interest
rate risk. 156 To attract a broader group of investors for RMBS,
Lawrence Fink of First Boston and Lewis Ranieri of Salomon Brothers
developed collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) for GSEs in
the early 1980s.157 Unlike pass-through mortgage certificates, a CMO
is a structured-finance vehicle whose securities are divided into
multiple "tranches."158 Those tranches offer investors differing rights
and priorities for payments of income and principal from the pooled
mortgages.159 Junior tranches of CMOs receive higher payoffs but are
exposed to greater risks of losses from prepayments or defaults on the
pooled mortgages. 160 In contrast, senior tranches of CMOs receive
lower yields but also benefit from greater protection against losses.161
Securities firms fought hard to prevent GSEs from capturing the
entire market for issuing RMBS. 162 Ranieri helped the Reagan
Administration to draft proposed legislation allowing securities
broker-dealers to underwrite "private label" RMBS on a more equal
footing with the GSEs. 163 In 1984, Congress included many of
153

See KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE AND NEXT STEPS 43–51 (2011); see also
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 146, at 6–16.
154
Jonathan J. McConnell & Stephen A. Buser, The Origins and Evolution of
the Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 173, 176–78
(2011).
155
Id.
156
GSEs include the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). McConnell & Buser, supra note 154, at
176–78.
157
SUZANNE MCGEE, CHASING GOLDMAN SACHS: HOW THE MASTERS OF THE
UNIVERSE MELTED WALL STREET DOWN… AND WHY THEY’LL TAKE US TO THE
BRINK AGAIN 159 (2011); MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 5–8, 13.
158
Id.; see also Investopedia Staff, Tranches, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tranches.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2017).
159
ALAN N. RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW
153 (2d ed. 2014).
160
McConnell & Buser, supra note 154, at 178.
161
Id.; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 5–8, 13.
162
MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 13–14; TAUB, supra note 121, at 73–
75.
163
Id.
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Ranieri's proposals in the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act, which exempted private-label RMBS from state securities laws
and also allowed insurance companies and pension funds to invest in
private-label RMBS with high credit ratings.164 Two years later, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 exempted tranches of private-label RMBS
from the threat of double taxation. 165 In response to both statutes,
securities broker-dealers launched ambitious programs to underwrite
private-label RMBS and ABS backed by a wide array of obligations,
including credit card receivables, automobile loans, boat loans,
commercial real estate loans, home equity loans, student loans, and
lease receivables.166
Commercial banks were equally determined to enter the privatelabel RMBS and ABS markets. However, two Supreme Court
decisions stood in their way.167 In 1966, Walter Wriston’s Citibank
obtained a ruling from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), which allowed the bank to establish a collective investment
fund called a "Commingled Investment Account."168 The fund pooled
and managed investments made by Citibank's customers, who received
participating "units" in the fund. Citibank's collective investment fund
was effectively "a mutual fund by another name."169
In 1971, the Supreme Court struck down the OCC's ruling and
held that Glass-Steagall prohibited Citibank's fund. 170 The Court
determined that the "units of participation" sold to customers were
"securities" within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act, and
Citibank, therefore, engaged in an unlawful "underwriting" when it
sold those units to its customers.171 After reviewing Glass-Steagall's
legislative history, the Court described a number of "hazards" and
"financial dangers" that Congress sought to prohibit by passing GlassSteagall.172 Among other risks, Congress was concerned that a bank
164

Id.
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 360–61; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at
14–16; TAUB, supra note 121, at 75–76, 228–31.
166
FEIN, supra note 5, at § 13.01; Thomas R. Boemio & Gerald A. Edwards, Jr.,
Asset Securitization: A Supervisory Perspective, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 659, 659–60
(1989).
167
See Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers
Trust I), 468 U.S. 137, 141 (1984); see also Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp (ICI v. Camp),
401 U.S. 617, 622–23 (1971).
168
CLEVELAND. & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at 294.
169
Id.; see also MADRICK, supra note 12, at 20 (referring to Wriston's "plans to
sell mutual funds").
170
ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 622–23.
171
Id. at 634–36, 639; see also CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at
294–95.
172
ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630.
165
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would have a "salesman's stake" in promoting the distribution of
securities underwritten by either the bank or its affiliate. 173
Accordingly, the bank would be tempted (i) to make unsound loans to
support the sale of those securities, and (ii) to provide biased
investment advice to persuade its depositors and other customers to
buy those securities. 174 Congress also feared that banks could lose
their "reputation" and their "customer good will" if they encouraged
customers to buy bad investments that they or their affiliates had
underwritten.175
Thirteen years after ICI v. Camp, the Supreme Court issued a
similar decision in Bankers Trust I. 176 Bankers Trust I struck down a
Fed order that allowed Bankers Trust to act as agent for its corporate
clients in selling their commercial paper to investors.177 Based on a
“functional analysis,” the Fed argued that commercial paper was not a
“security” within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act because a sale
of commercial paper was closer to a commercial loan than an
“investment transaction.”178 As in Camp, the Supreme Court applied a
broad definition of “security” in Bankers Trust I and rejected the Fed’s
attempt to distinguish between commercial paper and other types of
debt securities. 179 The Court also reaffirmed its analysis of GlassSteagall's purposes in Camp.180 Quoting Camp, the Court declared in
Bankers Trust I that:
Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the
investment banking business largely because it believed
that the promotional incentives of investment banking
and the investment banker’s pecuniary stake in the
success of particular investment opportunities was
destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial
banking and of public confidence in the commercial
banking system.181

173

Id. at 632.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 141.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 139.
179
Id. at 139–41, 149–57.
180
Id. at 144.
181
Id. at 155 (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634 (1971)); see
also Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 154 (explaining that Congress’ “concern about
commercial-bank underwriting activities derived from the perception that the role of
a bank as a promoter of securities was fundamentally incompatible with its role as a
disinterested lender and adviser”).
174
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Despite the Supreme Court’s strong defense of Glass-Steagall's
policies in ICI v. Camp and Bankers Trust I, large banks and federal
bank regulators continued to launch assaults on Glass-Steagall’s and
BHCA's structural barriers. After its defeat in Bankers Trust I, the Fed
issued a revised order that permitted Bankers Trust to sell commercial
paper under a different legal rationale. 182 Instead of claiming that
commercial paper was not a “security,” the Fed’s revised order
declared that Bankers Trust would not be engaged in a prohibited
“underwriting” of securities as long as the bank sold commercial paper
issued by its corporate clients only in private placements involving
sophisticated institutional buyers. 183
The securities industry
184
challenged the Fed's revised order.
However, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Fed, and the
Supreme Court denied further review.185
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis in Bankers Trust II by stating
that it owed “substantial deference” to the Fed's revised order in light
of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron.186 Applying the
first step of Chevron's two-step formula, the D.C. Circuit held that the
applicable provisions of Glass-Steagall were "ambiguous," and
Congress, therefore "has not clearly addressed the question" decided
by the Fed.187 Proceeding to the second step of Chevron, the D.C.
Circuit deferred to the Fed's "reasonable" determinations that Bankers
Trust's sales of commercial paper in private placements (i) were
permissible "brokerage" transactions falling within the "business of
banking" defined in 12 U.S.C. § 24, as amended by Section 16 of
182

See FED. RESERVE SYS., STATEMENT CONCERNING APPLICABILITY OF THE
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT TO THE COMMERCIAL PAPER ACTIVITIES OF BANKERS TRUST
COMPANY (1985).
183
Id.
184
See Sec. Ind. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers
Trust II), 807 F.2d 1052, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
185
Id. at 1055; cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
186
Id. at 1056 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(Chevron)). The Supreme Court decided Chevron three days before it issued its
decision in Bankers Trust I. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (stating that the decision
was issued on June 25, 1984); Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 137 (stating that the
decision was rendered on June 28, 1984). The Court gave “little deference” to the
Fed’s original order in Bankers Trust I because that order did not include an analysis
of whether the Fed's position was consistent with Glass-Steagall’s purposes.
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 143–44.
187
Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1056, 1059. Under the first step of Chevron,
the reviewing court asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
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Glass-Steagall, 188 and (ii) did not represent a prohibited
“underwriting” of securities under Sections 16 and 21 of GlassSteagall.189 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Fed’s position that it was
“reasonable” to interpret Glass-Steagall's prohibition on
“underwriting” as forbidding public offerings of securities but not
private placements.190
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that private placements of
commercial paper would involve at least one of the “subtle hazards”
identified in Camp and Bankers Trust I – namely, the danger that a
bank would lose its “reputation” and the “confidence” of its customers
if it encouraged them to buy unsound securities.191 However, the court
dismissed the significance of that risk.192 The court concluded that
Chevron “requires our deference to an agency’s reasonable
construction of its statute's ambiguities,” and “an agency’s
interpretation that impairs one of the statute's purposes but not others
may surely nonetheless be reasonable.” 193 The D.C. Circuit's
disregard of potential reputational risks from private placements
proved to be a very serious miscalculation. Major banks subsequently
paid large fines and civil settlements after selling toxic subprime
RMBS and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to institutional
investors in private placements under the SEC's Rule 144A.194
188

Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1056–62. Under the second step of Chevron,
“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute . . . . In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the . . . agency.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 844.
189
Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062–66.
190
Id. at 1062–70.
191
Id. at 1069.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 224–26;
Katherine Engel & Patricia McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2066–73 (2007); Wilmarth, Turning
a Blind Eye, supra note 32, at 1344–45; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered
System of Regulation Is Needed to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and
Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 280–81 (2015)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System]. In fairness to the D.C. Circuit, it should
be noted that the SEC issued Rule 144A in 1990, four years after the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Bankers Trust II. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 194, at 2071–71.
Rule 144A substantially relaxed the rules for private placements made to
institutional and other qualified investors in reliance on the private offering
exemption in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. See id. at 2072. Prior to
1990, private offerings had to comply with the much more restrictive provisions of
the SEC's Rule 144. See id. at 2066–73.
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Bankers Trust II provided a blueprint for subsequent federal court
decisions upholding agency regulations and orders that opened
loopholes in Glass-Steagall's and BHCA’s structural barriers. 195
Courts repeatedly invoked Chevron deference as a justification for
affirming agency rulings that used creative interpretations of
"ambiguous" statutory language to circumvent Glass-Steagall's and
BHCA's prohibitions.196
In April 1987, the Fed authorized bank holding companies to
establish “Section 20 subsidiaries,” which could underwrite and deal
in “bank-ineligible securities” that were not lawful for banks to
underwrite or trade under Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act.197 The
Fed's Citicorp order allowed Section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite and
trade four types of "bank-ineligible securities" – municipal revenue
bonds, private-label RMBS, ABS backed by consumer loan
receivables, and commercial paper.198 The Fed concluded that Section
20 subsidiaries would not violate Glass-Steagall as long as they were
not "engaged principally” in underwriting or dealing in “ineligible
securities.” 199 The Fed’s Citicorp order required Section 20
subsidiaries to focus most of their activities on underwriting and
trading “bank-eligible” government securities. 200 Accordingly, the
Fed limited the “bank-ineligible” securities activities of Section 20
subsidiaries to five percent or less of their gross revenues.201
195

See infra notes 211, 218, 233 and accompanying text (discussing later court
decisions in which federal courts granted deference to agency rulings that
undermined Glass-Steagall and BHCA); see also FEIN, supra note 5, at §§ 1.05, 405[A] (same).
196
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 153 (stating that the undermining of
"Glass-Steagall restrictions on bank's securities activities . . . is a tale of legal
ingenuity, and agency persistence, and the power of Chevron deference"); FEIN,
supra note 5, at §§ 1.05, 4.05[A] (explaining that federal courts “played a major role
in dismantling the Glass-Steagall Act” by issuing more than 15 decisions that
affirmed rulings by federal agencies, and noting that “courts generally have upheld
Glass-Steagall interpretations by the federal banking agencies based on the Chevron
rule of agency deference”).
197
Federal Reserve Board, Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control (Regulation Y): Amendments to Restrictions in the Board's Section 20
Orders, 62 Federal Register 45,296 (Aug. 27, 1997); Wilmarth, Transformation,
supra note 25, at 318.
198
Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act: Citicorp,
J.P. Morgan & Co, and Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. (Citicorp), 73 FED. RES. BULL.
473, 487 (1987).
199
Id. at 474 (noting that Section 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibited banks from
affiliating with companies that were “engaged principally” in ‘underwriting . . .
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.”).
200
Id. at 487.
201
Id. at 475–77, 485–86.
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Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and Governor Wayne Angell
dissented from the Citicorp order, which the Fed adopted by a 3-2
vote. 201 Volcker and Angell stated that they supported broader
securities powers for bank holding companies “as a matter of
policy.”202 However, they argued, “the interpretation adopted by the
majority would appear to make feasible . . . the affiliations of banks
with some of the principal underwriting firms or investment houses of
the country.”203 In Volcker's and Angell's view, “Such a legal result
. . . is inconsistent with the intent of Congress in passing the GlassSteagall Act.”204 Volcker and Angell maintained that the Fed should
not have issued the Citicorp order without “a fresh Congressional
mandate.”205
Volcker decided not to seek a third term as Fed Chairman, and his
inability to block the deregulatory outcome in Citicorp was evidently a
factor in that decision.206 Volcker’s dissent in Citicorp reflected his
opposition to any “rush to deregulation” until Congress approved an
“overall blueprint for change” that would preserve “the stability and
impartiality” of the banking system and also prevent “conflicts of
interest and undue concentrations of banking resources.”207 President
Reagan appointed Alan Greenspan to succeed Volcker, in part because
Greenspan was much more supportive of the Reagan Administration’s
agenda for deregulating the financial industry.208
The securities industry challenged the Fed’s Citicorp order, but the
Second Circuit upheld the Fed and the Supreme Court denied further
review.209 The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Citicorp order
201

Id. at 505. H. Robert Heller, Manuel Johnson, and Martha Seger voted in
favor of the Citicorp order. Id. All three of those Governors were appointed by
President Reagan. See People, FED. RES. HISTORY,
http://federalreservehistory.org/people (last visited Aug. 9, 2017). Volcker was
appointed by President Carter in 1979 and reappointed by President Reagan in 1983,
while Angell was appointed by Reagan in 1986. See id.
202
Citicorp, 73 FED. RES. BULL., at 505.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 506.
206
SILBER, supra note 91, at 259–62; see also Louis Uchitelle, Volcker, Loud
and Clear: Pushing for Stronger Reforms, and Regretting Decades of Silence, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2010, at BU1 (reporting that Volcker’s “reluctance to deregulate
contributed in part to his departure” from the Fed.).
207
Robert A. Bennett, A Banking Puzzle: Mixing Freedom and Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1984, at A1 (quoting in part Volcker’s testimony before a
congressional committee); Uchitelle, supra note 206.
208
Nathaniel C. Nash, Treasury Now Favors Creation of Huge Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1987, at A1.
209
Sec. Ind. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 69
(2d Cir.); cert. denied 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
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represented a significant step toward “dismantl[ing] the wall of
separation installed . . . by the Glass-Steagall Act.”210 However, like
the D.C. Circuit in Bankers Trust II, the Second Circuit concluded that
Chevron required judicial deference to the Fed’s “reasonable”
interpretation of an “ambiguous” statute. 211 Accordingly, the court
observed, “Whether [George] Santayana’s notion that those who will
not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it fairly characterizes
the consequences of the [Fed’s] action is not for us to say.”212 The
Second Circuit’s allusion to Santayana’s warning was tragically
prescient, but unfortunately it did not alter the court’s deferential
approach.
The Second Circuit determined that Section 20 of Glass-Steagall
was “ambiguous” on the question of whether banks could affiliate with
companies that carried on a securities business but were not “engaged
principally” in underwriting or trading bank-ineligible securities. 213
Given that ambiguity, the Second Circuit held that the Fed was
“reasonable” in concluding that banks could affiliate with such
companies under the common ownership of bank holding
companies. 214 The court also determined that the term “engaged
principally” was “intrinsically ambiguous,” and the Fed was
“reasonable” in finding that Glass-Steagall allowed a Section 20
subsidiary to derive five percent or less of its gross revenues from
activities involving bank-ineligible securities.215
Under Alan Greenspan’s leadership, the Fed steadily expanded the
scope of its Section 20 orders.216 In 1989, the Fed allowed Section 20
subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in all types of debt and equity
securities, and the Fed also raised the revenue limit on bank-ineligible
securities activities to ten percent. 217 The D.C. Circuit upheld the
Fed’s order, again noting the judicial “deference” that courts owed to
the Fed’s determinations. 218 By 1996, Section 20 subsidiaries
controlled one-fifth of the debt underwriting market and two percent
of the equity underwriting market in the United States.219
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Sec. Ind. Ass’n, 839 F.2d at 49.
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Id. at 63, 67.
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Simon Kwan, Cracking the Glass-Steagall Barriers, ECON. LETTERS (Mar.
21, 1997).
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365 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 318–19.
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In 1996, the Fed raised the revenue limit for bank-ineligible
securities activities to twenty-five percent, and in 1997 the Fed
removed numerous “firewalls” that had imposed tight restrictions on
cross-marketing and other transactions between bank holding
companies and their Section 20 subsidiaries. 220 In response to the
Fed's liberalized Section 20 rules, large domestic and foreign banks
acquired dozens of small and midsized securities firms.221 By 1998,
forty-five bank holding companies, including the twenty-five largest
U.S. banks, had established Section 20 subsidiaries.222
********************************************
The OCC pursued its own campaign to allow national banks to
securitize residential mortgages and other loans directly, instead of
relying on bank holding company affiliates.223 The OCC's campaign
was part of its vigorous competition with Alan Greenspan's Fed for the
position of deregulator-in-chief of the banking industry.224 The OCC
and the Fed each wanted to secure the allegiance of the largest banking
organizations by demonstrating that it was a "friendly regulator" and
an unequivocal champion of deregulation.225
In 1987, the OCC confirmed the authority of Security Pacific
220

Id. at 319; Federal Reserve Board, supra note 197.
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 319.
222
Id.
223
Fein, supra note 5, § 1.06[E], at 1-31 to 1-35.
224
Id. at 1-34.
225
Id. (stating that the Fed relaxed its § 20 rules in 1996 and 1997 in an "attempt
to regain favor as a friendly regulator and to outdo the OCC," which had been in "the
vanguard" of deregulatory efforts during the 1980s and 1990s); id. §§1.06[F] &[G]
(explaining how the Fed urged Congress during the 1990s to grant broader securities
and insurance powers to subsidiaries of bank holding companies, and to confirm the
Fed's status as the "umbrella regulator" of those holding companies, while the OCC
argued that Congress should provide broader powers to direct subsidiaries of
national banks, which the OCC regulated); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 933 (2012) (stating
that the Fed and the OCC "each sought to attract the patronage of major banks by
approving new activities and reducing regulatory requirements" during the 1990s);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s
Authority and Present a Serious Risk to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANNUAL REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 277 n.203 (2004)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules] (describing how the Fed and the
OCC fought over the issue of whether holding company subsidiaries or direct
subsidiaries of national banks should be the primary recipients of broader securities
and insurance powers, and how the Fed largely won that jurisdictional turf battle
when Congress enacted GLBA).
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National Bank to securitize residential mortgages that the bank had
originated, and to sell private-label RMBS resulting from those
securitizations.226 The securities industry sued the OCC and prevailed
before a federal district court, but the Second Circuit overruled the
district court and upheld the OCC's opinion. 227 The district court
determined that the bank's issuance and sale of RMBS was not a "mere
sale of assets" and instead constituted a prohibited "underwriting" of
"securities" under Section 21.228 The district court pointed out that (i)
each securitization trust was "a separate entity from the bank," (ii) the
pooled mortgages held by each trust had "a separate identity" from the
bank's assets, (iii) the bank had "the sole choice of which mortgages it
wants to shift to the trust," and (iv) the bank could, therefore, choose
to "relegate to the trust those mortgages which it saw as most likely to
be problems."229 Also, the bank would have "an interest in the success
of the sales" of the RMBS, thereby tempting the bank to become "an
advocate with an interest in supporting the sale of a particular
security."230 After considering Glass-Steagall's purposes, the district
court concluded that the OCC's opinion "does not take sufficient
account of the role the bank may play in marketing the [RMBS]" or
"the benefits that the bank hopes to gain" from selling the RMBS.231
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning and
upheld the OCC's opinion. 232 Applying "principles of deferential
review," the Second Circuit agreed with the OCC that Security
Pacific's sale of RMBS fell within the "business of banking" under 12
U.S.C. § 24(Seventh), as either a direct or "incidental" component of
the bank's authority to sell mortgages it had originated.233 The court
also agreed with the OCC that any activity falling within the "business
of banking" under Section 24(Seventh), as amended by Section 16 of
Glass-Steagall, could not be construed as a violation of Section 21 of
Glass-Steagall.234
The RMBS at issue in Security Pacific were mortgage passthrough certificates, which represented "fractional undivided interests
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See Sec. Ind. Ass'n v. Clarke, 703 F. Supp. 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
vacated and remanded, Sec. Ind. Ass'n v. Clarke (Security Pacific), 885 F.2d 1034
(2d Cir. 1989).
227
See Sec. Ind. Ass'n, 703 F. Supp. at 261; Security Pacific, 885 F.2d at 1052.
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Sec. Ind. Ass'n, 703 F. Supp. at 259–60.
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Id. at 259, 261.
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Id. at 260–61.
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Id.
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Security Pacific, 885 F.2d at 1052.
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Id. at 1044–49.
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Id. at 1049–50.
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in the pool of mortgage loans."235 In view of the certificates' passthrough structure, the OCC argued that the certificates were "legally
transparent," and investors in the certificates were "informed
purchasers" with "full disclosure of all material facts," including
information about the "underlying loans." 236 The Second Circuit
agreed with the OCC that "the nature of the transaction makes it
unlikely that [Security Pacific] will make unsound loans so as to
encourage purchase of the certificates."237
Both the OCC and the Second Circuit contended that investors
would be adequately protected because "the federal securities laws
require full disclosure of all material facts concerning the [RMBS] and
the offering."238 The Second Circuit declared that any "protection" for
investors in the RMBS "must come from the securities law and the
remedies they provide, not from the Glass-Steagall Act."239
The OCC and the Second Circuit proved to be completely
mistaken in their assumptions that (i) bank sponsors of RMBS would
not have financial incentives to originate or purchase bad mortgages
for securitization, (ii) the offering materials for RMBS would provide
full disclosures of all material facts to investors, and (iii) investors
could therefore protect themselves through due diligence. 240 Those
mistaken beliefs had massive costs and far-reaching consequences.241
As the securitization trend gained momentum after 2000, banks and
other lenders originated huge volumes of poorly-underwritten, highrisk subprime and "Alt-A" mortgages. 242 The enormous fees that
lenders could earn by originating and selling nonprime mortgages for
securitization created perverse incentives and caused lenders to
disregard sound underwriting principles and due diligence
standards.243
235

Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1045, 1046 (quoting the OCC's opinion).
237
Id. at 1051.
238
Id. at 1046 (quoting the OCC's opinion). The Second Circuit noted that any
investors who were concerned that the RMBS "might be based on bad mortgage
loans . . . can turn to the SEC [registration statement] filing to assess such risks." Id.
at 1052.
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Id. at 1052.
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Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 1015–35.
241
Id.
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The FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 42–45, 104–18,
213–28; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 126–28, 134–37, 216–29; ATIF
MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 75–116
(2014); TAUB, supra note 121, at 228–33; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 153, at 25–
41; Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 1015–35.
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Building on their previous success with CMOs, securities brokerdealers and banks developed “structured-finance” RMBS that were
divided into multiple tranches. 244 The complexity of those RMBS
made it very difficult for investors to evaluate the risks embodied in
the various tranches. Banks and broker-dealers also re-securitized
“mezzanine” tranches of RMBS (tranches with intermediate credit
ratings) to create CDOs, and then repeated that process by securitizing
“mezzanine” tranches of CDOs to create CDOs-squared. 245 The
objective of each structured-finance vehicle was to generate the
highest possible number of tranches with “AAA” credit ratings so that
they could be marketed to insurance companies, pension funds, mutual
funds, GSEs, and other institutional investors.246 The complexity and
opacity of CDO structures made it virtually impossible for investors to
assess the risks of the re-securitized tranches of RMBS or CDOs that
were included in the relevant asset pools.247
The OCC used its victory in Security Pacific to justify subsequent
rulings that allowed national banks to securitize a wide range of
consumer and commercial loans and other receivables.248 The OCC
also permitted national banks to securitize loans that they did not
originate but instead purchased from other lenders. 249 In 1996, the
OCC amended its regulations governing bank-eligible securities and
authorized national banks to invest in “Type IV” and “Type V”
securities, which included “marketable” private-label RMBS, ABS,
CDOs, and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).250 Thus,
the OCC provided carte blanche for a wide range of securitization
activities by national banks, just as the Fed had done for Section 20
subsidiaries of bank holding companies.
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Id. at 43–44, 118–21, 148–50; Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note
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supra note 128, at 120–24, 295–99; TAUB, supra note 121, at 45–46, 73–75, 156–60,
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The Fed’s and OCC’s orders spurred a rapid growth in
securitization activities by banking organizations during the 1990s.251
The total amount of outstanding private-label RMBS and other ABS
increased from less than $100 billion in 1990 to $900 billion in 1999,
and large banks accounted for a significant share of that market.252
Securitization offered multiple benefits to banks in the form of
reduced capital requirements, new sources of funding through the
capital markets, greatly expanded fee income, and the ability to move
credit risk off their balance sheets.253
After Congress passed GLBA, which removed all remaining
restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms, the
largest banks and securities broker-dealers established vertically
integrated structures that included every step in the securitization
chain from loan origination to the creation and marketing of CDOs
and CDOs-squared.254 As that process unfolded, the total outstanding
volume of private-label RMBS, CMBS, ABS, and CDOs continued to
grow from $1.6 trillion in 2001 to $3 trillion in 2004 and $5 trillion in
2006.255 It is now widely agreed that securitization of high-risk loans
played a central role in fueling the toxic credit bubble that led to the
financial crisis of 2007-09.256
3. The Explosion of OTC Derivatives
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were the third major vehicle
that large financial institutions and federal regulators used to break
down the structural barriers between the banking industry and the
securities and insurance sectors.257 Derivatives are financial contracts
whose value is determined by reference to some underlying asset,
obligation, index, or rate (the underlying), such as an equity stock,
debt instrument, stock index, commodity, interest rate, or currency
exchange rate. 258 Derivatives are typically used either to hedge
251

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 35, 44–45.
Id. at 44–45, fig.3.1; Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note
29, at 984–91; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 388–90, 403.
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Id. at 973, 988–91, 1017–20, 1027–30.
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STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL, SHADOW BANKING: ECONOMICS AND POLICY, 9,
Fig.2 (2012) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187661.
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Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 1002–50; see
also supra notes 243, 247 and works cited therein.
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Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, at 980–981, 991–94, 1027–35,
1046–48.
258
The most widely-used types of derivatives are (i) a forward, in which the
buyer is obligated to purchase, and the seller is required to deliver, some type of
commodity or other physical asset at a future date, (ii) a swap, in which the parties
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against various types of risks or to speculate about future changes in
the value of the underlying. 259 Exchange-traded derivatives are
standardized contracts that are publicly traded on futures and options
exchanges, while OTC derivatives are customized contracts that are
privately negotiated between “dealers” (large financial institutions that
specialize in creating and marketing OTC derivatives) and “endusers,” such as commercial and industrial firms or institutional
investors.260
Exchange-traded futures and options based on changes in interest
rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices became popular
vehicles for risk management and speculation in the 1970s.261 The
volatility of interest rates, currency rates, and commodity prices
increased significantly during that period in response to rising inflation
and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange
rates.262 In 1974, Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) to oversee markets for exchange-traded
derivatives established pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA). 263 The CEA, as amended in 1974, prohibited off-exchange
contracts for future delivery of commodities unless the contracts were
settled by actual physical delivery.264 However, the 1974 legislation
included the “Treasury Amendment,” which exempted a number of
financial contracts that were not traded on futures or options
agree to exchange streams of payments based on the future values of an underlying
asset, obligation, index, or rate, and (iii) an option, in which the option seller gives
the option buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying at an
agreed price on or before a specified future date. RONALD H. FILLER & JERRY W.
MARKHAM, REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (SWAPS,
OPTIONS, AND FUTURES): CASES AND MATERIALS 1–9 (2014); Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 25, at 333 n.485; Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets
and the Commodity Exchange Act: Report of the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets, PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. FIN. MKT. 1, 4–5 (1999),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf
[hereinafter PWGFM, Over-the-Counter Derivatives].
259
FILLER & MARKHAM, supra note 258, at 24–27; Lynn A. Stout, supra note
16, at 7–8; GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE
AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A
CATASTROPHE 12 (2009).
260
TETT, supra note 259 at 24–25; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at
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MARKHAM, supra note 258, at 40-41; MADRICK, supra note 12, at 96–97; TETT,
supra note 259, at 10–11.
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Stout, supra note 16, at 18 n.61.
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Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 722–24 (1999).
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exchanges. 265 When OTC derivatives emerged in the early 1980s,
their status was highly uncertain under the 1974 legislation.266
Markets for OTC currency swaps and OTC interest rate swaps
grew rapidly during the 1980s, and the largest U.S. banks and
securities firms captured the lion’s share of both markets. 267 The
CFTC suggested in 1987 that it might attempt to regulate OTC swaps,
but the major swaps dealers threatened to move their business overseas
if the CFTC did so.268 The CFTC “backed down” and issued a policy
statement in 1989.269 The CFTC’s 1989 policy statement declared that
the agency would refrain from regulating “qualifying” OTC swaps that
fell within a defined “safe harbor.” 270 To qualify for that “safe
harbor,” OTC swaps were required to have “individually tailored
terms,” could not be traded on or connected to “a clearing organization
or a margin system,” and could not be “marketed to the general
public.”271
In 1992, Congress passed further amendments to the CEA, which
expressly authorized the CFTC to exempt certain types of OTC swaps
from regulation under the CEA.272 The CFTC responded by issuing a
regulation in 1993 that replaced its 1989 policy statement. 273 The
1993 rule exempted OTC swaps from regulation under the CEA if the
swaps were not “standardized as to their material economic terms” and
if the parties to those swaps were “eligible swap participants,”
including regulated financial institutions, qualified business firms,
state and local governments, institutional investors, and wealthy
individuals.274 However, derivatives dealers and end-users continued
265

Id. at 767 n.251.
PWGFM, Over-the-Counter Derivatives, supra note 258 at 7–8, 24–26
(discussing the 1974 legislation, including the “Treasury Amendment”). In 1981,
Salomon Brothers pioneered the first OTC currency swap, a $210 million contract
between IBM and the World Bank. Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16, at 690–91;
TETT, supra note 259 at 11–12. In 1997, the Supreme Court held that the Treasury
Amendment barred the CFTC from regulating OTC options to buy or sell foreign
currency. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465 (1997).
267
Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16, at 690-94 (explaining that “the swaps
market in the 1980s-1990s [was] dominated by a small number of increasingly large
commercial banks in competition with a small number of prominent investment
banks”).
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Id. at 688. Stout, supra note 16, at 19.
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270
Id.
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Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Concept Release, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,116
(May 12, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 CFTC Concept Release].
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Id. at 26,116–17.
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Id. at 26,117.
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traded on or through a multilateral transaction execution facility.” Id.
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to have significant concerns about the precise scope and legally
binding effect of the 1993 rule’s exemptions for OTC swaps.275
********************************************
Despite lingering uncertainties about the legal status of OTC
swaps, the OCC moved aggressively to expand the authority of
national banks to engage in derivatives transactions during the 1980s
and 1990s. 276 Saule Omarova has provided a comprehensive and
insightful analysis of the OCC’s campaign to expand the derivatives
powers of national banks, 277 and only a summary overview of that
campaign will be presented here.
In 1987 and 1988, the OCC allowed national banks to enter into
OTC swaps and exchange-traded derivatives based on interest rates,
currency rates, and commodity price indexes for precious metals.278
Using a “look-through” approach, the OCC argued that those types of
derivatives were comparable to discounting promissory notes and
trading in foreign currencies and precious metals, which were
activities expressly authorized for national banks under the definition
of the “business of banking” in 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh).279
The OCC used a more aggressive “functional equivalency”
analysis to permit national banks to engage in a much broader range of
commodity-related derivatives between 1987 and 1992.280 The OCC
used its “functional equivalency” approach to approve new derivatives
activities by extrapolating from the OCC’s previously authorized and
purportedly comparable activities.281 For example, the OCC asserted
that commodity swaps were “functionally equivalent” to interest rate
and currency swaps, which the OCC had previously authorized for
275

H.R. 10 and the need for financial reform: Testimony of Chairman Alan
Greenspan Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (1999) (Testimony of chairman Alan Greenspan); PWGFM, Overthe-Counter Derivatives, supra note 258, at 9–12; see also infra notes 646–56, 710–
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1999 that the federal government might take action to regulate OTC derivatives).
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See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed
the ‘Business of Banking, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV 1041 (2009).
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Id. at 1056.
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Id. at 1058–10. See generally OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and
Derivatives Activities, Fourth Quarter 2007, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/derivatives/dq407.pdf (discussing derivatives activities).
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Omarova, supra note 277, at 1060.
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national banks.282 To support its claim, the OCC argued that, for each
type of swap, the dealer bank acted as a “financial intermediary on
behalf of its customers, making and receiving payments,” and the bank
also entered into hedging transactions so that “the only risk retained by
the bank would be credit risk, the same risk that the bank assumed
when it made a loan.”283 By focusing solely on credit risk, the OCC’s
analysis “failed to take into account the full complexity of risks
associated with commodity [swaps].”284
In the mid-1990s, the OCC used the “financial intermediary”
concept to develop a “financial intermediation” theory of banking
powers, which justified an almost limitless scope for the “business of
banking” under the National Bank Act. 285 The OCC’s “financial
intermediation” theory asserted that the “business of banking” should
“encompass virtually any modern form of financial intermediation,
broadly understood as a financial activity for customers’ account[s]
involving exchanges of payments and assumption or transfer of
financial risk.” 286 Under the OCC’s “financial intermediation”
analysis, “the statutory concept of the ‘business of banking’ . . .
effectively ceased to function as a potentially limiting device with
respect to commercial banks’ activities and risk profile.”287
The OCC used its hyper-elastic concept of the “business of
banking” to authorize an ever-expanding array of derivatives activities
for national banks. 288 For example, in 1993 and 1995, the OCC
allowed national banks to hedge their exposures to commodity swaps
by making or taking physical delivery of the underlying commodities,
transferring documents of title, and engaging in other related activities,
including “storing, transporting, obtaining, or disposing of such
commodities.289 The OCC argued that bank ownership and delivery of
physical commodities for hedging purposes was a “logical outgrowth”
of the authority of national banks to act as dealers for commodity
swaps, even though the OCC acknowledged that banks were not
allowed to purchase or own physical commodities for investment
purposes.290
282
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16, 1990).
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From 2003 to 2006, the OCC relied on its earlier opinions allowing banks to own
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A notable example of the OCC’s step-by-step expansion of the
derivatives powers of national banks occurred when the OCC
proceeded from (i) allowing banks to offer equity-linked deposits, with
payoffs based on stock indexes, to (ii) permitting banks to enter into
equity swaps as hedges against their risk exposures to equity-linked
deposits, and ultimately (iii) authorizing banks to buy equity stocks as
hedges against their risk exposures to equity swaps.291 In 1988, the
OCC allowed Chase Manhattan National Bank (Chase) to offer
certificates of deposit whose payment of “interest” was based on the
performance of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (equity-linked
CDs). 292 The OCC declared that equity-linked CDs fell within the
express authority of national banks to accept deposits, and it dismissed
the relevance of Chase’s use of a stock index to determine the amount
of “interest” payable on those deposits. 293 Similarly, the OCC
assigned no legal significance to the fact that Chase invested the
proceeds of equity-linked CDs in exchange-traded S&P 500 index
futures and therefore assumed a significant stock market risk. 294
Chase was required to pay depositors for any increase in the value of
S&P 500 futures, and to absorb any losses if the value of S&P 500
futures declined, as Chase remained obligated to repay the depositors’
originally invested principal when their CDs matured. 295 The OCC
fully recognized the stock market risk created by equity-linked CDs,
and the OCC, therefore, allowed Chase to purchase long and short
positions in S&P 500 futures to hedge against that risk.296
The mutual fund industry challenged the OCC’s order, alleging
that Chase’s offering of equity-linked CDs and Chase’s purchase of
S&P 500 futures for hedging purposes violated the Glass-Steagall
Act.297 However, a federal district court dismissed the lawsuit.298 The
physical commodities solely for hedging purposes to justify even more expansive
orders. Id. at 1085–86. Those orders permitted national banks to engage in a broad
range of activities involving physical commodities (including electricity, oil, natural
gas, coal, and metals). Id. at 1085, 1093. The Fed followed suit by allowing several
of the largest financial holding companies to engage in a wide variety of
“complementary” activities involving physical commodities. See id. at 1085–87,
1090–96.
291
See id. at 1077–87.
292
Id. at 1063–64.
293
Id. The OCC also allowed national banks to offer CDs with interest rates
based on the performance of commodity indexes, and to hedge their exposures by
purchasing exchange-traded commodity index futures. Id. at 1063, 1066.
294
Id. at 1064.
295
Id.
296
Id. at 1063–65; see also Investment Co. Institute v. Ludwig (ICI v. Ludwig),
884 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1995).
297
See ICI v. Ludwig, 884 F. Supp. at 4–5.
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district court agreed with the OCC that “the plain language of the
[Glass-Steagall] Act simply does not encompass stock index futures”
as either “stock” or “securities” that banks were barred from
underwriting or trading. 299 The district court was also strongly
influenced by a 1995 Supreme Court decision, which accorded great
deference to the OCC’s interpretation of the scope of the “business of
banking” in another context.300
In ICI v. Ludwig, the OCC and the district court applied a
literalistic and narrow reading of the meaning of “stock” and
“securities” under the Glass-Steagall Act.301 The OCC and the district
court rejected the mutual fund industry’s attempt to use a functional
and risk-based analysis to demonstrate that Chase was effectively
engaging in "stock-trading” by offering equity-linked CDs and by
investing in S&P 500 futures to hedge against the bank’s exposures to
those CDs.302 A functional and risk-based approach – similar to the
analysis that the Supreme Court applied to Citibank’s “Commingled
Investment Account” in Camp and Bankers Trust’s sale of commercial
paper in Bankers Trust I – would almost certainly have resulted in a
finding that Chase’s offering of equity-linked CDs and Chase’s
investments in S&P 500 futures constituted a prohibited
298

Id. at 5.
See id. at 5.
300
Id. In Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 513 U.S. 251
(1995), the Supreme Court upheld an OCC opinion that allowed national banks to
sell annuities. The OCC’s opinion in VALIC stated that the sale of annuities was an
activity within the banks’ “traditional role as financial intermediaries” and therefore
qualified as an “incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of
banking.” Id. at 257 (quoting the OCC’s opinion). The Supreme Court held that,
under Chevron, the OCC’s opinion was entitled to “controlling weight” as a
“permissible construction” of the National Bank Act. Id. at 257. The Court agreed
with the OCC’s position that “the ‘business of banking’ is not limited to the
enumerated powers in § 24 Seventh and that the Comptroller therefore has discretion
to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated." Id. at 258, n.2. The
Court stated that “the Comptroller’s discretion must be kept within reasonable
bounds,” but the Court did not adopt any legal test to define the outer limits of those
“reasonable bounds.” Id. Thus, VALIC “failed to articulate a clear principled
standard of what constituted the ‘business of banking’,” and the OCC “interpreted
VALIC as a full endorsement of the agency’s long-held broad view of the bank
powers clause.” Omarova, supra note 277, at 1053.
301
See ICI v. Ludwig, 884 F. Supp. at 5 (noting that “[t]he OCC relies on a strict
reading” of “the plain language of the [Glass-Steagall] Act,” and accepting that
approach).
302
Id. (noting, without disagreement, the plaintiff’s claim that Glass-Steagall
prohibited “stock-trading by banks for their own accounts,” but agreeing with the
OCC that the court should reject the plaintiff’s “attempts to equate ownership of
stock index futures to stock speculation through its analysis of the comparative risks
of each investment”).
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“underwriting” of “securities” and a forbidden “dealing” in “stock”
under Glass-Steagall.303
The OCC’s opinion and the district court’s decision in ICI v.
Ludwig were typical of the asymmetric analysis that federal banking
agencies and most courts applied during the agency-driven
deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s.304 Federal
agencies repeatedly used “functional equivalency” as a one-way
ratchet to expand – but never to limit – the permitted activities of
banking organizations. 305 Most court decisions either endorsed the
regulators’ approach or deferred to the regulators’ ultimate decisions
under Chevron. 306 As indicated in ICI v. Ludwig, the financial
industry and federal regulators took full advantage of the fact that
“there was no explicit provision in Glass-Steagall against trading in
derivatives products.”307
In a 1994 opinion, the OCC declared that national banks could
enter into equity swaps and equity index swaps to hedge their
exposures to stock index futures resulting from equity-linked CDs.308
The OCC asserted that “swap contracts, are in some respects, direct
descendants of traditional deposit contracts” because a bank and its
customers exchanged streams of payments under swap contracts as
they did under deposits.309 The OCC also argued that “equity swaps
and equity index swaps are permissible for national banks as a
financial intermediation activity,” and those swaps would also benefit
banks by “expanding their customer base, and increas[ing] their
revenues.” 310 Thus, the OCC’s authorization of equity swaps and
equity index swaps relied on “functional equivalency” and “financial
intermediation” theories and completely disregarded the additional
303

See supra notes 167–81 and accompanying text (discussing ICI v. Camp and
Bankers Trust I).
304
See supra notes 116–19, 226–34, 280–84, 292–303, infra notes 308–11 and
accompanying text (providing examples of rulings by federal agencies and courts
during the 1980s and 1990s that used "functional equivalency" concepts to expand,
but not to restrict, the powers of banks and bank holding companies); see also FEIN,
supra note 5, §§ 1.05, 4.05[A] (explaining that judicial deference was an important
factor in many court decisions upholding agency rulings that opened loopholes in
Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's structural barriers).
305
See id.
306
See id.
307
TETT, supra note 259, at 17–18.
308
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 892 (Letter
from Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. to Rep. James A. Leach, Sept.
13, 2000), http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-andprecedents/sep00/int892.pdf.
309
Id.
310
See id. (discussing OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 (Sept. 13, 1994)).
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stock market risks that banks would incur under equity swaps.311 The
1994 equity swap opinion also reflected the OCC’s eagerness to give
national banks every conceivable opportunity to expand their
revenues.312
In 2000, the OCC issued Interpretive Letter 892 (hereinafter IL
892), which authorized national banks to purchase equity stocks as
physical hedges against their exposures to equity swaps and equity
index swaps.313 The OCC issued IL 892 after it secretly allowed three
large national banks to buy equity stocks for hedging purposes. 314
Congressman Jim Leach, a co-sponsor of GLBA, became aware of the
OCC’s actions and strongly criticized the OCC.315 The OCC issued IL
892 to justify what it had done.316
IL 892 declared that the OCC’s earlier opinions regarding equitylinked CDs, stock index futures, and equity swaps supported the
OCC’s view that national banks could invest in equity stocks for
hedging purposes as part of the “business of banking.” 317 IL 892
provides a striking illustration of how the OCC relied on its previous
rulings expanding the scope of permissible banking activities to
provide a “bootstrap” for authorizing new and even broader
activities. 318 The OCC also invoked its “financial intermediation”
theory and its “[h]edging risks” rationale to justify its decision
allowing national banks to buy equity stocks as physical hedges
against their exposures under equity derivatives.319
IL 892 pointed out that national banks would “retain additional
revenues . . . and enjoy substantial cost savings” by making direct
purchases of equity stocks instead of entering into “mirror” hedging
transactions with their broker-dealer affiliates. 320 Through direct
311

Id.
Id.; see also Omarova, supra note 277, at 1069–72.
313
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 1–2.
314
Michael Schroeder, Leach Criticizes Bank Regulator on Stock Rule, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A38.
315
Id.
316
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 1-2; Omarova,
supra note 277, at 1079–80. Rep. Leach was particularly concerned that purchases
of corporate stock by national banks could potentially result in “breaching the wall
between banking and commerce.” Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra
note 308, at 1.
317
Id. at 1–2.
318
Id. at 5–7; Omarova, supra note 277, at 1060, 1072, 1079–80.
319
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 7–9; Omarova,
supra note 277, at 1080.
320
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note, at 9–10. Before 2000,
a national bank would typically hedge its exposure to a “long” equity swap by
“entering into a mirror transaction” – usually a “short” equity swap – with a
continued . . .
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purchases of equity stocks, national banks could eliminate the extra
transaction costs associated with “mirror transactions” conducted by
their broker-dealer affiliates.321 Moreover, national banks would earn
additional profits through “a reduction in net interest expense” because
mirror transactions by nonbank affiliates were “funded at the
borrowing rate of their holding companies, rather than the more
favorable rate enjoyed by the banks.”322
IL 892 argued that national banks should be allowed to make the
highest possible profits by conducting all of their derivative activities
in-house instead of through broker-dealer affiliates. 323 The OCC
emphasized the significant cost-of-funding advantage that national
banks enjoyed, compared with their parent holding companies and
broker-dealer affiliates. 324 National banks enjoyed that advantage
because (i) they could obtain low-cost funding through their FDICinsured deposits, (ii) they could secure emergency loans through the
Fed’s discount window, and (iii) they could enter into interbank
payments on Fedwire that were guaranteed by the Fed.325
Thus, IL 892 enabled national banks to reap additional profits from
their cost-of-funding advantage, but the OCC conveniently ignored the
fact that conducting derivatives-related activities inside national banks
(instead of their broker-dealer affiliates) created a significantly higher
risk of inflicting losses on the federal government and taxpayers.326 IL
892 reflected the OCC’s general policy of “achieving a positive
outcome for the banks seeking an expansion of their derivatives
powers,” as well as the OCC’s failure to consider “potential systemic
risks” posed by the “complex derivatives businesses” of national
“nonbank affiliate.” See id. at 2. The nonbank affiliate would then hedge its
exposure to the bank under the “short” equity swap by creating a “long” position
through the purchase of equity stock. Id. at 2–3.
321
Id. at 3.
322
Id.
323
Id. at 3, 16.
324
Id. at 3.
325
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 1044; see
also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 3.
326
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 1045. The
significant cost-of-funding advantage that banks enjoyed, compared to their holding
company affiliates, was demonstrated in 2011, when the Fed allowed Bank of
America (BofA) to transfer a large volume of derivatives contracts from its Merrill
Lynch broker-dealer subsidiary (Merrill) to its subsidiary national bank. Wilmarth,
Two-Tiered System, supra note 194, at 349. “The derivatives transfer reportedly
allowed BofA -- which was then struggling with a host of problems -- to avoid
contractual requirements to post $3.3 billion of additional collateral with its
derivatives counterparties . . . due to the fact that BofA’s subsidiary bank was
explicitly protected by the federal safety net and therefore held a significantly higher
credit rating than Merrill.” Id.
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banks.327
By permitting national banks to purchase equity stocks, IL 892
contravened the explicit terms of the fifth sentence of 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh), as amended by Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act.328 The
fifth sentence states: “Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise
permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall authorize the
purchase by [a national bank] for its own account of any shares of
stock of any corporation.”329 IL 892 asserted that “the fifth sentence
. . . is not a complete bar on bank purchases of stock.”330 According to
the OCC, the fifth sentence is merely intended “to make clear” that the
authorization for national banks to purchase “investment securities”
under the second sentence of Section 24 (Seventh) does not provide an
independent “source of authority for national banks to purchase
stock.”331
The OCC’s interpretation of the fifth sentence is completely
undermined by the fourth sentence of Section 24 (Seventh), which was
also amended by Section 16 of Glass-Steagall.332 The fourth sentence
defines “investment securities” as “marketable obligations evidencing
indebtedness of any person . . . in the form of bonds, notes, and/or
debentures commonly known as investment securities under such
further definition . . . as may by regulation be prescribed by the
[OCC].” 333 Thus, the fourth sentence of Section 24 (Seventh)
specifically defines “investment securities” to include only debt
securities and to exclude stock. Congress, therefore, had no reason to
add the fifth sentence unless Congress intended to prohibit national
banks from buying all equity stocks in the absence of specific
statutory permission. In fact, Congress has passed several laws
granting specific authority for national banks to buy stock in
designated classes of corporations.334
Congress's repeated grants of specific, narrowly-defined
authorities for stock investments by national banks plainly indicate –
327

Omarova, supra note 277, at 1105, 1106.
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §16, 48 Stat. 162, 185 (1933).
329
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2008) (emphasis added).
330
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 12.
331
Id.
332
48 Stat. 162, 185.
333
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (emphasis added).
334
For example, Congress has passed statutes that expressly authorize national
banks to invest in the stock of operating subsidiaries, financial subsidiaries, bank
service corporations, bank premises corporations, small business investment
companies, community development corporations, safe deposit companies, and
agricultural credit corporations. FEIN, supra note 5, at § 7.05[B][1], [2], [3] & [5],
[G][3], [N], [S], [T].
328
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as confirmed by the terms of the fifth sentence – that national banks
may not purchase any other types of corporate stock without express
statutory permission. 335 Thus, IL 892's interpretation of the fifth
sentence flies in the face of the relevant statutory context and also runs
afoul of the well-established canon against construing a statute in a
way that would make it "meaningless" or mere "surplusage." 336 IL
892 was not challenged in any lawsuit, and the courts have never
considered the validity of the OCC's interpretation of the fifth sentence
of Section 24(Seventh).337
The OCC's derivatives rulings reveal the intellectual gymnastics
that the agency was willing to perform to enable national banks to
offer the broadest possible range of OTC derivatives and other
financial services to their customers. 338 By acting as derivatives
dealers, national banks could provide synthetic substitutes for a wide
range of securities and futures contracts, including equity stocks, debt
instruments, and exchange-traded options.339 OTC derivatives largely
escaped regulation during the 1980s and 1990s because they occupied
an "ambiguous position spanning the categories of futures, securities,
and loans." 340 Consequently, "regulators who were favorable to
deregulation could happily exempt such contracts from existing
rules." 341 OTC derivatives helped the largest banks and federal
335

Applying the canon of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the special mention of one thing in a statute indicates an intent to exclude
other similar things), courts have held that a federal agency cannot expand the
boundaries established by specific and defined grants of authority in its governing
statute. See Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Hawke (IIAA v. Hawke),
211 F.3d 638, 643, 644–45 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and cases cited therein.
336
See id. at 643–44, and cases cited therein. As shown above, the fifth
sentence of Section 24(Seventh) would add nothing to what the fourth sentence
already provides if the OCC's interpretation were accepted.
337
At the request of Congressman Leach, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) reviewed IL 892 and accepted the OCC's opinion as a "reasonable
interpretation of the bank powers clause." Omarova, supra note 277, at 1081.
However, the GAO "did not scrutinize the fundamental assumptions built into the
OCC's interpretation." Id. Except for ICI v. Ludwig, "the legal validity of the OCC's
decisions expanding bank derivatives powers has not been challenged in court." Id.
at 1064 n.98, 1105.
338
Omarova, supra note 277, at 1097–1104.
339
Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note
25, at 337–38; see also Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 315–18 (2d Cir.
2002) (describing Citibank's sale of equity swaps and cash-settled OTC options to
plaintiff Caiola, which established "synthetic positions, . . . the values of which are
pegged to the market prices of the related physical shares or options," and stating
that the equity swaps and OTC options sold to Caiola created a "synthetic
portfolio").
340
Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16, at 690.
341
Id.
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banking agencies to undermine Glass-Steagall by blurring “the
boundary between . . . commercial and investment banking."342
********************************************
In the mid-1990s, J.P. Morgan & Co. (JPMC) introduced a new
type of derivative, the credit default swap (CDS), which helped to
break down BHCA's boundary wall separating banks from the
insurance business.343 In 1995, JPMC persuaded the OCC and the Fed
to allow banks to enter into CDS as dealers and end-users.344 JPMC
also convinced the regulators that banks could reduce their capital
requirements by purchasing CDS protection against the risk of defaults
on their loans.345
In a CDS transaction, the "protection buyer" purchases protection
against specified events of default on a designated bond or other debt
instrument, while the "protection seller" provides that protection in
return for the buyer's payment of periodic premiums. 346 As Alan
Blinder observed, "A CDS is an insurance contract posing as a
derivative. . . . If the bond never defaults, which is the usual case, the
seller wins and the buyer loses. But in the event of default, the seller
loses big time. It's classic insurance."347
JPMC did not stop with CDS contracts. In the late 1990s, JPMC's
derivatives team created a more complex structure known as
"BISTRO," which was the first synthetic collateralized debt obligation
(synthetic CDO). 348 BISTRO brought together the worlds of
derivatives and securitization.349
To create BISTRO, JPMC assembled a pool of $9.7 billion of
CDS, which provided protection against defaults on loans made by
JPMC to more than 300 companies.350 JPMC bundled those CDS into
342

Id. at 674; see also id. at 692 ("By disrupting the effectiveness of GlassSteagall, swaps . . . contributed to its eventual formal repeal.").
343
TETT, supra note 259, at 47–54.
344
Id.
345
Id. at 44–49 (noting that Bankers Trust experimented with the CDS concept
in 1991, but it was JPMC that used CDS to "create a mass-market credit derivatives
business"); see also MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128 at 60–62.
346
TAUB, supra note 121, at 192–93; Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal
Banking, supra note 29, at 993.
347
BLINDER, supra note 2, at 66; see also Mahoney, supra note 7, at 34 ("A
typical CDS operates like an insurance contract."); MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note
128, at 60 ("A credit default swap is essentially an insurance policy against the
possibility of default.").
348
TETT, supra note 259, at 51.
349
Id. at 51–52.
350
Id. at 54–55.
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a securitized pool managed by a synthetic CDO.351 The CDO issued
$700 million of tranched CDO securities to investors, while JPMC
retained $9 billion of "super-senior" risk if the total volume of defaults
on the pooled CDS exceeded $700 million.352 JPMC got rid of that
"super-senior" risk by entering into credit derivatives with AIG
Financial Products, a London subsidiary of the insurance giant AIG.353
BISTRO was a prime example of how banks used securitization
and derivatives to accomplish large-scale tax avoidance and regulatory
capital arbitrage. As was typical in securitization deals, JPMC
established a "special purpose vehicle" (SPV) in an offshore tax haven
to hold BISTRO's securitized CDS. 354 Locating the SPV in a tax
haven immunized the SPV's cash flows from taxation.355 In addition,
the Fed and the OCC agreed to reduce JPMC's regulatory capital
requirements by eighty percent for the corporate loans protected by
BISTRO's pooled CDS, because JPMC obtained credit protection for
its exposures on those CDS from AIG, a AAA-rated company. 356
Thus, as Gillian Tett explained, “BISTRO pulled off a dance around
the Basel [international bank capital] rules. The feat was so clever that
some bankers started to joke that 'BISTRO' really stood for 'BIS Total
Rip Off,' referring to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS),
which had overseen the Basel Accord.”357
BISTRO confirmed the ability of the largest financial institutions
to avoid taxes and reduce their regulatory capital requirements by
using securitization and derivatives. 358 BISTRO also provided a
template for Wall Street’s subsequent creation of CDS and synthetic
CDOs based on subprime mortgages and RMBS, instead of corporate
loans. 359 The BISTRO concept had disastrous effects when it was
applied to the subprime mortgage market. 360 CDS and synthetic
CDOs enabled a wide range of financial institutions and other
institutional investors to place multiple, overlapping bets on the
performance of designated tranches of subprime RMBS. Those
pyramids of bets collapsed, and greatly intensified the resulting losses

351

Id. at 60–64.
Id.
353
For detailed discussions of the BISTRO transaction, see id. at 51–56, 60–64,
and MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 78–81.
354
TETT, supra note 259, at 54.
355
Id.
356
Id. at 63–64.
357
Id. at 64.
358
Id. at 57–61.
359
Id.
360
Id. at 60–63.
352
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when borrowers defaulted on the underlying subprime mortgages.361
The bank-friendly actions of the OCC and the Fed helped to
promote a tremendous boom in OTC derivatives markets after 1985,
just as they had done for securitization. 362 The aggregate notional
value of OTC derivatives in global markets increased rapidly from $7
trillion in 1989 to $88 trillion in 1999 and $595 trillion in 2007.363
The total notional value of credit derivatives grew at an even faster
rate, “rising from only $180 million in 1997 to $1 trillion in 2001 . . .
and $58 trillion in 2007.”364 The top U.S. commercial bank dealers
controlled a significant share of the global markets for OTC
derivatives, as the combined notional value of their derivatives
contracts grew from $5 trillion in 1990 to $38 trillion in 2000 and
$159 trillion in 2007, including $14 trillion of credit derivatives.365
III.AN IDEOLOGY OF COMPREHENSIVE DEREGULATION LED TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE RIEGLE-NEAL ACT, GLBA AND CFMA
As described above in Part II, during the 1980s and 1990s large
banks persuaded federal agencies and courts to open a number of
loopholes in the legal barriers that separated banks from the securities
and insurance sectors.366 However, those loopholes were subject to
many restrictions and did not allow banks to establish full-scale
affiliations with securities firms and insurance companies. 367
Executives of big banks were far from satisfied with the limited
victories they had achieved. To accomplish their long-range goal of
building financial conglomerates similar to European universal banks,
leaders of the big-bank lobby needed to convince Congress to pass
three major pieces of legislation.
The first item on the big-bank agenda was to repeal GlassSteagall’s and BHCA’s constraints on interstate expansion by banks

361

MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 80–81, 120–24, 263–68; FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at xxiv-xxv, 142–46, 190–95; TETT, supra
note 259, at 66–69, 94–103, 132–39; Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response,
supra note 68 at, 951, 964–67.
362
Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 987–88,
991–93.
363
Id. at 991–92.
364
Id. at 993.
365
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 334 (providing figures for the
top seven U.S. bank dealers in OTC derivatives in 1990 and 2000); OCC’s Quarterly
Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities, supra note 279, at graph 4
(providing figures for the top five U.S. bank dealers in 2007).
366
See supra Part II.
367
See id.

"/ ' /

 // )/
)/(/  )/)/ )

, )/%/

and bank holding companies.368 The second element was to repeal
Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s prohibitions that prevented banks from
establishing full-scale affiliations with securities firms and insurance
companies.369 The final component was to insulate over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives from any substantive regulation by the CFTC or
SEC.370
A. Efforts to Authorize Interstate Banking and to Repeal GlassSteagall Did Not Succeed during the 1980s but Provided the
Foundation for the Treasury Department’s 1991 Deregulatory
Plan
In January 1981, the outgoing Carter Administration issued a
report calling for the phased removal of restrictions on interstate
banking and branching. 371 With one relatively minor exception,
Congress did not adopt President Carter’s proposals. 372 However,
Carter’s proposals set the stage for an extensive debate throughout the
1980s regarding the potential benefits and risks of interstate
banking.373
In March 1981, the banking industry called on the new Reagan
Administration to remove Glass-Steagall’s barriers to bank
involvement in securities activities. 374 The American Bankers
Association (ABA) declared that its campaign to repeal Glass-Steagall
was “gaining momentum” because of “a political drift toward
deregulation.” 375 However, the ABA’s proposals faced strong
opposition from the securities industry and independent community
banks.376
In December 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan announced
that the Reagan Administration would submit a proposal to Congress
368

See infra Parts III.A and III.B.
See infra Parts III.A and III.C.
370
See infra Part III.D.
371
Wilmarth, State Bank Powers, supra note 64, at 1154 n.87.
372
Id. (explaining that, in 1989, Congress adopted one of Carter’s proposals by
authorizing interstate acquisitions of failed banks with assets of $500 million or
more).
373
Id. at 1154–55 n.87 (describing unsuccessful efforts to pass interstate
banking legislation during the 1980s); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, VOLUME I: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING
CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 129–30 (1997) (same) [hereinafter FDIC
HISTORY], https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
374
Jeff Gerth, Bank Target: The Glass-Steagall Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/03/business/bank-target-glass-steagall-act.html.
375
Id.
376
Id.
369
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for a phased repeal of Glass-Steagall.377 Secretary Regan declared that
the Reagan Administration wanted to “remov[e] artificial barriers
between commercial banking and investment banking” as part of the
Administration’s broader campaign to eliminate “excessive and
outmoded government regulation” and demolish “barriers hindering
free market activity.”378 As a first step toward those goals, the Reagan
Administration urged Congress to allow nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies to underwrite and deal in state and local revenue
bonds and mutual fund shares, and to engage in a limited number of
other securities activities.379
The largest U.S. banks eagerly supported the Carter and Reagan
proposals for interstate banking and repeal of Glass-Steagall.380 Until
he retired in 1984, Citibank chairman Walter Wriston was the banking
industry’s “recognized visionary leader” in pushing for comprehensive
deregulation.381 Wriston joined Citibank in 1946 and rose through the
ranks to become president in 1967 and chairman in 1970.382 Wriston
had an intense dislike for government regulation in general and the
New Deal in particular.383 As a Wall Street economist noted, “There
was something emotional about [Wriston’s] drive [for deregulation]
. . . I felt Wriston wanted simply to dismantle the financial system as
we knew it.”384 Wriston explained “his passion for breaking down old
restraints on bank operations” in the following terms: “[m]y
experience has been you either move forward or you die – it’s true in
all biology.”385
Wriston dreamed of transforming Citibank (and its holding
company, Citicorp) into a “global financial services corporation” that
would “change the face of banking.”386 Wriston wanted Citibank to be
an “all-around bank” that provided a “one-stop financial center” for its
retail and institutional customers, much as Citibank’s predecessor
(National City Bank) had done in the 1920s under Charles Mitchell’s
leadership.387 As noted above, Wriston pioneered the use of large377

‘Marketplace’ Era is at Hand For Financial Institutions, AM. BANKER, Dec.
16, 1981, 1981 WLNR 76809.
378
Id.
379
Id.
380
See Robert A. Bennett, Sanford’s New Banking Vision, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1985, at F1 [hereinafter Bennett, Sanford’s New Banking Vision].
381
Id.
382
Walter B. Wriston, TUFTS, http://dca.lib.tufts.edu/features/wriston/ (last
visited Aug. 30, 2017).
383
Bennett, Sanford’s New Banking Vision, supra note 380.
384
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 10–11, 14, 19, 23 (quoting Albert Wojinlower).
385
Bennett, supra note 207.
386
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at 277–79, 308–09.
387
Id. at 156–58, 258–60, 276–79, 302–04, 308–09; M ADRICK, supra note 12, at
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denomination, negotiable-rate CDs and Eurodollar deposits that
enabled Citibank and other large banks to circumvent Regulation Q’s
restrictions on deposit interest rates in the 1960s.388
Wriston also developed a new type of loan – the floating-rate
syndicated loan.389 This innovative form of credit helped Citibank to
expand its lending to large corporations and foreign governments.390
Floating-rate loans provided credit at an agreed spread over the
variable cost of Eurodollar funding in London, thereby shifting the
risk of future changes in interest rates to the borrowers.391 In addition,
the process of syndicating a loan enabled Citibank to play a role
similar to a “bond underwriter, negotiating the terms of a credit with
the borrower and then arranging for the participation of other banks”
in the syndicate.392 By the early 1970s, floating-rate syndicated loans
were the dominant source of bank credit for multinational corporations
and foreign governments.393 Syndicated loans permitted Citibank and
other large U.S. banks “to play the same international role that bond
financing had played in the 1920s.”394
12–14, 20; see Wilmarth, Prelude to Glass-Steagall, supra note 4, at 1292–1300.
388
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
389
See James Grant, Too Big to Fail?: Walter Wriston and Citibank, HARV.
BUS. REV. (1996), https://hbr.org/1996/07/too-big-to-fail-walter-wriston-andcitibank.
390
See id.
391
See id.
392
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at 267–68.
393
Ross P. Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises: The Search for the Enduring
Reforms of the International Financial System, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 7
(2001).
394
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at 267–68; MADRICK, supra note
12, at 101–03. The syndicated loans arranged by Citibank and other large “money
center” banks for less-developed countries (LDCs) during the 1970s and early 1980s
proved to be as reckless and unsound as the foreign bonds that Citibank’s and
Chase’s predecessors underwrote and sold during the 1920s. The large up-front fees
that lead banks received for arranging syndicated loans created the same perverse
incentives to disregard long-term risks as the large front-end profits that foreign
bond underwriters reaped during the 1920s. CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 225–29,
237, 304, 637–48; FDIC HISTORY, supra note 373, at 191–201; MADRICK, supra
note 12, at 101–09, 172–73; SILBER, supra note 91, at 218–27, 242–47; Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 25, at 312–16, 378–81; see also Wilmarth, Prelude to
Glass-Steagall, supra note 4, at 1297–1314) (describing National City’s and Chase’s
sales of high-risk foreign bonds during the 1920s). The very bad performance of
syndicated LDC loans arranged by money center banks during the 1970s and early
1980s should have provided a clear warning about their probable behavior if they
succeeded in re-entering the securities underwriting business. See Martin Feldstein,
An Interview with Paul Volcker, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 112–13 (2013) (quoting
Paul Volcker’s observation that the LDC lending crisis was “something like . . . the
subprime mortgage thing” because, during the 1970s, “money was flowing through
continued . . .
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Citibank earned handsome fees for acting as the “lead” bank in
syndicated loans, and it soon began to make floating-rate syndicated
loans in the United States to business firms, commercial real-estate
ventures, energy projects, and local and state governments. 395
Syndicated loans brought Citibank and other large U.S. banks closer to
the investment banking model because “[t]he process of loan
syndication is similar to the formation of an underwriting syndicate for
publicly issued debt securities, and syndicated loans are often viewed
by borrowers as a ‘substitute’ for underwritten bonds.”396
Wriston failed, however, when he attempted to build a mutual fund
business at Citibank. 397 As described above, the Supreme Court
invalidated Citibank’s “Commingled Investment Account” in its 1971
Camp decision. 398 Despite that setback, Wriston spearheaded the
banking industry’s campaign to repeal Glass-Steagall until he retired
in 1984, and his successors (John Reed and Sandy Weill) continued to
lead that fight until Congress enacted GLBA in 1999.399
JPMC was probably the second most active participant in the
banking industry’s assault on Glass-Steagall. After World War II,
JPMC built up a substantial investment banking business in overseas
markets, where Glass-Steagall’s limitations did not apply.400 Along
with Citicorp and Bankers Trust, JPMC persuaded the Fed and the
courts to allow bank holding companies to establish Section 20
subsidiaries that could underwrite and trade bank-ineligible
the big banks to Latin America in a way that arguably looked constructive for a
while but was ultimately unsustainable”).
395
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 378–79.
396
Id. at 378–81; see CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at 268–71, 438
nn.31–32.
397
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 20.
398
See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.
399
See Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 22, at 72, 77, 134–35; see also
MADRICK, supra note 12, 99–101, 106–09, 311–15; Richard W. Stevenson,
Financial Services Heavyweights Try Do-It-Yourself Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1998, at A1.
400
CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 538–41, 593, 653–56, 704–05; see Testimony
by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs United States Senate
(Dec. 1, 1987) (explaining that “foreign offices of U.S. banks and their foreign
subsidiaries have been actively engaging abroad in a wide variety of securities
activities”),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19871201.pdf
; TETT, supra note 259, at 16 (noting that JPMC “built up a good capital markets
business” in its London branch because “Glass-Steagall didn’t apply overseas”);
FEIN, supra note 5, at § 16.01 (providing a general overview of the authority of U.S.
banks to engage in securities activities abroad through foreign branches and
subsidiaries).
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securities.401
Lewis Preston, who led JPMC during the 1980s, was determined
to remove Glass-Steagall’s barriers so that JPMC could establish a
major investment banking presence in the United States as well as
foreign markets. 402 In 1984, Preston instructed JPMC’s staff to
produce an extensive critique of Glass-Steagall, entitled Rethinking
Glass-Steagall.403 Alan Greenspan was then a director of JPMC, and
he was “very instrumental in getting that document out.”404 JPMC
continued to play a prominent role in the attack on Glass-Steagall
under the leadership of Preston’s successor, Dennis Weatherstone.405
Along with Walter Wriston, Alan Greenspan was one of the
strongest opponents of Glass-Steagall. Like Wriston, Greenspan had a
deep aversion to government regulation and the New Deal. 406
Greenspan was a close friend and follower of Ayn Rand from the early
1950s until her death in 1981, and he shared her libertarian philosophy
and unwavering belief in laissez-faire capitalism.407 During the 1960s,
Greenspan “wrote several essays for the [Ayn] Rand publication, The
Objectivist,” in which he “criticized both consumer protection and
401

Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16, at 686–87; see supra notes 197–201,
209–20 and accompanying text (discussing the approval of Section 20 subsidiaries
by the Fed and the courts).
402
See generally J.P. MORGAN & CO. INC., RETHINKING GLASS-STEAGALL: THE
CASE FOR ALLOWING BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUBSIDIARIES TO UNDERWRITE AND
DEAL IN CORPORATE SECURITIES 30–42 (1984).
403

Id.
CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 654–56, 716 (quoting an unnamed JPMC
“insider”).
405
Id. at 716–17; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 53–54; TETT, supra
note 259, at 76.
406
MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 128, at 84–91, 103.
407
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 153, at 189–90; MADRICK, supra note 12, at
228; MCLEAN & NOCERA supra note 128, at 85. In April 1997, Greenspan received
the “Adam Smith Award” from the Association of Private Enterprise Education. In
his acceptance speech, Greenspan declared, “I have never lost sight of the fact that
government regulation can undermine the effectiveness of private market regulation
and can itself be ineffective in protecting the public interest.” He argued that
“[r]egulation by government unavoidably involves some element of perverse
incentives,” and "rapidly changing technology . . . is rendering much government
bank regulation irrelevant." He predicted that “market-stabilizing private regulatory
forces should gradually displace many cumbersome, increasingly ineffective
government structures.” Greenspan applauded the fact that “regulatory restraints
against interstate banking and combinations of investment and commercial banking
are being swept away under the pressures of technological change,” and he assured
his audience, “The future accordingly looks bright.”. Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Ass’n of Private Enter.
Educ.: The Evolution of Banking in a Market Economy (Apr. 12, 1997).
404
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antitrust laws because they interfered with the free market.” 408
Greenspan considered Rand “a stabilizing force” in his life, and she
stood at his side when he took the oath of office as Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers in 1974.409
Greenspan granted an interview to the New York Times in June
1987, shortly before he was nominated by President Reagan to
succeed Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Fed.410 In that interview,
Greenspan advocated unrestricted nationwide banking, the repeal of
Glass-Steagall, and the removal of BHCA’s barriers to acquisitions of
banks by commercial and industrial firms.411 Greenspan’s positions
were identical to policy proposals that Treasury Under Secretary
George Gould announced in the same news article. 412 In sharp
contrast to Paul Volcker – who said in 1984 that he was concerned
about a “rush to deregulation” that could produce an “undue
concentration of banking resources”413 – Greenspan assured the Times,
“I do not have a fear of undue concentration of banking powers.”414
In December 1987, Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee
that the Fed strongly supported a deregulation bill drafted by Senators
William Proxmire (D-WI) and Jake Garn (R-UT).415 The ProxmireGarn bill would have repealed Glass-Steagall’s anti-affiliation
provisions and allowed bank holding companies to establish securities
subsidiaries that could engage in a full range of securities activities.416
Greenspan praised the Proxmire-Garn bill for addressing “what is
perhaps the single most important anomaly that now plagues our
financial system—the artificial separation of commercial and
investment banking.” 417 Greenspan advised the Committee that
“repeal of Glass-Steagall would provide significant public benefits
408

MADRICK, supra note 12, at 228.
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 153, at 190.
410
See Nash, supra note 208.
411
Id.
412
Id. (quoting proposals made by Greenspan and Gould). Gould’s proposal
that the federal government should encourage the creation of five to ten megabanks
by authorizing unrestricted nationwide banking triggered significant opposition, and
that proposal did not advance further until the Treasury Department issued a
comprehensive plan for financial deregulation in 1991, discussed below in Part III.B.
See also Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 981.
413
Bennett, supra note 207 (quoting Volcker’s congressional testimony).
414
See Nash, supra note 208 (emphasis added).
415
Legislative Proposals to Restructure Our Financial System: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 91–92, 96–97
(1987) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals] (testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
416
Id.
417
Id. at 86.
409
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consistent with a manageable increase in risk.”418
Greenspan acknowledged that “securities activities are clearly
risky,” as demonstrated by “the unprecedented decline in the stock
market that occurred on October 19, 1987, and the subsequent market
volatility.”419 However, he assured the Committee that “potential risks
from securities activities can be effectively managed.”420
Greenspan also admitted that “some large U.S. banks encountered
problems” and suffered losses in their London operations during the
U.K.’s “secondary banking crisis” in the mid-1970s and again in 1986,
after the U.K. carried out its “big bang” deregulation of the London
Stock Exchange.421 Greenspan dismissed those problems as “‘startup’ difficulties rather than long-term safety and soundness
concerns.”422 Greenspan recognized that “empirical studies invariably
find that [securities] underwriting and dealing are riskier than the total
portfolio of other banking functions.” 423 However, he maintained,
“there is evidence of some potential for limited diversification gains,
or overall risk reduction, for banks being allowed increased securities
powers.”424
Greenspan plainly understood that banks would face significant
risks if they made a full-scale entry into the securities business. 425
However, he advised the Senate Banking Committee that banks could
be “effectively insulated from their securities affiliates through an
appropriate structural framework” that included “institutional fire
walls.”426 In his view, “one of the most important” firewalls in the
Proxmire-Garn bill was a provision that would prohibit a bank from
“being able to lend to, or purchase assets from, its securities
418

Id. at 87
Id. at 92.
420
Id.
421
Id.
422
Id. For descriptions of problems that U.S. and U.K. banks encountered in
London’s financial markets during the "secondary banking crisis" of 1973 to 1975,
and again after the "Big Bang" of 1986, see CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 701;
RICHARD DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEREGULATION: THE GREAT BANKING
EXPERIMENT 11–12, 34–35, 106–16 (1992); DAVIS, supra note 74, at 152–53, 229–
30, 237–38; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra 25, at 325; U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 60, at XXI-12 through XXI-14.
423
Legislative Proposals, supra note 415, at 93 (emphasis added).
424
Id. (emphasis added).
425
Id. (“The Congress adopted the Glass-Steagall Act . . . because it believed
that banks had suffered serious losses as a result of their participation in investment
banking. The Congress also thought that bank involvement in the promotional
aspects of the investment banking business would produce a variety of ‘subtle
hazards’ to the banking system such as conflicts of interest and loss of public
confidence.”).
426
Id. at 96.
419
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affiliate.” 427 He believed that a “straightforward prohibition on
lending to securities affiliates” was needed to “limit the transfer of the
risk of the securities activities to the federal safety net.”428
Greenspan emphasized the importance of a no-credit firewall in his
1987 testimony because he recognized that existing limitations on
transactions between banks and their nonbank affiliates would not
contain the risks resulting from affiliations with securities firms.429 As
he explained, “Our experience indicates . . . that these limitations,
embodied in sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, do not
work as effectively as we would like and, because of their complexity,
are subject to avoidance by creative interpretation, particularly in
times of stress.”430 Thus, Greenspan recognized that (i) a repeal of
Glass-Steagall could enable banks to transfer their federal safety-net
subsidies and resulting cost-of-funding advantages to their securities
affiliates through extensions of credit and purchases of assets, and (ii)
Sections 23A and 23B would not be adequate to control such transfers
of subsidies.431
Greenspan’s insistence on strict firewalls to prevent transfers of
safety-net subsidies proved to be short-lived. In May 1990, a coalition
of big banks and supporting trade groups issued a report contending
that legislation to repeal Glass-Steagall should not include additional
“firewalls” between banks and their securities affiliates.432 The bigbank coalition argued that existing laws, including Sections 23A and
427

Id. at 97.
Id. at 97–98.
429
Id. at 93–94.
430
Id.; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (codifying Sections 23A and 23B).
Greenspan agreed with provisions in the Proxmire-Garn bill that would allow “a
securities affiliate . . . to borrow from its holding company parent.” Greenspan
advised that “[t]he holding company is not protected by the federal safety net.”
Legislative Proposals, supra note 415, at 98. Greenspan’s advice was not accurate
in view of the decision by the Fed, FDIC and OCC to bail out the parent holding
company of Continental Illinois and all of its subsidiaries and creditors in 1984.
George C. Nurisso & Edward Simpson Prescott, Origins of Too-Big-to-Fail Policy,
21–24, 33 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 17–10, 2017); FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES
OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–8 (2010) [hereinafter FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N (2010)]; FDIC HISTORY, supra note 373, at 235–36, 243–52.
During the financial crisis of 2007–09, federal authorities again took extraordinary
actions to protect Citigroup, Bank of America, and a number of other large financial
holding companies (including their securities subsidiaries). Wilmarth, Two–Tiered
System, supra note 194, at 256–66.
431
Legislative Proposals, supra note 415.
432
FEIN, supra note 5, at § 1.04[B]; Barbara Rehm, Coalition Presses Congress
to Stop Building ‘Firewalls’, AM. BANKER, May 10, 1990 at 4, 1990 WLNR
1842348 [hereinafter Rehm (1990)].
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23B of the Federal Reserve Act, would be sufficient to prevent
conflicts of interest and other adverse effects of bank affiliations with
securities firms.433
Greenspan quickly fell into line with the big-bank coalition’s
arguments. In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in July
1990, Greenspan stated that the Fed was “reevaluating both the
efficacy and desirability of substantial fire walls” between banks and
their securities affiliates. 434 He gave two reasons for the Fed’s
reassessment. First, the failure of Drexel Burnham in early 1990
“raised serious questions about the ability of fire walls to insulate one
unit of a holding company from funding problems of another.”435 The
insolvency of Drexel’s holding company quickly led to creditor runs
on Drexel’s broker-dealer subsidiaries and forced those subsidiaries
into receivership.436 Second, Greenspan was concerned that “high and
thick fire walls reduce synergies and raise costs for financial
institutions, a significant problem in increasingly competitive financial
markets.”437
It is ironic, to say the least, that Greenspan used the Drexel
episode—when firewalls failed—to argue for weaker firewalls
between banks and their securities affiliates. It also seems clear that
Greenspan, like the big banks, wanted to eliminate strong firewalls in
order to increase the potential value of expected synergies between
banks and their securities affiliates. In his 1990 testimony, Greenspan
advised Congress that “more limited fire walls,” such as the existing
provisions of Sections 23A and 23B, would be sufficient as long as
Congress allowed federal regulators to impose higher capital
requirements and stricter regulatory standards on bank holding
companies that owned broker-dealer subsidiaries. 438 Greenspan
argued that stronger capital requirements and supervisory standards
would “go a long way to limit the transference of bank safety net
subsidies to bank affiliates.”439
433

FEIN, supra note 5, at § 1.04[B]; Rehm (1990), supra note 432.
Fed. Reserve Sys., Statements to Congress, 76 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 731,
734 (1990) (statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate, July 12, 1990).
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Id.
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See id.; see also Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note
29, at 1607 (explaining that “when Drexel Burnham declared bankruptcy in February
1990, following the collapse of the junk bond market, its problems quickly spread”
to its broker-dealer subsidiaries, which the SEC was “obliged to liquidate . . . after
they could not obtain even short-term credit from counterparties or banks”).
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Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 434, at 734.
438
Id. at 437.
439
Id. at 436.
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The banking industry responded with great enthusiasm to
Greenspan’s testimony.
Representatives of big-bank trade
associations hailed Greenspan’s statement as “a bold and ingenious
stroke” and “a refreshing insight” because he recognized that a “strictfirewalls approach” would be an “obstacle to efficiency in product and
service integration.” 440 Other observers agreed that Greenspan’s
testimony “effectively undermined the firewall concept.”441
Greenspan’s testimony in 1987 and 1990 should be remembered in
the context of GLBA’s final terms and the massive bailouts of
financial holding companies during 2007–09. 442
Greenspan
recognized in both 1987 and 1990 that banks would have strong
incentives to transfer their safety-net subsidies to their securities
affiliates.443 Greenspan’s 1987 testimony highlighted the importance
of strong firewalls (including a no-transfer-of-credit rule) to prevent
the spread of subsidies.444 In contrast, his 1990 testimony focused on
the need for high levels of capital and strong supervisory standards if
strong firewalls were not imposed. 445 As discussed below, GLBA
relied primarily on Sections 23A and 23B to prevent the spread of
safety net subsidies. In addition, Greenspan and the Fed granted
frequent waivers of Section 23A and did not impose stringent capital
requirements or tough regulatory standards on large diversified
banks.446 The weak terms of GLBA and the lax regulatory policies of
Greenspan’s Fed resulted in a massive and costly expansion of the
federal safety net during the decade after GLBA’s passage.447
Congress did not pass the Proxmire-Garn bill in 1987 or 1988448,
440

Linda Corman, Firewalls May Have Outlived Their Usefulness, AM.
BANKER, July 26, 1990 at 1, 1990 WLNR 1840266 (quoting Richard Whiting,
general counsel of the Association of Bank Holding Companies, and Robert Dugger,
chief economist of the ABA).
441
Id.
442
See infra Part III.C; Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 194, at 256–
73.
443
See generally Legislative Proposals, supra note 415; Fed. Reserve Sys.,
supra note 434.
444
Legislative Proposals, supra note 415, at 91.
445
Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 434, at 736.
446
See infra text accompanying notes 606–20.
447
See infra notes 594–617 and accompanying text (discussing GLBA’s reliance
on Sections 23A and 23B and the Fed’s frequent waivers of Section 23A after 2000);
Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 32, at 1328–40 (describing the Fed’s
record of regulatory laxity under Greenspan’s leadership); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of
Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 897-905, 917–18 (2011) (same).
448
See Sandra Suarez & Robin Kolodny, Paving the Road to “Too Big to Fail”:
Business Interests and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in the U.S., POLITICS &
SOCIETY 1, 15–21 (2010).
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just as it failed to pass an earlier Senate bill sponsored by Senator
Garn in 1984. 449 On each occasion, the securities and insurance
industries and independent community banks worked together to
prevent a repeal of Glass-Steagall, and they received significant help
from influential Democratic members of Congress.450 One of the most
determined and effective defenders of Glass-Steagall was Rep. John
Dingell (D-MI), whose father strongly supported passage of the GlassSteagall Act as a Michigan congressman 1933.451
After the stock market crashed in October 1987, the securities
industry pointed out that Glass-Steagall played a highly beneficial role
by preventing a contagious spillover of losses from securities firms to
commercial banks.452 In addition, big-bank advocates were severely
embarrassed when Continental Illinois – which received a large
federal bailout in 1984 – extended more than $600 million of
emergency loans to rescue its options trading subsidiary (First
Options) during the crash.453 Continental’s emergency loans exceeded
the lending limit that the OCC established when it allowed Continental
to acquire First Options in 1986.454 Members of Congress strongly
criticized Continental, and the First Options fiasco helped to defeat the
banking industry’s campaign to repeal Glass-Steagall in 1987 and
1988.455
The largest banks persisted in their efforts to remove geographic
and product-line barriers, and they soon received fresh support from
the federal government.456 In 1991, the Treasury Department issued a
449

Id. at 17.
See id. at 15–21.
451
See id. at 20. See also FEIN, supra note 5, at § 1.06[A]; Nash, supra note
208; Leslie Wayne, Bank Barrier Resists Foes; Glass-Steagall Walls May Just Be
Replaced, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991; 77 CONG. REC. 3906-07 (1933) (remarks of
Rep. Dingell).
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Robert Trigaux, BRIEFING: Playing on Glass-Steagall Fears, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 23, 1987 at 1, 1987 WLNR 570383 (reporting that “‘Glass-Steagall Saved U.S.
Again’ is emblazoned on large round buttons appearing in Washington now, a lapel
message from the securities industry that the stock market fall of October was less of
a catastrophe only thanks to the absence of commercial banks in the securities
underwriting business”); see also supra text accompanying notes 72–74, 85 (citing
evidence showing that Glass-Steagall played a positive role during the October 1987
stock market crash by shielding commercial banks from exposure to losses suffered
by securities firms).
453
See Terry Atlas, Lawmakers Take Continental to Task, CHI. TR., Feb. 4,
1988, 1988 WLNR 1724293.
454
Id.
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See id.; DALE, supra note 422, at 53–54; Trigaux, supra note 452; Robert
Trigaux, Revival of Continental’s Woes Raises Doubts on New Powers, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 28, 1987, 1987 WLNR 567921.
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Suarez & Kolodny, supra note 448, at 17–21 (describing continued efforts by
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blueprint for comprehensive deregulation, entitled Modernizing the
Financial System. 457 The Treasury plan contained the same three
proposals that Treasury Under Secretary George Gould floated in 1987
– nationwide banking and branching, the repeal of Glass-Steagall, and
the removal of barriers to acquisitions of banks by commercial and
industrial firms. 458 As described below in Part III.B. and III.C.,
Congress enacted Treasury’s first two proposals and thereby paved the
way for the creation of giant financial conglomerates that stretched
across the nation and spanned all sectors of the financial industry.
B. In 1994, Congress Passed the Riegle-Neal Act, Which Adopted
Treasury’s 1991 Proposal for Nationwide Banking and
Branching
The first key proposal of the 1991 Treasury deregulation plan was
to authorize unrestricted nationwide banking through interstate
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies as well as interstate
branching. 459 Treasury urged Congress to repeal Section 3(d) of
BHCA, which allowed each state to determine the degree to which
out-of-state bank holding companies could acquire banks within its
borders.460 Beginning in 1975, states began to permit entry by out-ofstate bank holding companies.461 By 1991, thirty-four states allowed
entry by bank holding companies located anywhere in the nation,
subject to reciprocity requirements in twenty-two states.462 Fourteen
large banks to persuade Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall during the late 1980s and
early 1990s); Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 979–80 (discussing
unsuccessful efforts to persuade Congress to enact interstate banking legislation in
the early 1990s).
457
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 60.
458
Id. at 49–61. For Gould’s 1987 proposals, see supra notes 411–12 and
accompanying text. Congress has not yet adopted the Treasury plan’s third proposal,
which would permit acquisitions of banks by commercial and industrial firms.
However, GLBA allows financial holding companies to make “merchant banking”
investments that could potentially undermine the separation of banking and
commerce. Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at
1579–87. In addition, two provisions of GLBA allow the Fed to approve
“complementary” activities for financial holding companies and preserve certain
“grandfathered” powers for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Based on those
two provisions, the Fed has permitted Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and several
other financial holding companies to engage in commodities activities that are
commercial in nature. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall
Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2013).
459
Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1580.
460
Id.; Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 962, 977–79.
461
Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 963–64.
462
Id.
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other states allowed entry by out-of-state bank holding companies only
if their home states were located in a defined geographical region and
offered reciprocal access.463 Treasury’s plan called for a new federal
statute that would remove all federal and state barriers to interstate
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies.464
Treasury also proposed an amendment to the McFadden Act (12
U.S.C. § 36), which would authorize national banks to establish
branches on a nationwide basis either by merging with banks in other
states or by opening de novo branches across state lines. 465 This
proposal represented a more radical change to existing law, because in
1991 the McFadden Act barred national banks and state member banks
from opening branches across state lines.466
The Treasury plan argued that nationwide banking and branching
would create stronger and safer banks through geographic
diversification.467 The plan also contended that nationwide banking
and branching would create a more efficient, competitive and
profitable banking industry and would provide greater convenience to
bank customers, including large corporations, residents of multistate
urban areas, and travelers.468 The plan did not specifically promote
the idea of nationwide megabanks.469 However, as I argued in a 1992
article, the plan clearly indicated Treasury’s support for “a rapid
consolidation of most of the banking industry into a small number of
large nationwide banks.”470
In the same article, I maintained that nationwide banking and
branching would present serious potential risks to the U.S. financial
system and economy for several reasons. 471 First, while large,
geographically diversified banks might face lower risks of failure due
to local or regional economic downturns, mergers between large banks
would encounter significant challenges as a result of culture clashes
463

Id. at 964, 977–79.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 60, at 51.
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Id. at 51–52.
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Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 963, 978–79. The McFadden
Act did not prohibit interstate branching by state nonmember banks, but only four
states allowed their banks to establish out-of-state branches in 1991. Id. at 963–64
n.16.
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U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 60, at XVII-8, XVII-9.
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Id. at XVII-9 through XVII-13.
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See id. at 49–53
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Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 980–82. In 1987, as noted
above, Treasury Under Secretary George Gould called for interstate banking
legislation and the repeal of Glass-Steagall in order to promote the creation of “5 to
10 giant banks that would rival in size the largest banks in Japan, West Germany,
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and incompatible risk profiles. 472 During the 1980s stronger banks
often experienced severe difficulties after absorbing weaker
institutions, because losses and other problems from acquired
institutions infected the combined organizations. 473 Second, it was
very doubtful whether executives could successfully identify and
control the wide range of risks presented by complex financial
giants. 474 Third, Treasury’s assertion that larger size would confer
greater safety was contradicted by the fact that many large banks
performed poorly during the 1980s and early 1990s.475 Eleven of the
fifty largest U.S. banks either failed or required federal bailouts during
that period.476 Fourth, empirical studies raised serious doubts about
the claimed efficiency advantages of the largest banks, and many
consumers and small businesses were not happy with the services
provided and fees charged by big banks.477 Fifth, nationwide banks
would present significant threats to competition in many markets for
banking services, and antitrust laws were not likely to be effective in
controlling those threats.478
Sixth, and most importantly, I argued that nationwide banking and
branching would make the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) problem much
worse by creating giant banks whose potential failures would pose
much greater systemic threats to the U.S. banking system.479 Federal
regulators invoked the TBTF rationale when they bailed out several
472
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large regional banks during the banking crisis of the 1980s and early
1990s, including Continental Illinois in 1984, First RepublicBank in
1988, and Bank of New England in 1991. 480 Regulators protected
those banks and their uninsured creditors to avoid the possibility of
triggering creditor runs on big money center banks that faced severe
threats to their survival.481 James Barth, Dan Brumbaugh, and Robert
Litan determined that “the largest banks, as a group, pose[d] the
greatest risk to the FDIC” in 1990, and they identified several money
center banks — including Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, Chemical, and
Manufacturers Hanover — as institutions that had inadequate loan loss
reserves and “very thin capital margins” at that time. 482 Federal
regulators provided extensive forbearance and implicit support to
Citicorp, the largest U.S. bank, which was severely undercapitalized
and struggled with multiple problems during the late 1980s and early
1990s.483
In light of the grave threats that large U.S. banks faced during the
1980s and early 1990s, it was not surprising that the 1991 Treasury
plan did not seek to abolish the TBTF policy.484 Instead, the Treasury
plan recommended that the TBTF policy should be codified by
incorporating a new “systemic risk exception” into federal law. 485
That “exception” would allow Treasury and the Fed to determine
jointly that uninsured depositors of a failing bank should be protected
in order to prevent “systemic risk.” 486 To justify the proposed
codification of TBTF, Treasury cited the “most recent example” of
protecting uninsured depositors at the Bank of New England, and
Treasury also declared: “The government must always maintain the
flexibility to protect the banking system and the economy in
circumstances of genuine systemic risk.”487
In December 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), 488 which expanded the
supervisory, enforcement, and resolution powers of federal banking
480
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regulators. As proposed by the Treasury plan, FDICIA requires
regulators to follow “prompt corrective action” and “early resolution”
policies.489 Those policies are designed to force regulators to impose
strict sanctions on undercapitalized banks and to close weak banks
before they become insolvent.490
FDICIA also requires the FDIC to use the least costly method for
resolving bank failures.491 The “least-cost test,” which was included
in the Treasury plan, is intended to stop the FDIC from protecting
uninsured depositors in most failed banks. 492 However, as the
Treasury plan recommended, FDICIA includes a “systemic risk
exception” to the least-cost test. 493 Under that exception, the Fed,
FDIC and Treasury may jointly decide to protect uninsured creditors
of a failed bank to “avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on
economic conditions or financial stability.”494 Thus, as I pointed out
in my 1992 article, FDICIA “for the first time provide[d] a clear
statutory basis for the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine."495
FDICIA also contained a second significant expansion of the
federal safety net, which directly benefited securities firms and other
nonbanks. Section 473 of FDICIA amended Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act by authorizing the Fed to provide emergency
loans to nonbanks secured by almost any type of collateral that the Fed
deemed to be satisfactory, including securities and other types of
financial instruments. 496 Prior to 1991, the Fed could not accept
489
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securities as collateral for loans under Section 13(3). 497 Goldman
Sachs and other large securities firms lobbied for the amendment
because of concerns created by the Fed’s failure to rescue Drexel
Burnham from bankruptcy in 1990.498 Senator Christopher Dodd (DCT) sponsored the amendment to Section 13(3), and he explained that
the amendment would permit the Fed “to make fully secured loans to
securities firms in instances similar to the 1987 stock market crash.”499
In 2008, the Fed relied on its expanded lending authority under
Section 13(3) to provide massive amounts of financial support to large
securities firms — including securities broker-dealers that were
affiliates of major banks — as well as AIG and other nonbanks.500
Morgan Ricks has suggested (and I agree) that FDICIA’s grant of
“lender of last resort” authority to the Fed with regard to securities
firms was a significant factor that encouraged the explosive growth of
securities broker-dealers and their non-deposit liabilities (including
commercial paper and repos) after 1991.501
FDICIA did not include Treasury’s proposal for nationwide
banking and branching. 502 Community banks and their allies
successfully defeated efforts by the George H.W. Bush Administration
and big banks to incorporate that proposal in the 1991 legislation.503
As a result, Treasury’s interstate banking recommendation remained
an active agenda item when the Clinton Administration took office in
early 1993.504
The Clinton Administration submitted an interstate banking bill to
Congress in October 1993.505 Administration officials worked closely
497
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with the big-bank lobby to secure passage of Riegle-Neal in
September 1994.506 Riegle-Neal authorized nationwide banking and
branching, as the Treasury plan recommended.507 Community banks
and consumer groups could not stop the legislation after the insurance
industry saw “passage as inevitable, [and] dropped its opposition.”508
When President Clinton signed Riegle-Neal into law, he declared,
“Our work is far from over,” and he promised to push Congress to
approve further deregulation of the financial industry.509
Riegle-Neal greatly accelerated a wave of consolidation that was
already sweeping through the banking industry. In 1995, big banks
announced nine mergers that ranked among the fourteen largest U.S.
bank mergers up to that time. 510 Seventy-four “megamergers”
occurred between 1990 and 2005 in which both the acquiring and
acquired banks held more than $10 billion of assets. 511 During the
same period, the ten largest U.S. banks more than doubled their share
of total U.S. banking assets from twenty-five percent to fifty-five
percent.512 The three largest U.S. banking organizations in 2007 —
Citigroup, BofA, and JPMC — expanded rapidly after 1990, and each
bank held more than $1.5 billion of assets at the end of 2007. 513
Wachovia, the fourth-largest bank, also grew quickly and held almost
$800 billion of assets at the end of 2007.514
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The consolidation trend transformed the U.S. banking industry into
a two-tiered structure with a “barbell” shape. 515 A small group of
giant megabanks occupied the top end of the barbell, and they
controlled a substantial majority of the banking industry’s assets.516
Several thousand smaller, community-oriented banks were clustered at
the lower end of the barbell, and their share of the industry’s assets
steadily declined.517 As the largest banks exploded in size, they also
achieved unprecedented political clout, as they showed when they
convinced Congress to pass GLBA and CFMA.518
C. In 1999, Congress Passed GLBA, Which Adopted the
Treasury’s 1991 Proposal to Authorize Full-Scale Affiliations
between Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies
The second central component of the 1991 Treasury deregulation
plan was its proposal to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s antiaffiliation rules and to authorize financial holding companies that
could own banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.519 The
Treasury plan argued that unrestricted affiliations between banks and
other providers of financial services would create “a stronger, more
diversified financial system that will provide important benefits to the
consumer” and respond effectively to “market innovation.”520
Treasury’s 1991 report acknowledged that federal agency rulings
already permitted banks and bank holding companies to engage “in a
broad range of securities activities,” including securitization of loans
as well as underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible securities
through Section 20 subsidiaries. 521 However, those agency rulings
imposed “numerous restrictions,” such as “strict ‘firewall’
requirements” that imposed significant constraints on transactions
between banks and their securities affiliates.522 In Treasury’s view,
the deregulation achieved through agency rulings was seriously flawed
and incomplete because it had proceeded in “a piecemeal, inefficient,
515
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and often irrational manner.” 523
Treasury’s 1991 report called on Congress to allow banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies to establish full-scale
affiliations under the common ownership of financial holding
companies, “so that natural synergies c[ould] be realized.”524 Treasury
predicted that businesses and consumers would benefit from “more
financial vendors offering a greater variety of products at
competitively lower prices.” 525 In addition, financial holding
companies would produce “a more stable stream of income,” thereby
enhancing “the overall stability of financial markets.”526
Treasury’s report recognized that the “federal safety net cannot be
extended to [nonbank affiliates] without eroding market discipline,
exposing the taxpayer to additional losses, and unfairly subsidizing the
activities of financial affiliates.” 527 The report acknowledged that
transfers of funds from a bank to its nonbank affiliates could produce a
situation in which (i) the federal safety net was “exposed to losses
from affiliates” and (ii) the “bank’s funding advantages from the
safety net could ‘leak’ into affiliated financial activities.”528 Treasury,
therefore, recommended the use of “firewalls” to separate banks from
their nonbank affiliates.529
Treasury argued, however, that firewalls “should be kept to the
minimum necessary to protect insured deposits and prevent [an] unfair
funding subsidy,” and firewalls “should not restrict or impede
operational, managerial, or marketing synergies between a bank and
its financial affiliates.”530 In line with Greenspan’s 1990 testimony,
Treasury’s 1991 report advised that the existing limits on affiliate
transactions under Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
would be sufficient, particularly if regulators were given authority to
impose additional “discretionary” restrictions on affiliate
transactions.531
FDICIA did not include Treasury’s financial holding company
proposal. 532 The House Banking Committee incorporated much of
Treasury’s proposal into its bill, but the House Energy and Commerce
523
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Committee, led by Representative Dingell, imposed very strict limits
on the securities and insurance activities that would be permissible for
nonbank affiliates of banks. 533 The resulting House bill was
unacceptable to both Treasury and the big banks, and they abandoned
their efforts to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s anti-affiliation
rules in November 1991.534 The insurance industry and community
banks worked together to stop the repeal legislation, while the
securities industry was ambivalent and did little to support it.535
Big banks and their political allies focused on interstate banking
legislation until Congress passed Riegle-Neal in September 1994.536
In early 1995, the big-bank lobby launched a new campaign to pass
“financial modernization” legislation that would tear down GlassSteagall’s and BHCA’s structural barriers. 537 Prospects for passage
seemed favorable after Republicans captured control of the House in
the 1994 midterm elections, and after Representative Dingell lost his
blocking position as chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee.538 However, the insurance industry and community banks
succeeded in blocking financial modernization bills during 1995 and
1996.539
Congress also failed to pass financial modernization legislation in
1997 and 1998, but two major events occurred during those years that
shifted the political landscape in favor of financial deregulation. 540
First, after repeatedly losing legal challenges to federal agency rulings,
large securities firms and insurance underwriters decided to join the
big banks in pushing for repeal of Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s antiaffiliation rules. 541 Securities firms and insurance underwriters
endorsed the financial holding company concept because it created a
“two-way street” that would enable them to conduct banking activities
533
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on equal terms with bank holding companies.542 The shift of securities
firms and insurance underwriters to the pro-repeal side left insurance
agents and community banks as the only major trade groups that
opposed repeal.543
The second decisive event occurred in April 1998, when Travelers
and Citicorp announced their decision to merge under the name of
“Citigroup,” thereby creating the world’s biggest financial
institution. 544 Travelers was a major insurance company that
controlled a large securities broker-dealer (Salomon Brothers), while
Citicorp was the largest U.S. bank holding company.545 The Citigroup
merger created the first “universal bank” that could offer
comprehensive banking, securities, and insurance services in the
United States since the 1930s.546
Citigroup’s co-leaders — Sanford (Sandy) Weill of Travelers and
John Reed of Citicorp — declared that their new financial
conglomerate would offer unparalleled convenience to their customers
through “one-stop shopping” for a wide range of banking, securities,
and insurance services.547 They also argued that Citigroup would have
a superior ability to withstand financial shocks due to its broadly
diversified activities.548 Sandy Weill proclaimed, “We are creating a
model financial institution of the future. . . . In a world that’s changing
very rapidly, we will be able to withstand the storms.” 549 Thus,
Citigroup’s founders cited the same anticipated benefits of universal
banking that the 1991 Treasury report had trumpeted.
The creation of Citigroup was a very aggressive move that placed
intense pressure on Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s
structural barriers. The proposed merger “challenge[d] both the
statutory letter and regulatory spirit” of Glass-Steagall and BHCA.550
The sole source of statutory authority for the merger was “a temporary
542
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exemption in [BHCA], which allowed newly-formed bank holding
companies to retain nonconforming assets for up to five years after
their creation.” 551 However, as a banking lawyer noted, that
temporary exemption was “intended to provide an orderly mechanism
for disposing of impermissible activities, not warehousing them in
hopes the law would change so you could keep them.”552
The Citigroup merger confronted Congress with a “Hobson’s
choice” — either repeal Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation
rules or force Citigroup, within five years, to divest all of its activities
that were not permitted by Glass-Steagall and BHCA.553 In blunter
terms, the Citigroup deal put a gun to the head of Congress, and it did
so with the full blessing of top government officials. Sandy Weill and
John Reed consulted with Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin, and President Clinton before they announced
the Citigroup merger.554 All three officials endorsed the merger.555
Based on those advance consultations, Reed told the press that
Travelers and Citicorp were confident “there wasn’t a legal problem”
in completing the merger. 556 The Fed approved the merger in due
course, and the D.C. Circuit upheld the Fed’s approval.557
The “advance clearance” that Travelers and Citicorp received from
Clinton, Greenspan, and Rubin was “extraordinary” and, to my
knowledge, unprecedented. 558
The kid-gloves treatment that
government leaders provided to Travelers and Citicorp demonstrated
the “powerful influence” that big banks and Wall Street firms could
551
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wield in their dealings with politicians and regulators. 559 As Jeff
Madrick observed, the advance blessing for Citigroup provided “a
stark example of the ease with which the powerful on Wall Street got
the ear of key policymakers, and also how easily the Fed, through its
rulings, could bypass the intentions of Congress.” 560 For his part,
Greenspan assured Reed and Weill, “I have nothing against size . . .
[i]t doesn’t bother me at all.”561
********************************************
Citigroup and Weill promptly became the leading private-sector
champions for repeal of the remaining obstacles to universal banking.
Big banks, securities firms, and insurance companies joined with
Citigroup in financing a campaign for GLBA’s passage that spent
more than $300 million on lobbying and political campaign
contributions.562 Greenspan and Rubin eagerly supported the financial
industry’s efforts to get rid of the legal obstacles to universal
banking.563 Greenspan argued that Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s antiaffiliation rules forced financial institutions “to take elaborate steps to
develop and deliver new financial products in a manner that is . . .
increasingly burdensome and serve[s] no useful public purpose.”564 In
Greenspan’s view, those “archaic statutory barriers” threatened to
“undermine the global dominance of American finance, as well as the
continued competitiveness of our financial institutions.” 565 He also
hailed the benefits of “one-stop shopping” that universal banking
would offer to businesses and consumers.566
Rubin similarly contended that an increasing “convergence”
between the business models of large banks and securities firms made
“any legal separation of commercial and investment banking
increasingly awkward and artificial.” 567 He warned Congress that
559

Id.; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 306.
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 313.
561
Id. (quoting Greenspan).
562
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 314–15; Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 22, at
74–75; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 306–07; Robert Scheer, Privacy
Issue Bubbles Beneath the Photo Op, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at B9.
563
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 312–15; Scheer, supra note 562.
564
H.R. 10 and the Need for Financial Reform Before the H. Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System).
565
Id.
566
H.R. 10, the Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System).
567
Financial Services Competitiveness Act Before the H. Comm. on Banking
continued . . .
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Glass-Steagall and BHCA imposed “unnecessary costs on the financial
system” and could “conceivably impede safety and soundness by
limiting revenue diversification.” 568 Rubin was confident that
universal banks would provide “more integrated, convenient financial
services to consumers and communities.”569 He acknowledged “the
legitimacy of the concerns that led to [the] enactment of GlassSteagall.” 570 However, he believed those concerns could be
“adequately addressed” by Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act as well as strong capital and regulatory standards.571
Thus, Greenspan, Rubin, and the Clinton Administration
enthusiastically embraced the perceived benefits of universal banking
and worked hard to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s antiaffiliation rules. Rubin was a former co-chief executive of Goldman
Sachs, and he maintained an extensive network of relationships with
leaders of major banks and securities firms. 572 President Clinton
maintained close friendships with leading financiers (including Sandy
Weill and Hugh McColl), and he welcomed the political contributions
his campaigns received from big banks, Wall Street firms, and their
trade associations.573 In May 1996, Clinton was the featured guest at a
political fundraising event for leading bankers, which was held at the
White House and hosted by the Democratic National Committee.574
and Financial Services, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Robert Rubin, Secretary,
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury).
568
Id.
569
Id.
570
Id.
571
Id.
572
Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 32, at 1409–11; Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra
note 22, at 101.
573
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER--AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE
CLASS 247–50 (2010); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 518, at 93–104, 185–87;
MADRICK, supra note 12, at 287, 313–15; Malone, supra note 518; Scheer, supra
note 562; Scism, supra note 506. Rubin and Greenspan did have a significant
jurisdictional battle over which federal agency should be given primary authority to
regulate the new universal banks. Rubin argued that national banks should be
allowed to conduct expanded powers through directly-owned financial subsidiaries,
which would be regulated by the OCC (an autonomous unit within the Treasury
Department). In contrast, Greenspan contended that broader powers should be
granted only to nonbank subsidiaries of financial holding companies, which the Fed
would regulate. GLBA’s final terms granted only limited powers to financial
subsidiaries of national banks. In contrast, GLBA gave significantly broader powers
to nonbank subsidiaries of financial holding companies and also gave the Fed
primary authority to determine the scope of those powers. Suarez & Kolodny, supra
note 448, at 27–31; Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 225, at 277
n.203.
574
Stephen Labaton, A Clinton Social with Bankers Included a Leading
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Top executives from several of the nation’s largest banks attended the
fund-raiser, along with Clinton, Rubin, other senior Treasury officials,
and Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig (the senior regulator
of national banks).575 The event included a discussion of strategies for
repealing Glass-Steagall.576
Congress approved GLBA in November 1999, due in large part to
the Clinton Administration’s strong backing as well as the unified
support of big banks, securities firms, and insurance underwriters.577
Insurance agents and community banks strongly opposed the
legislation, and Republicans and Democrats disagreed over the
standards that financial holding companies should be required to
satisfy under the Community Reinvestment Act.578 As a result, final
passage of GLBA did not come easily.579
In October 1999, Citigroup hired Robert Rubin as its new cochairman in the midst of prolonged political and financial debates over
GLBA.580 Rubin’s stature as a former Treasury Secretary provided a
“highly visible public endorsement” for Citigroup’s campaign to
repeal Glass-Steagall.581 A few weeks later, when final negotiations
on GLBA “appeared to reach an impasse,” Senator Phil Gramm (RTX) arranged for Sandy Weill “to help broker a last-minute
compromise between Republican congressional leaders and the
Clinton Administration, thereby securing [GLBA’s] passage.”582
During the congressional debates over GLBA, supporters of the
legislation repeated the claims previously made by the 1991 Treasury
report — and by Greenspan and Rubin — that the new financial
holding companies would (i) “earn higher profits based on favorable
economies of scale and scope,” (ii) “achieve greater safety by
diversifying their activities,” (iii) offer “one-stop shopping” that would
provide “increased convenience and lower costs for businesses and
consumers,” and (iv) “compete with foreign universal banks” more
Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1997, at 8.
575
Id.
576
Id.
577
Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 22, at 73–75; Wilmarth, Transformation,
supra note 25, at 306–07.
578
Daniel J. Parks, Financial Services Overhaul Bill Clears After Final
Skirmishing Over Community Reinvestment, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2654, 2654
(1999).
579
Daniel J. Parks, United at Last, Financial Industry Pressures Hill
to Clear Overhaul, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2373, 2373 (1999); Suarez & Kolodny,
supra note 448, at 27–31.
580
Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 22, at 75.
581
Id.; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 306.
582
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 306–07.

#/ &/

 // )/
)/(/  )/)/ )

, )/%/

effectively.583 GLBA’s supporters also argued that the legislation was
needed to sweep away the “inefficient and costly” and potentially
“unstable” loopholes that federal agency rulings had created, and to
replace those loopholes with a clear, definitive legal framework
authorizing full-scale affiliations between banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies.584
When he signed GLBA into law, President Clinton declared, “This
is a very good day for the United States. . . . [W]e have done right by
the American people and . . . we have increased the chances of making
the next century an American century.”585 At the signing ceremony,
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers similarly proclaimed, “With
this bill, the American financial system takes a major step forward
towards the 21st century. . . . I believe we have found the right
framework for America’s future financial system.”586
Phil Gramm, whose free-market zeal matched Greenspan’s,
boasted at the signing ceremony that GLBA was “a deregulatory
bill.”587 Gramm noted that “when Glass-Steagall became law, it was
believed that government was the answer. . . . We are here to repeal
Glass-Steagall because we have learned that government is not the
answer.”588 A few months after GLBA’s passage, Gramm described
Wall Street as “the very nerve center of American capitalism . . . to

583

Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 973
(summarizing arguments of GLBA’s supporters); see S. Rep. No. 106-44, at 4–6
(1999); 145 Cong. Rec. S13,783–84 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Gramm).
584
145 Cong. Rec. S13,783 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Gramm);
see also 145 Cong. Rec. S13,888 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Reed,
stating that GLBA would provide an “important ratification” of prior developments,
and would “allow our financial institutions to be more efficient and more effective”);
145 Cong. Rec. S13,990 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Bryan, stating that
GLBA would provide "a new regulatory model, a new framework" to replace earlier
court decisions and agency rulings); 145 Cong. Rec. S13,907 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1999) (remarks of Sen. Lieberman, stating that GLBA would establish a “rational
financial structure” to replace “regulatory loopholes”).
585
Press Release, Bill Clinton, President, Statement by President Bill Clinton at
the Signing of the Financial Modernization Bill (Nov. 12, 1999).
586
Id.
587
Id.
588
Id.; see also Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back,
Unswayed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2008)
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/economy/17gramm.html (describing
Gramm, a former economics professor at Texas A&M, as a “fierce opponent of
government intervention in the marketplace,” and quoting a fellow Senator’s
description of Sen. Gramm as a “true dyed-in-the-wool, free-market guy . . . very
much a purist”) (quoting former Senator Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL)).
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me, that’s a holy place.”589
In contrast to the rosy predictions of GLBA’s supporters, GLBA’s
opponents argued that “the new universal banks permitted by GLBA
were likely to generate financial risks and speculative excesses similar
to those that occurred during the 1920s.”590 Opponents contended that
regulators would almost certainly protect the new universal banks as
institutions that were TBTF.591 Opponents also warned that “removal
of Glass-Steagall’s constraints might ultimately cause a financial crisis
similar in magnitude to the Great Depression.”592
********************************************
GLBA’s supporters acknowledged that GLBA should protect the
federal safety net from the potential risks of securities and insurance
activities, and should also prevent banks from transferring their safetynet subsidies to their securities and insurance affiliates. 593 To
accomplish those goals, GLBA relied primarily on “firewalls”
resulting from (i) the separate corporate identities of banks and their
nonbank affiliates, and (ii) the restrictions on affiliate transactions
under Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.594 However,
as Joseph Stiglitz subsequently explained, the firewall arguments of
GLBA’s supporters relied on “an obvious intellectual
inconsistency.”595 If insured banks and the federal safety net needed
589

Lipton & Labaton, supra note 588 (quoting Gramm’s remarks at a Senate
hearing in April 2000).
590
Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 974
(summarizing arguments made by GLBA's opponents).
591
Id. (same).
592
Id. (same); see 145 Cong. Rec. S13,871–74 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks
of Sen. Wellstone); 145 Cong. Rec. S13,896–97 (remarks of Sen. Dorgan); 145
Cong. Rec. H11,530, H11,542 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
593
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 7–8 (1999) (stating that “[t]he deposit
insurance funds must be adequately insulated from paying the losses of firms which
are affiliated with insured banks.”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, at 134–35 (1999).
594
Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1683, 1692, 1696–97, 1707 (2011); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at
454–57; see S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 7–8 (1999) (citing the “safeguards” provided by
GLBA's requirement that securities and insurance activities must be conducted in
separate nonbank subsidiaries within “the holding company structure”); id. at 66
("Additional Views" of nine Democratic Senators, expressing confidence in the
"strict limits" provided by Sections 23A and 23B); 145 Cong. Rec. S13,783-84
(daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Gramm); id. at 13,881 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1999) (remarks of Sen. Schumer).
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JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
WORLD’S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE 160 (2003).

#/ /

 // )/
)/(/  )/)/ )

, )/%/

to be shielded from the risks posed by securities and insurance
affiliates, “what were the benefits of integration?”596 If, on the other
hand, Congress established only weak “Chinese walls” in order to
promote desirable “economies of scope” across financial holding
companies, that approach would obviously increase the risks to the
FDIC and taxpayers and would also enable banks to transfer safety-net
subsidies to their affiliates.597
In 1995, Paul Volcker warned Congress that regulators would
probably be forced to extend the federal safety net to protect large
securities firms if they were allowed to affiliate with large banks.598 In
testimony before the House Banking Committee, Volcker said:
[I]t is obvious that if you had a large investment bank
allied with a large [commercial] bank, the possibility of
a systemic risk arising is evident. . . . It may be even
evident with the investment bank alone. We are trying
to keep them out of the so-called safety net now, but
certainly you cannot keep them out if they are
combined with a banking institution.599
GLBA’s supporters ignored Stigler’s paradox and Volcker’s
warning, and Congress adopted the “limited” firewall approach, as
Greenspan and Rubin had advocated. 600 In contrast, Senator Paul
Wellstone (D-MN), a strong opponent of GLBA, warned that the
firewalls remaining after Glass-Steagall’s repeal would be “weak” and
would probably disappear during a future financial crisis. 601
Wellstone pointed out that Glass-Steagall was “one of several
stabilizers” designed to prevent a second Great Depression, and GLBA
would “repeal that stabilizer without putting any comparable safeguard
in place.”602
Saule Omarova has shown just how porous and ineffective the
596

Id. at 159–61.
Id.
598
SILBER, supra note 91, at 275, 419 n.5 (quoting Volcker’s testimony before
the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services in April 1995).
599
Id.
600
See supra notes 434–39, 571 and accompanying text (discussing Greenspan’s
and Rubin’s recommendation for “limited” firewalls); Wilmarth, Transformation,
supra note 25, at 457 (questioning “whether regulators and lobbyists for the financial
services industry actually believed in the virtues of corporate separation during the
1990s, or whether they simply viewed the ‘firewall’ argument as a convenient tool to
help persuade Congress that [GLBA] would not create undue risks.”).
601
145 CONG. REC. S13,872 (daily ed., Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Wellstone).
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Section 23A firewall proved to be.603 Section 23A is not an absolute
barrier to the transfer of safety-net subsidies because it permits banks
to transfer some of their cost-of-funding advantages to their
affiliates. 604 Under Section 23A, a bank may extend credit to, and
may purchase assets from, its nonbank affiliates as long as the bank
complies with specified quantitative limits, collateral requirements,
and qualitative conditions.605 The scope of Section 23A is limited by a
number of statutory exemptions, which provide interpretive challenges
and opportunities for arbitrage. 606 In addition, the Fed possessed
broad, unilateral, authority to waive Section 23A’s requirements until
2010.607 Thus, as Alan Greenspan admitted in his 1987 testimony, the
“complexity” of Sections 23A and 23B made both statutes vulnerable
“to avoidance by creative interpretation, particularly in times of
stress.”608
The first acid test of the post-GLBA firewalls occurred during the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.609
When the attacks threatened to disrupt financial markets on Wall
Street, the Fed flooded the financial markets with liquidity by
purchasing $150 billion of government securities and by extending
more than $45 billion of discount window loans to banks.610 The Fed
also “suspended” Section 23A’s limits on affiliate transactions and
603

See Omarova, supra note 594, at 1688–89.
Id. at 1690.
605
Id. at 1692–94.
606
Id. at 1697–1700, 1706–09; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at
604

456.
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Omarova, supra note 594, at 1701. Section 23B requires affiliate
transactions to be conducted on arm’s-length, market-based terms, but Section 23B
does not impose additional quantitative limits on affiliate transactions); id. at 1693–
94; see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 23–25 (discussing Sections
23A & 23B). The Dodd-Frank Act limited, but did not abolish, the Fed’s authority
to grant exemptions and waivers from Section 23A’s requirements. Omarova, supra
note 594, at 1701, 1766–68.
608
Legislative Proposals to Restructure our Financial System, Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 20 (1987) (statement
by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System);
see also supra notes 434–41 above and accompanying text (discussing the context of
Greenspan’s 1987 testimony); see also Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at
456 (noting that “regulators and analysts have acknowledged that . . . the restrictions
in Sections 23A and 23B are complicated and difficult to enforce”).
609
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Subprime Crisis Confirms Wisdom of Separating
Banking and Commerce, 27 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 9 (2008)
(following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Board suspended Section
23A's restrictions on affiliate transactions between large banks and their securities
affiliates).
610
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 60.
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“urged major banks to make large transfers of funds to their securities
affiliates.”611 In my 2002 article, I suggested that the Fed’s Section
23A waivers on 9/11 indicated that “the [Fed] views the survival of
major financial conglomerates as an indispensable element of its
broader mission to preserve market stability. Market participants
therefore have strong reasons to expect that the TBTF policy will be
applied to all important subsidiaries of leading financial holding
companies.”612
As Saule Omarova has shown, the Fed subsequently acted in
precisely the way I anticipated in 2002. The Fed repeatedly waived
Section 23A’s restrictions to assist large financial institutions as they
expanded and consolidated their operations between 2000 and 2007.613
The Fed granted even broader waivers of Section 23A’s limitations
after the financial crisis began in mid-2007, so that major banks could
rescue their threatened securities affiliates and MMMFs.614 The Fed’s
extraordinary waivers after mid-2007 permitted “massive transfers of
funds” from large banks to their nonbank affiliates in ways that
“purposely exposed banks to risks associated with their affiliates’
nonbanking business and transferred [the] federal subsidy outside the
[banking] system.”615
The Fed’s large-scale waivers of Section 23A after the financial
611

Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 456–57, 472; see also Report
from the President: Responding to September 11 and Future Prospects for the New
York Regional Economy, in 2001 Annual Report, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 1, 3, 7–9
(2001),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/aboutthefed/annual/annual01/repor
t.pdf (describing how the New York Fed “stave[d] off a potential liquidity crisis that
could have posed a systemic risk” on 9/11 by (i) “inject[ing] tens of billions of
dollars into the financial system through discount window loans [that reached $46
billion on September 12, 2001,]” and “open market operations” in which the Fed
purchased Treasury bonds from primary dealers, and (ii) providing “appropriate
flexibility” under Section 23A, which allowed banks to “extend credit” to their
securities affiliates in view of “the difficult conditions in government securities and
money markets”).
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Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 473.
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Omarova, supra note 594, at 1706–29. For example, in 2006 the Fed granted
waivers under Section 23A that enabled Citigroup to transfer more than $17 billion
of subprime mortgages from its nonbank mortgage lending subsidiaries to Citibank,
its flagship bank. Those transfers significantly increased Citibank’s losses from
subprime mortgages after the financial crisis broke out in mid-2007. Id. at 1712–17.
614
See id. at 1729–50. In addition, the Fed approved broad waivers of Section
23A to help Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley convert to financial holding
companies, and to enable GMAC to provide vehicle financing to General Motors'
customers in conjunction with the federal government’s rescue of General Motors.
Id. at 1750–61.
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Id. at 1762–63.
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crisis broke out were part of a comprehensive series of rescue
measures that bailed out large financial conglomerates in the banking,
securities, and insurance sectors.616 Those bailouts “turned to ashes”
the promises made by Citigroup’s founders – and by GLBA’s
supporters – that Glass-Steagall’s repeal would usher in a new era of
greater economic prosperity and financial stability while avoiding any
extension of the federal safety net beyond the traditional banking
system. 617 GLBA’s opponents proved to be highly prescient when
they warned that TBTF bailouts of large financial conglomerates
would almost certainly occur if Congress repealed Glass-Steagall. On
the evening when the House of Representatives passed GLBA,
Congressman Dingell declared:
[W]hat we are creating now is a group of institutions
which are too big to fail. . . . Taxpayers are going to be
called upon to cure the failures we are creating tonight,
and it is going to cost a lot of money, and it is coming.
Just be prepared for those events.618
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, two leading proponents of
universal banking admitted that TBTF bailouts were the price that
society must pay to secure the elusive benefits of global universal
banks. In a private interview, Robert Rubin stated: “Too big to fail
isn’t a problem with the system. It is the system. You can’t be a
competitive global financial institution serving global corporations of
scale without having a certain scale yourself.
The bigger
multinationals get, the bigger financial institutions will have to get.”619
In testimony before a House of Lords subcommittee in 2014,
HSBC chairman Douglas Flint acknowledged that universal banks
received an “implicit subsidy” during the financial crisis. 620 The
public “subsidy” for universal banks resulted from the fact that
“investment banking operations were alongside society’s deposits,
616

See Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 194, at 256–73; Wilmarth,
Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 957–59, 978–79, 1041–42.
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Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 22, at 70–72, 132–37.
618
145 CONG. REC. H11,542 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Dingell);
see also 145 CONG. REC. S13, 896–97 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Dorgan, expressing a similar warning).
619
DAVID ROTHKOPF, POWER, INC., THE EPIC RIVALRY BETWEEN BIG BUSINESS
AND GOVERNMENT––AND THE RECKONING THAT LIES AHEAD 266 (2012) (quoting
an undated private interview with Mr. Rubin).
620
Wilmarth, The Financial Industry’s Plan for Resolving Failed Megabanks
Will Ensure Future Bailouts for Wall Street, 50 GA. L. REV. 43, 78 (2015)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Financial Industry's Plan] (quoting Douglas Flint’s testimony
on Oct. 21, 2014, before Subcommittee A (Economic & Financial Affairs) of the
Select Committee on the European Union of the U.K. House of Lords).
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[and] there was an implicit underwriting of the debt within the
[combined] operation because one would not risk the systemic panic
that would happen if people thought their deposits were at risk.”621
According to Flint, that “subsidy” is an inevitable charge that
“society” must pay to maintain a financial system that includes large
universal banks: “At the end of the day, the burden of failure [of a
universal bank] rests with society. Whether you take it out of
society’s future income through taxation or whether you take it out
through their pensions or savings, society is bearing the cost.”622
I have argued elsewhere that we must reject the TBTF “price” of
universal banks, or we will continue to pay that price during future
financial crises.623 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
GLBA’s supporters assured the American people that they would not
pay such a price, while GLBA’s opponents correctly predicted that
TBTF bailouts of financial holding companies were virtually certain to
occur if Congress repealed Glass-Steagall.624
D. Congress Enacted CFMA to Provide “Legal Certainty” for
OTC Derivatives
The final element of the deregulation campaign pursued by large
financial institutions was to insulate their OTC derivatives activities
from substantive regulation by the CFTC or SEC.625 Markets for OTC
derivatives expanded rapidly during the 1990s, and those markets
became much larger in volume than markets for exchange-traded
derivatives.626 The largest U.S. banks and securities dealers controlled
about forty percent of the global OTC derivatives market in 1998.627
Derivatives activities produced $46 billion of revenues for U.S. bank
dealers between 1996 and 2000 and accounted for six percent of the
total revenues of the seven largest bank dealers during that period.628
However, as described above, the ability of OTC derivatives to escape
621

Id. (same).
Id. at 64 (same).
623
See Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 22, at 132, 136–37.
624
See Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 973–75.
625
See infra notes 651–54, 667, 711, 746–55 and accompanying text.
626
PWGFM, Over-the-Counter Derivatives, supra note 258, at 4 (stating that
the total notional value of OTC derivatives reached $80 trillion in 1998, compared
with $13.5 trillion for exchange-traded futures and options); see also Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 25, at 334 n.489 (stating that the total notional value of
OTC derivatives grew from $7 trillion in 1989 to $88 trillion at the end of 1999).
627
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res., Financial Derivatives: Remarks
Before the Futures Industry Association (Mar. 19, 1999).
628
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 337.
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most types of regulation depended on a tenuous exemption approved
by the CFTC in 1993.629
The explosive growth of derivatives markets after the mid-1980s
was accompanied by numerous warning signs about their risks.630 The
first danger signal occurred when “portfolio insurance” failed during
the stock market crash of October 1987.631 Portfolio insurance was a
derivatives-based hedging strategy that was “designed to protect a
stock portfolio from dropping below a prespecified floor value.” 632
Portfolio insurance used short sales of exchange-traded stock index
futures to offset declines in stock prices.633 Portfolio insurance was
the harbinger of a “brave new world of synthetic instruments [based
on] dynamic trading strategies.”634
Portfolio insurance had “all the potential pitfalls of any hedging
strategy,” because it depended on accurate predictions of future market
volatility as well as a “liquid” market. 635 When the stock market
began to crash in October 1987, portfolio insurance triggered huge
volumes of sell orders for stock index futures, and liquidity quickly
disappeared in the futures markets. 636 There was very little buyer
demand for stock index futures, and the collapse of prices for stock
index futures helped to drive down prices in the stock market. 637
“Many observers, including the Brady Commission, concluded that
portfolio insurance increased the severity of the crash by magnifying
selling pressures in both the stock market and the futures markets.”638
During the 1990s, numerous scandals and large trading losses
connected to OTC derivatives raised even greater public concerns.639
The Fed’s unexpected decision to increase short-term interest rates in
629

See supra notes 273–75 and accompanying text (discussing the CFTC’s 1993
exemption rule).
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Kent Cherny & Ben R. Craig, Reforming the Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Market: What’s to Be Gained?, CLEVELAND FED. RESERVE (July 7, 2010)
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economiccommentary/economic-commentary-archives/2010-economic-commentaries/ec201006-reforming-the-over-the-counter-derivatives-market-whats-to-be-gained.aspx.
631
Mark Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a
Discussion of the Federal Reserve Response 1, 15–16 (Nov. 2006),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf.
632
RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE
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Id. at 14.
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Carlson, supra note 631, at 16.
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1994 inflicted large losses on a wide variety of institutional investors
who bought highly-leveraged OTC interest-rate derivatives from bank
dealers. 640 Gibson Greetings, Procter & Gamble, and several other
companies sued Bankers Trust, alleging that the bank sold them
complex interest-rate derivatives without disclosing the embedded
risks.641 Bankers Trust paid more than $250 million to settle those
lawsuits and to cover civil penalties assessed by the CFTC and SEC.642
Similarly, Orange County, California sued Merrill Lynch after losing
$1.6 billion on highly-leveraged interest-rate derivatives purchased
from Merrill.643 Merrill ultimately paid $470 million to settle civil,
criminal, and SEC claims related to the Orange County debacle.644 In
1995, Barings Bank, a prominent U.K. investment bank, failed after
losing more than $1.4 billion on speculative derivatives trades made
by Nicholas Leeson, the general manager of Barings’ Singapore
subsidiary.645
The foregoing events and other derivatives-related problems
attracted the attention of policymakers. The U.S. General Accounting
Office issued a study warning that OTC derivatives could create
serious systemic hazards due to the high concentration of OTC
derivatives exposures within a small group of large banks and
securities firms, as well as regulatory gaps and weaknesses. 646
Members of Congress introduced four bills calling for stronger
regulation of OTC derivatives.647
In response to this threat of federal regulation, the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and its allies sprang into
action. ISDA represented the major banks and securities firms that
were large dealers in OTC derivatives, as well as leading corporate
640
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Rise?, ECONOMIST BLOG (Mar. 22, 2011),
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See id. at 364–65.
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supra note 25, at 332–35, 354, 368 (discussing findings made by the GAO and other
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end-users and institutional investors. 648 ISDA’s chairman, Mark
Brickell, was a JPMC executive.649 Brickell had unlimited faith in the
wisdom of markets, and he once said, “I am a great believer in the
self-healing power of markets. . . [m]arkets can correct excess far
better than any government. Market discipline is the best form of
discipline there is.”650
Brickell and ISDA launched a “tenacious campaign” to block any
regulation of OTC derivatives, and ISDA’s efforts received strong
support from the Clinton Administration and Alan Greenspan. 651
ISDA and other big-bank trade associations argued that regulation of
OTC derivatives would impose unwarranted costs and stifle
innovations in risk management by financial institutions.652 Echoing
ISDA’s themes, Greenspan warned Congress against passing
legislation that would create “a regulatory regime that is itself
ineffective and that diminishes the effectiveness of market
discipline.”653 ISDA blocked all four proposed bills dealing with OTC
derivatives, thereby achieving “one of the most startling triumphs for a
Wall Street lobbying campaign in the twentieth century.”654
Derivatives problems persisted, however. Dealers and end-users
suffered significant derivatives-related losses during the Mexican and
East Asian crises of 1995 and 1997. 655 For example, JPMC paid
almost $600 million to settle lawsuits brought by several Korean banks
and securities firms after they incurred large losses on OTC currency
swaps they bought from JPMC.656
*********************************************
In 1998, a new regulatory threat appeared. At a contentious
meeting in April, CFTC Chairman Brooksley Born received strong
warnings from Greenspan, Rubin, and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
not to proceed with her plan to consider new regulations for OTC
648
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derivatives. 657 Despite that warning, the CFTC issued a “Concept
Release” in May 1998. 658 The Concept Release requested public
comment on whether the CFTC should consider issuing new rules for
OTC derivatives.659
The Concept Release stated that the CFTC did not have any
“preconceived result in mind.”660 However, the CFTC pointed out that
“the explosive growth in the OTC market in recent years has been
accompanied by an increase in the number and size of losses even
among large and sophisticated users” of derivatives.661 Those losses
and other problems indicated “the need to review the current
exemptions” for OTC derivatives under the CFTC’s 1993 rule, and to
consider whether the CFTC should modify those exemptions in order
“to enhance the fairness, financial integrity, and efficiency of this
market.”662
Rubin, Greenspan, and Levitt responded to the Concept Release by
issuing a “blistering” joint statement.663 The three officials expressed
“grave concerns” about the Concept Release, and they “seriously
question[ed] the CFTC’s jurisdiction in this area.” 664 The three
officials were “very concerned” that the Concept Release would
“increase the legal uncertainty concerning certain types of OTC
derivatives.”665
Despite the strong opposition voiced by Rubin, Greenspan, and
Levitt, Brooksley Born refused to withdraw the CFTC’s Concept
Release.666 ISDA and its allies immediately began to lobby Congress
for legislation that would impose a moratorium on the CFTC’s
authority to regulate OTC derivatives.667 The Treasury, Fed, and SEC
657
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eagerly supported the proposed moratorium. At a Senate hearing in
July 1998, Treasury Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers declared
that the “dramatic growth of the [OTC] market in recent years is
testament not merely to the dynamism of modern financial markets but
to the benefits that derivatives provide for American businesses.”668
Summers argued that the CFTC’s Concept Release “cast the shadow
of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market” and
created “the risk that the U.S. will see its leadership position in
derivatives erode” as dealers and end-users moved their derivatives
activities to foreign countries.669 He maintained that there was “no
clear evidence of a need for additional regulation of the institutional
OTC derivatives market,” because “parties to these kinds of
contract[s] are largely sophisticated financial institutions that would
appear to be eminently capable of protecting themselves from fraud
and counterparty insolvencies and . . . are already subject to basic
safety and soundness regulation under existing banking and securities
laws.”670
Greenspan testified at the same Senate hearing, and he fully
concurred with Summers’ views.671 Greenspan contended that “aside
from safety and soundness regulation of derivatives dealers under the
banking or securities laws, regulation of derivatives transactions that
are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary.” 672 To
support that claim, Greenspan declared:
Professional counterparties to privately negotiated
contracts . . . have demonstrated their ability to protect
themselves from losses from fraud and counterparty
insolvencies. They have managed credit risks quite
effectively through careful evaluation of counterparties,
the setting of internal credit limits, and judicious use of
netting and collateral agreements. In particular, they
have insisted that dealers have financial strength
sufficient to warrant a credit rating of A or higher.673
668
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Two months later, the crisis surrounding Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) revealed that Summers’ and Greenspan’s faith
in the effectiveness of market discipline for OTC derivatives was
completely unfounded. 674 LTCM, a prominent hedge fund, was
founded in 1994 by “a dazzling array of partners,” including Nobel
Prize laureates Myron Scholes and Robert Merton.675 Together with
Fischer Black, Scholes and Merton pioneered “the modern option
pricing and risk management theories” that underlay much of the OTC
derivatives market. 676 LTCM's other founders included former Fed
vice chairman David Mullins and John Meriweather, the leader of
Salomon Brothers’ “legendary” bond-trading team during the
1980s.677 Meriweather recruited several members of that team to join
him at LTCM.678
LTCM produced large profits between 1994 and 1997 by using
highly-leveraged, speculative trading strategies that relied heavily on
OTC derivatives. 679 LTCM’s profits “caused the fund's investors,
lenders, and counterparties to ask few questions about the risks
inherent in its capital position and trading strategy.”680 In early 1998,
LTCM held about $5 billion in equity capital, while “its huge
investment portfolio included $125 billion of securities, including
large amounts of debt securities borrowed from commercial and
investment banks under repurchase agreements and derivatives having
aggregate notional values of $1.25 trillion.”681
LTCM’s “primary strategy” during 1998 was to make
innovation of American capital markets,” and he argued that Congress should block
any attempt by the CFTC to regulate OTC derivatives because “imposition of new
regulatory costs also may stifle innovation and push transactions offshore.”
Testimony of Chairman Arthur Levitt Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, concerning the Regulation of the Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Market and Hybrid Instruments (July 30, 1998), 1998 WL 468780
(S.E.C.).
674
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Banking and Financial Services (Mar. 24, 1999) 1999 WL 179223 (stating that
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“‘convergence-arbitrage’ trades, in which it sought to take advantage
of . . . pricing discrepancies between higher-risk, private-sector debt
securities and lower-risk government bonds in both domestic and
overseas markets.”682 LTCM expected that global market conditions
would improve in 1998, due to the positive effects of rescue programs
organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and major
industrial nations for East Asian countries that encountered severe
difficulties in 1997. 683 LTCM believed that credit spreads between
risky and “safe” bonds would narrow in 1998, and the fund also
“aggressively sold equity options because it believed that volatility in
the equity markets would decline.”684 The fund's traders based their
trading positions on “value at risk” (VAR) models derived from
Scholes’ and Merton’s theoretical work.685 LTCM’s models indicated
that disruptive events like a sovereign bond default or a stock market
crash were very unlikely to occur in 1998.686
In August 1998, Russia devalued the ruble and defaulted on debt
owed to foreign creditors.687 The IMF did not intervene with a rescue
package, as many market participants expected. 688
Russia’s
devaluation and debt default “triggered a global ‘flight to quality’ as
investors frantically sought to buy ‘safe’ and highly liquid securities
(especially U.S. treasury bonds) while unloading their positions in
illiquid, high-risk securities or related derivatives. Yield spreads
between high-risk and low-risk debt securities widened dramatically,
and the volatility of equity markets soared.”689 Those events dealt “a
fatal blow to LTCM’s ‘convergence’ strategy” and doomed the
fund.690 Scholes later admitted that “the VAR models used by LTCM
and other major financial institutions had failed to anticipate the
‘liquidity risk’ that suddenly appeared in August 1998.”691
By mid-September, LTCM had lost $4.4 billion of its capital and
682
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appealed to the Fed for help.692 The Fed concluded that “a failure by
LTCM to fulfill its derivatives contracts and securities repurchase
agreements could paralyze global financial markets” by setting off a
“chain reaction of failures among large [derivatives] dealers” as well
as panicked, “fire-sale” liquidations of securities and other financial
assets connected to OTC derivatives. 693 Federal regulators also
determined that a number of major banks and securities firms had
engaged in “herd behavior” by attempting to copy LTCM’s trades, and
those institutions were exposed to the same types of losses that
crippled LTCM. 694 Regulators feared that LTCM’s failure could
create a systemic crisis in global financial markets and could threaten
the survival of large banks and securities firms.695
To forestall such a crisis, the Fed took the extraordinary action of
cutting short-term interest rates three times in seven weeks.696 The
Fed also arranged an emergency rescue of LTCM by fourteen of the
largest U.S. banks and securities firms.697 The rescue group injected
$3.6 billion of new capital into LTCM in return for ninety percent of
the fund’s equity.698 The LTCM debacle confirmed “prior warnings
that the rapid growth of OTC derivatives would aggravate systemic
risk in the financial markets.”699 The LTCM crisis also demonstrated
that neither regulators nor market participants understood the location,
magnitude, or potential correlations of LTCM’s risk exposures in OTC
derivatives.700 The near collapse of AIG in 2008 revealed the same
type of risk assessment failures by regulators and market
participants.701
The 1998 financial crisis inflicted severe losses on Citigroup,
BofA, Bankers Trust, and a number of other domestic and foreign
financial conglomerates. 702 Given the weakened condition of large
692
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financial institutions and the highly-stressed circumstances in many
financial markets, the Fed felt obliged to take extraordinary measures
to prevent the crisis from becoming a full-fledged global financial
panic.703
In my view, the 1998 crisis should be viewed as a precursor and
dress rehearsal for the global financial crisis of 2007–09. However,
market participants and policymakers failed to apply the lessons they
should have learned from the 1998 crisis, and they did not build
adequate defenses to deal with the next decade’s crisis. A 2011 study
determined that large banks and securities firms that suffered the
greatest declines in stock market value during the 1998 crisis also
recorded the worst stock market performances in 2007 and 2008.704
Thus, large financial institutions that incurred severe losses in 1998
“d[id] not appear to subsequently alter the[ir] business model or to
become more cautious regarding their risk culture” prior to the
outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007.705 The extraordinary
measures that the Fed took in 1998 to stabilize financial markets and
to help rescue LTCM may have caused large banks and securities
firms to believe that they did not need to change their business models
or risk profiles.706 They may well have expected that the Fed would
intervene to protect major financial firms during any similar future
crisis.707
Similarly, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission determined
that the 1998 financial crisis (i) did not persuade large financial
institutions to make any significant changes in the high-risk strategies
that caused them to incur severe losses in 1998, and (ii) did not cause
financial regulators to insist on such changes by the institutions they
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supervised. 708 A reasonable observer might well conclude that the
1998 crisis was the dead canary in the mine, or the tree falling in the
forest, that advocates of “financial modernization” were determined
neither to see nor hear.
*********************************************
Someone who knew nothing about the politics of OTC derivatives
might reasonably assume that the LTCM debacle would have caused
the Clinton Administration and Congress to join with Brooksley Born
in crafting new regulations to control the risks of OTC derivatives. Of
course, nothing like that happened. Only a few policymakers publicly
agreed with Born that LTCM’s collapse demonstrated the need for
new rules governing OTC derivatives. 709 Opponents of stronger
regulation dismissed any connection between LTCM’s failure and
either (i) LTCM’s enormous positions in OTC derivatives or (ii) the
absence of regulation for OTC derivatives.710 The derivatives lobby
“besieged Congress with appeals” to block the CFTC from adopting
any new regulations for OTC derivatives, and Congress quickly
imposed a temporary moratorium on such measures.711
708
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Congress requested reports on the LTCM crisis and the regulation
of OTC derivatives from the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets (PWGFM or the Working Group). 712 The Working Group
included the heads of the Treasury, Fed, SEC, and CFTC.713 Before
the Working Group issued its reports, Greenspan staked out his
position in a speech he presented to a derivatives trade group in March
1999. 714 In that speech, Greenspan declared that OTC derivatives
represented “[b]y far the most significant development in finance
during the past decade.” 715 He praised OTC derivatives for
“enhanc[ing] the process of wealth creation” by creating the “ability to
differentiate risk and allocate it to those investors most able and
willing to take it.”716 He also lauded “the profitability of derivative
products” for boosting the earnings of major banks and for
contributing to “the significant gain in the overall finance industry’s
share of American corporate output during the past decade.”717
Greenspan acknowledged that losses from derivatives “rose to
record levels in the third quarter of 1998.”718 However, he argued,
“[d]erivative instruments were bystanders [and] were scarcely the
major players” during the 1998 crisis.719 He also contended that “there
are fundamental strengths in [the derivatives] markets,” and “there has
not been a significant downturn in the economy overall that has tested
the resilience of derivatives markets.” 720 Greenspan’s speech never
specifically mentioned either LTCM or the emergency rescue of
LTCM arranged by the Fed.721
Statement of Senator Dick Lugar, supra note 710; Faiola et al., supra note 663.
712
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Greenspan also admitted that the standard VAR models used by derivatives dealers
and end-users did not predict the losses that they incurred during the East Asian and
Russian crises of 1997–98. Greenspan noted that VAR models did not capture “the
extreme negative tail that reflects the probability of occurrence of a panic.”
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Given the substance and tone of Greenspan’s speech, it is not
surprising that both of the Working Group’s reports minimized the
role played by derivatives in LTCM’s failure, and the second report
recommended a sweeping deregulation of OTC derivatives. 722 The
Working Group’s first report, issued in April 1999, assigned primary
blame for LTCM’s “near collapse” to its “excessive leverage,” and the
report described LTCM’s massive positions in OTC and exchangegraded derivatives only in general terms, with relatively few details.723
The report focused mainly on LTCM’s “opaqueness and low degree of
external monitoring,” which resulted from (i) the “minimal scrutiny”
of LTCM’s risk profile and trading strategies by investors, creditors,
and counterparties, and (ii) the “minimal information” that LTCM
provided to those parties.724
The Working Group determined that “none of [LTCM’s] investors,
creditors, or counterparties provided an effective check on its overall
activities.”725 The report also concluded that “[t]he risk management
weaknesses revealed by the LTCM episode were not unique to
LTCM” and also occurred, “albeit to a lesser degree, in . . . investment
and commercial banks.” 726 Thus, the Working Group’s first report
revealed that market discipline failed to restrain excessive risk-taking
by LTCM and also failed to protect leading banks and securities from
suffering heavy losses.727 Nevertheless, the Working Group declared
that market discipline should remain the “primary mechanism that
regulates risk-taking by firms in a market economy.” 728 In the
Working Group's view, “market discipline of risk-taking is the rule
and government regulation is the exception. . . . Any resort to
government regulation should have a clear purpose and should be
banks to enhance their risk modeling procedures[.]” Id. In his 1999 derivatives
speech, as on so many other occasions, Greenspan expressed a strong preference for
a supervisory approach that relied primarily on the internal risk management
procedures of banks as well as market discipline. Id.; see also Alan Greenspan,
Remarks at the International Conference of Banking Supervisors (June 13, 1996)
(stating that “the same technology and innovation that is driving supervisors to focus
on [bank] management processes will, through the development of market structures
and responses, do much of our job of ensuring safety and soundness. We should be
careful not to impeded the process.”).
722
See generally PWGFM, Hedge Funds, supra note 681 (discussing LTCM);
PWGFM, Over-the-Counter Derivatives, supra note 258 (urging Congress to
deregulate OTC derivatives).
723
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carefully evaluated in order to avoid unintended outcomes.”729
The Working Group's first report acknowledged that LTCM “held
very substantial OTC derivatives positions related to reference assets
that were not actively traded” and for which there “was little liquidity
. . . even under normal circumstances.”730 The report also pointed out
that LTCM’s counterparties would have faced significant losses if
LTCM had defaulted on OTC derivatives that were “illiquid” and
“difficult to hedge or liquidate.” 731 However, the report did not
recommend any new substantive rules to address the risks created by
high concentrations of illiquid OTC derivatives held by either dealers
or end-users.732
The Working Group’s strong ideological commitment to market
discipline –– in the face of abundant evidence showing that such
discipline failed in 1998 –– helps to explain why its first report did not
recommend any new substantive controls for OTC derivatives.
Instead, the report recommended measures to “constrain excessive
leverage” through enhanced disclosures and improved risk
management practices. 733 In keeping with the Working Group’s
distaste for substantive regulation, the report rejected any “direct
constraints on leverage” and instead called for better “credit-risk
management.”734
The Working Group’s second report, issued in November 1999,
urged Congress to approve a comprehensive deregulation of OTC
derivatives.735 In cover letters addressed to congressional leaders, the
Working Group lauded the benefits of OTC derivatives and warned
that the dominant position of U.S. derivatives dealers would be
threatened unless Congress removed the “cloud of legal uncertainty”
that surrounded OTC derivatives:
729
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One of the most dramatic changes in the world of
finance during the past fifteen years has been the
extraordinary development of the markets for financial
derivatives.
Over-the-counter derivatives have
transformed the world of finance, increasing the range
of financial products available to corporations and
investors and fostering more precise ways of
understanding, quantifying, and managing risk . . .
A cloud of legal uncertainty has hung over the OTC
derivatives markets in the United States in recent years,
which, if not addressed, could discourage innovation
and growth in these important markets and damage
U.S. leadership in these arenas by driving transactions
off-shore.736
The Working Group called on Congress to exclude OTC
derivatives between “sophisticated counterparties” from regulation by
the CFTC under the CEA, whether the transactions were completed
through privately-negotiated transactions or electronic trading systems
or other clearing systems. 737 The report also recommended
exemptions from CFTC regulation for most “hybrid instruments,”
including deposits or securities that contained features similar to
swaps, forwards, options, or futures.738 The Working Group declared
that the proposed exemptions were essential to remove “legal
uncertainty” about OTC derivatives and to “provide a permanent
clarification of the legal status of these instruments.”739
Echoing arguments previously made by Greenspan and Summers,
the Working Group’s second report contended that “sophisticated
counterparties” in OTC derivatives transactions did not need
regulatory protection because most dealers were already subject to
adequate supervision by bank regulators, the SEC, or the CFTC.740
The report also maintained that “[m]ost OTC derivatives are not
susceptible to manipulation” because their payoffs were based on an
underlying “rate or price determined by a separate, highly liquid
market.”741 The report further claimed that derivatives did not affect
prices in other markets because “prices established in OTC derivatives
736
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transactions do not serve a significant price discovery function.” 742
The Working Group's conclusions that OTC derivatives did not need
to be regulated, could not be used for manipulative purposes, and
would not affect prices in related markets proved to be very grave
miscalculations.
Like its first report, the Working Group's second report stated that
regulators should rely on “private counterparty discipline” as the
“primary mechanism” for ensuring that OTC derivatives dealers did
not create “systemic risk.”743 Despite the first report's conclusion that
market discipline failed to restrain highly-leveraged and speculative
risk-taking by LTCM, the second report asserted that “private
counterparty credit risk management has been employed effectively by
both regulated and unregulated dealers of OTC derivatives, and the
tools required by federal regulators [to supplement market discipline]
already exist.” 744 Except for two brief references, the Working
Group's second report did not mention LTCM and did not contain any
discussion of lessons learned from the LTCM crisis.745 It appeared
that members of the Working Group had already expunged the LTCM
fiasco from their collective memories.
*********************************************
Armed with the support provided by the Working Group's second
report, the derivatives industry and its political allies mounted a
successful campaign to enact CFMA.746 The only significant question
742
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was how broad the scope of CFMA’s deregulation should be. Senator
Phil Gramm was not satisfied with the bills that emerged from House
and Senate committees.747 Those bills excluded OTC derivatives from
regulation by the CFTC, but Gramm was greatly concerned that the
SEC might attempt to regulate OTC derivatives. 748 Gramm put an
extended hold on the legislation until congressional leaders and the
Clinton Administration agreed on a final bill that was acceptable to
him.749 Under CFMA’s final version, OTC derivatives entered into by
financial institutions, corporate end-users, institutional investors, or
wealthy individuals were excluded from all substantive regulation by
either the CFTC or SEC. 750 In addition, OTC derivatives were
protected from regulation under state laws.751 The CFTC and SEC
retained only a very limited authority to bring enforcement actions for
fraud or manipulation on a case-by-case basis.752
The Working Group strongly endorsed the final version of CFMA.
The Working Group praised CFMA for preserving the “competitive
position” of the United States in OTC derivatives markets, and for
“providing legal certainty and promoting innovation, transparency and
efficiency in our financial markets.”753
Senator Gramm agreed that CFMA would provide “legal
certainty” for OTC derivatives. 754 In addition, he argued, CFMA
“completes the work of [GLBA]” and “protects financial institutions
from over-regulation.”755 Gramm declared that GLBA and CFMA had
dismantled the post-New Deal system of financial regulation and
established a new regime of comprehensive deregulation, which would
enable U.S. financial institutions to dominate global financial markets:
end-users).
747
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Taken together with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the
work of this Congress will be seen as a watershed,
where we turned away from the outmoded Depressionera approach to financial regulation and adopted a
framework that will position our financial services
industries to be world leaders into the new century.756
IV.CONCLUSION
Riegle-Neal, GLBA and CFMA were highly consequential laws.
Those three laws allowed large banks to become much bigger and
more complex, and to undertake a much wider array of high-risk
activities. They transformed the U.S. financial industry from a
decentralized system of independent financial sectors, with specialized
financial institutions, into a highly consolidated industry dominated by
large financial conglomerates. The big-bank lobby and its political
allies secured passage of Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA through a
carefully-planned campaign, and not by accident. All three laws
reflected an ideology of comprehensive deregulation, and they
provided a blueprint for light-touch supervision based on a declared
faith in the wisdom and self-healing properties of untrammeled
financial markets.
The prevailing ideology of deregulation was clearly articulated in
the 1991 Treasury report as well as public interviews, speeches, and
testimony by policymakers like Phil Gramm, Alan Greenspan, Robert
Rubin, and Lawrence Summers, and financial industry leaders like
Walter Wriston and Sandy Weill. The ideology of deregulation was
not consistent, and it was arguably disingenuous. Policymakers and
industry leaders recognized that large financial conglomerates were
likely to benefit from (i) transfers of federal safety-net subsidies from
conglomerate-owned banks to their securities and insurance affiliates,
and (ii) the TBTF subsidy. However, whenever Congress or federal
regulators faced a choice between limiting the spread of public
subsidies or granting more profit-making opportunities to big banks
and Wall Street, the big banks and Wall Street almost always
prevailed.757
The ideology of deregulation clearly served the interests of large
financial institutions, and their power and influence grew in response
to all three statutes. Riegle-Neal enabled the largest banks to expand
756
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throughout the nation, thereby increasing their political advantage over
smaller banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.758 Major
securities firms and insurance companies joined the campaign to enact
GLBA when they realized they could not prevent big banks from
extending their reach into securities and insurance markets. All three
financial sectors supported CFMA because it allowed the largest
financial institutions to conduct their OTC derivatives businesses free
of any substantive regulation. The enactment of GLBA and CFMA in
consecutive years showed just how powerful the emerging financial
conglomerates had become.759
I disagree with scholars who contend that GLBA and CFMA did
not play important roles in promoting the reckless credit boom that led
to the financial crisis. Those analysts maintain that GLBA and CFMA
merely ratified what federal regulators and courts had already done in
permitting large financial institutions to expand the scope of their
financial activities before 1999.760 As discussed above in Part II.B,
regulators and courts issued rulings during the 1980s and 1990s that
opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s structural barriers
and granted exemptions from regulation for OTC derivatives. 761
However, those loopholes and exemptions rested on highly contestable
legal interpretations and could have been reversed by either regulators
or the courts. In addition, the drafters of the 1991 Treasury plan and
advocates for GLBA and CFMA argued that the loopholes and
exemptions were incomplete, burdensome, inefficient, and
unacceptable.762
The proponents of GLBA and CFMA declared that both statutes
were urgently needed to provide “legal certainty” for a deregulated
regime of universal banking that could (i) incorporate all types of
financial activities within a “one-stop shopping” platform, and (ii)
offer a full range of OTC derivatives without any substantive
regulation by the CFTC or SEC.763 It is highly unlikely that the largest
financial institutions and their trade associations would have pursued a
twenty-year legislative campaign, involving hundreds of millions of
dollars in lobbying expenses and political campaign contributions, if
they had viewed GLBA and CFMA as insignificant laws. The
758
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evidence clearly points to the contrary conclusion: namely, that big
banks and Wall Street firms viewed GLBA and CFMA as essential
components of their strategy to build giant financial conglomerates
that could dominate domestic and global financial markets by
exploiting their TBTF status and associated public subsidies.764
One very tangible way to confirm the significance of GLBA and
CFMA is to see how quickly the financial industry changed in
response to those statutes. GLBA expanded the previously-authorized
securities and insurance activities of banking organizations by
allowing banks to establish full-scale affiliations with securities firms
and insurance companies. 765 GLBA’s first major dividend for big
banks was to validate Citigroup’s universal banking strategy. 766
Without GLBA, Citigroup would have been forced to divest major
segments of its nonbanking activities, and other banks could not have
copied Citigroup’s business model.
GLBA created a second
immediate benefit for big banks by permitting them to convert their
limited Section 20 securities subsidiaries into full-service securities
broker-dealers with many fewer operational constraints. 767 A year
after GLBA’s enactment, a federal regulator observed, “Loopholes
cost money . . . A top bank told me [GLBA] was a major boost to their
bottom line.”768
GLBA’s endorsement for Citigroup’s universal banking model
quickly led to the creation of similar financial conglomerates. In
2000, Credit Suisse and UBS acquired large U.S. securities firms
(Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and Paine Webber), and Chase merged
with JPMC to form a commercial and investment banking giant.769
Meanwhile, Deutsche Bank completed its acquisition of Bankers Trust
(a U.S. bank with significant investment banking activities) in 1999.770
The top securities firms responded to the emergence of universal
banks with their own consolidation and diversification strategies.
Morgan Stanley merged with Dean Witter in 1997, while the four
other major securities firms –– Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs,
764
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Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns –– also grew rapidly in the late
1990s and early 2000s.771 By 2004, the “Big Five” securities firms
held combined assets of $2.5 trillion, compared with $4.7 trillion of
assets held by the five largest U.S. banks.772
The four largest securities firms (all except Bear Stearns)
complemented their securities activities with deposit-taking and
lending by acquiring FDIC-insured thrifts and industrial banks
(institutions that were not subject to BHCA’s ownership
restrictions).773 Deposit-taking and lending allowed securities firms to
obtain low-cost, government-subsidized funding and to compete more
directly with large banks by providing credit to consumers and
businesses. By 2006, the four largest securities firms had become “de
facto universal banks.”774 Meanwhile, CFMA enabled leading banks
and securities firms to deal in an extensive array of OTC derivatives,
including CDS and synthetic CDOs.775
As I have shown in previous work, a group of eighteen domestic
and foreign financial conglomerates “dominated global and U.S.
markets for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured
financial products, and OTC derivatives” by 2007. 776 That group
(which I have called the “big eighteen”) included the four largest U.S.
banks (BofA, Citigroup, JPMC, and Wachovia), the “Big Five” U.S.
securities firms, the largest U.S. insurer (AIG), and eight foreign
universal banks (Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, HSBC, RBS, Société Générale, and UBS). 777 The “big
eighteen” became the “epicenter” of the global financial crisis, as they
accounted for three-fifths of the $1.5 trillion of worldwide losses
recorded by financial institutions from mid-2007 through the spring of
2010. 778 Of the “big eighteen,” only Lehman failed outright, but
twelve other institutions received massive amounts of financial
assistance from government authorities in the United States, United
771
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Kingdom (UK), and European Union (EU).779
The ten American members of the “big eighteen” could never have
achieved their size and scope in 2007 without the enactment of at least
one of the three statutes (Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA) discussed
in this article. Similarly, the eight foreign universal banks greatly
expanded their size and scope in the UK, EU, and the United States in
response to deregulation that occurred in all three regions.780 As Barry
Eichengreen has observed, “[t]he result of [Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and
CFMA] was a massive increase in the size, complexity, and leverage
of US financial institutions. . . . [¶] And what was true of banks in the
United States was similarly true of banks elsewhere, notably in
Europe.”781
A second way to confirm the very significant impact of GLBA and
CFMA is to consider the explosive growth that occurred in markets for
“shadow bank deposits,” securitization, and OTC derivatives after
2000. The volume of outstanding MMMFs increased from $1.8
trillion in 2000 to $3.8 trillion in 2007, and the commercial paper
market grew from $1.3 trillion to $2 trillion during the same period.782
Outstanding repos at securities broker-dealers (including affiliates of
banks) rose from $2.5 trillion to $3.5 trillion between 2002 and 2007,
while outstanding structured-finance securities issued in private-label
securitizations expanded from $1.6 trillion to $5 trillion between 2001
and 2006.783 Most dramatically, the aggregate notional values of OTC
derivatives in global markets exploded from $95 trillion in 2000 to
$673 trillion in mid-2008, with U.S. financial institutions accounting
for about two-fifths of that market.784 It seems highly improbable that
779
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such dramatic growth could have occurred in all of those markets
without the far-reaching deregulation authorized by GLBA and
CFMA.785
John Reed and Sandy Weill, who co-founded Citigroup,
subsequently renounced their brainchild.786 Reed apologized in 2009
for his role in creating Citigroup and said that Congress made a
mistake when it repealed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.787 In a 2013
interview, Reed explained that “the greatest problem [in Citigroup]
was of clashing cultures” between traders and commercial bankers.788
As the trading culture expanded, it was “infectious” and became the
“more dominant” ethos within Citigroup. 789 The trading culture
“made risk harder to control,” and the complexity of Citigroup made it
“harder to manage.” 790 Paul Volcker agreed with Reed that the
“cleavage between the culture on the investment banking side of the
house and the traditional lending side of the house” was a “major
worry” caused by universal banks.791
In a 2010 interview, Sandy Weill defended his role as the
“Shatterer of Glass-Steagall.”792 However, his views had changed two
years later.793 During a CNBC interview in 2012, Weill declared that
policymakers should “split up investment banking from banking, have
banks be deposit takers, have banks make commercial loans and real
estate loans, have banks do something that‘s not going to risk the
taxpayer dollars, that‘s not too big to fail.”794 He recommended that
universal banks should be “broken up so that the taxpayer will never
be at risk, the depositors won‘t be at risk, the leverage of the banks
will be something reasonable,” and so that independent investment
banks could “make some mistakes” without causing systemic crises.795
Charles Mitchell, who built the first big universal bank at National
City (Citigroup’s predecessor) during the 1920s, 796 subsequently
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decided that Glass-Steagall served the public interest by separating
commercial banks from securities firms. In testimony before the
Federal Monopoly Committee in December 1939, Mitchell praised
Glass-Steagall as a “great ‘step’ of progress,” even though he had
opposed its enactment in 1933.797 Mitchell told the Committee, “I am
convinced today that if we had gone along with the development of the
securities affiliates [of commercial banks] it would have resulted in [a]
monopoly.”798
The recantations of Reed, Weill, and Mitchell highlight a number
of reasons for restoring structural barriers similar to Glass-Steagall and
the pre-1999 BHCA. Separating banks from the capital markets
would end the culture clash between banking and trading, and it would
also eliminate conflicts of interest that make it impossible for universal
banks to act as impartial allocators of credit and unbiased providers of
investment advice. Separation would stop financial conglomerates
from extending their safety-net subsidies and TBTF guarantees into
the capital markets, thereby distorting prices and promoting excessive
risk-taking in those markets. Restoring Glass-Steagall and the pre1999 BHCA would prevent financial conglomerates from dominating
many sectors of our financial markets by exploiting their public
subsidies and leveraging their unfair cost-of-funding advantages.
Whenever we hear policymakers and financial industry leaders
proclaiming their devotion to “free” financial markets and “market
discipline,” we must remember that our post-GLBA financial system
seriously undermines those principles.799
This article does not include detailed recommendations for
proposed reforms to address the problems created by Riegle-Neal,
GLBA, and CFMA. I have discussed possible reforms in previous
work, 800 and I plan to develop a more complete set of potential
reforms in future work. There are at least two approaches that a new
regime of structural separation could adopt. The first, which I call
“external Glass-Steagall,” would require a complete separation
between banks and the capital markets, similar to the original GlassSteagall Act. The first approach would break up existing financial
conglomerates and prevent the formation of new ones.
The second approach, which I call “internal Glass-Steagall,” would
require financial conglomerates to structure their subsidiary banks as
797
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FDIC-insured “narrow banks,” which would be strictly separated from
their nonbank affiliates. Among other restrictions, conglomerateowned banks could not make any loans or other transfers of funds to
their nonbank affiliates, except for the payment of lawful dividends to
their parent holding companies. 801 An “internal Glass-Steagall”
approach would not force financial conglomerates to break up, but it
would seek to prevent conglomerate-owned banks from transferring
their federal safety-net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. This
approach is similar to “ring-fencing” legislation that the UK adopted
after the financial crisis. 802 An "internal Glass-Steagall" approach
would raise important questions regarding the ability and willingness
of regulators to establish and enforce strong firewalls that would be
effective in preventing the spread of public subsidies from
conglomerate-owned banks to their nonbank affiliates.
At a minimum, as I will discuss in future work, a restoration of
Glass-Steagall-style structural reforms must accomplish two goals.
First, in order to shrink the shadow banking system and reduce the
threat of creditor “runs” in that system, reforms must prohibit
nonbanks from offering deposit substitutes: namely, debt instruments
with very short terms that are payable at par, such as short-term repos
and MMMFs with fixed NAVs of one dollar per share. 803 Second,
reforms must establish a strict separation between FDIC-insured banks
and the capital markets, based on either an “external” or “internal”
Glass-Steagall approach. Those reforms must include a prohibition
that would bar FDIC-insured banks from entering into derivatives
except for those that provide bona fide hedges against risk exposures
arising out of traditional banking activities. 804 Without such a
prohibition, banks would be able to circumvent any structural reforms
by using derivatives to create synthetic substitutes for securities,
futures, options, and insurance (as shown above in Part II.B.3).
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